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Innovation is regarded as a driving force behind national and firm level competitive advantage, 
which leads to higher future earnings and positive long-term abnormal operating performance. 
The financial system also plays an essential role in increasing firm and economic growth. The 
literature supports the notion that better developed financial intermediaries and markets can 
enhance productivity growth and technological innovation. In this thesis, we consider both 
micro (firm-level) and macro (country-level) factors and discuss how they affect innovation 
performance from the perspective of financial literature.  
We specifically emphasise the influence of two factors based on the empirical research on 
international samples. The first is stock liquidity. We provide a deep understanding of these 
factors by exploring how it affects innovation outputs and what impact it has on innovation 
performance. We find that although stock liquidity can affect firm innovation through R&D 
investment, the most impact on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock liquidity 
itself. Besides, while increased stock liquidity improves a firm’s innovation performance, it 
mainly contributes to a firm’s efficiency in producing high-quality patents rather than more 
patents. The second is the pandemic shocks. We demonstrate that following a pandemic, 
innovation output is disrupted for approximately seven years. In addition, the main result of 
the effect of pandemic shocks on aggregate innovation output is driven mainly by a significant 
reduction in innovative activity in the Information and Communication technology sector. 
Overall, we show that financial systems could improve innovation performance by boosting its 
efficiency, such as increasing stock liquidity. It could also affect innovation activities as a 
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Chapter 1 Thesis Introduction  
Innovation is regarded as a driving force behind national and firm level competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1998). Although innovation can be defined differently in different contexts, put simply, 
it is the process of developing new ideas and putting them into practice (Neely and Hii, 1998; 
Tidd and Bessant, 2020). Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) showed that innovation leads 
to new business opportunities and enhances productivity growth. Neely and Hii (1998) 
suggested that innovation enhances the knowledge stock of society. And more importantly, that 
innovation leads to higher future earnings (Ali et al., 2008) and positive long-term abnormal 
operating performance (Eberhart et al., 2008). It is clear that the innovative ability at the firm, 
regional and national level is the key determinant of the wealth generation capability of 
economies (Solow, 1956; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
The financial system also plays an essential role in increasing firm and economic growth 
through its intermediation function, which improves investment efficiency (Goldsmith, 1969; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Schumpeter's (1911) work was one of the earliest pieces of 
research to emphasise the importance of finance in innovation procedures. He argued that 
adequate credit access encourages the widespread adoption of new technologies. An extensive 
literature has also explored the relationship between finance and innovation (see detail in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis). The literature supports the notion that better developed financial 
intermediaries and markets can enhance productivity growth and technological innovation 
(King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Brown et al., 2009).  
In this thesis, we continue the research into the field of finance and innovation. More 
specifically, we investigate factors that may impact on innovation activities from the 




(firm-level) and macro (country-level) factors and discuss how they affect innovation 
performance. 
In Chapter 2, we review the literature around the relationship between financial markets and 
firm innovation from the perspective of primary markets, equity markets and other financial 
markets. Regarding this, we conclude that innovation has several characteristics. First, 
innovation is risk-taking behaviour which involves a substantial probability of failure 
(Holmström, 1989). Second, innovation requires long-term, continuous investment. Manso 
(2011) and Ederer and Manso (2013) revealed that for innovation to perform better there needs 
to be a tolerance of early failures. Third, innovation is a labour-intensive, multi-stage process. 
Ederer (2008) suggested that innovation activities tend to succeed when innovators are 
encouraged to team up with others and are rewarded for long-term joint achievements. Fourth, 
asymmetric information is between investors and firm managers. Adverse selection problems 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) are more likely in R&D-intensive industries because of the inherent 
risk involved in the investment. Ethical problems are also an issue for high-tech firms so many 
find it easier to substitute high-risk projects for low-risk ventures. In addition, Allen and Gale 
(1999) argued that it is usually difficult to evaluate innovative projects because information 
about their prospects is either sparse or hard to process, which often leads to a variety of 
opinions. Aboody and Lev (2000) show that R&D makes a significant contribution to 
asymmetric information between corporate insiders and normal investors, which leads to 
insider trading and gains. A fifth characteristic is a high level of intangible assets. R&D 
investment creates intangible assets for the firm (Johnson and Pazderka, 1993) and leads to a 





In Chapter 3, we merge the patent-based data from the PATSTAT database with firm account 
information from Datastream. This list includes 11,371 company names from 44 countries 
across the period 1990 to 2010. It covers around 42.04% of patents from the PATSTAT 
database and 14.43% of equities from the Datastream database. Overall, we provide a basis for 
global research by which to investigate the innovation performance of public companies. 
In Chapter 4, we study the R&D-patent relationship from the perspective of stock liquidity. 
R&D and patent-based data represent different steps in the innovation process. While R&D 
investments measure inputs in the innovation process (Ashwin et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2018), 
patent-based indicators show the ability to create inventions (Coombs et al., 1996; OECD., 
1997; Flor and Oltra, 2004). Previous literature has investigated the impact of stock liquidity 
on firm innovation (Fang et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018). However, it has largely ignored the 
possibility that stock liquidity could affect firm innovation outputs through R&D investments. 
In terms of this, we propose the first hypothesis, namely that stock liquidity can indirectly affect 
firm innovation outputs through R&D investments. On the one hand, increased stock liquidity 
may improve R&D investment by reducing the cost of raising capital. On the other hand, it 
may impede R&D investment because of the potential threat of hostile takeovers and short-
term institutional investors. Secondly, we hypothesise that stock liquidity could directly affect 
firm innovation outputs. An increase in stock liquidity could improve firm innovation activities 
by reducing asymmetric information between investors and firm managers. In addition, it could 
facilitate the entry of long-term and/or strategic institutional investors, thereby improving a 
firm’s innovation abilities.  
In terms of this, we employ a structure model to introduce high-frequency trading (hereafter, 
HFT) start date as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity. As High-frequency traders mainly 




the top 30 percentile of the largest public companies, by market capitalisation in each exchange. 
Our results show that while stock liquidity causes a significant negative influence on firm R&D 
investment, it is much lighter than the impact on firm innovation outputs. Thus, we argue that 
although stock liquidity can affect firm innovation through R&D investment, the most impact 
on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock liquidity itself. We also show that 
while R&D investment causes larger impacts on firm innovation quantity than stock liquidity, 
it does not significantly improve other patent-based indicators. In addition, we observe that 
stock liquidity significantly improves the patent generality index and originality index. It could 
be an explanation of the positive relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation 
quality. 
In Chapter 5, we focus on the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation 
performance. There is still a debate around what impact stock liquidity has on a firm’s 
innovation outputs. Fang et al. (2014) and Wen et al. (2018) separately investigated the US 
and Chinese markets and obtained the opposite results. This may be due to the different macro 
conditions in the US and China, such as financial structures, economic regulations, and policy 
environment. Regarding this, we employ the hierarchical linear model to separate the within-
country and cross-country impacts of firms’ stock liquidity on their innovative activities 
(Greene, 2003; Griffin et al., 2019).  
Our empirical evidence shows continuously increased positive impacts of stock liquidity on 
firms’ patent-based indicators. Our main findings in this chapter come from the perspective of 
innovation efficiency. We find that while increased stock liquidity improves a firm’s 
innovation performance, it mainly contributes to a firm’s efficiency in producing high-quality 
patents rather than more patents. In addition, from the perspective of the country’s character, 




international trading and economic freedom. Regarding levels of economic freedom across five 
different areas, we find that countries with better protection of people and their rightfully 
acquired property improves firm innovation performance over a longer period than other areas. 
In Chapter 6, we investigate the economic consequences of pandemics from an idea-based 
theory of economic growth. We assume that pandemics pose a threat to research productivity 
and funding channels in the long run. Firstly, the spread of a pandemic tends to cause a rise in 
infection and a rise in the national death toll, thereby decreasing labour supply, whilst 
increasing real wages for each survivor regardless of their contribution to innovation, and 
impeding teamwork. Secondly, we propose that pandemics impede firm innovation activities 
by reducing internal funding. This leads to a drop in a firm’s income and forces managers to 
cut long-term projects  (i.e., R&D) in order to meet short-term earning targets (Bushee, 1998; 
Graham et al., 2005). Thirdly, pandemic spreads tend to decrease firm innovation outputs by 
impeding external fundings. Jordà et al. (2020) showed that the countries tend to experience a 
low natural interest rate in the decades following the pandemic. This is explained through the 
increased precautionary savings and depressed investment opportunities. It implies that firms 
experience financial constraints and work poorly in producing new projects or new products. 
Investors are also less willing to invest in new projects during the pandemic due to adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
Regarding this, we analyse the long-term consequences of pandemic shocks on innovation 
output and demonstrate that following a pandemic, innovation output is disrupted for 
approximately seven years. We show that the main result of the effect of pandemic shocks on 
aggregate innovation output is driven mainly by a significant reduction in innovative activity 
in the Information and Communication technology sector. Furthermore, there are some notable 




Pandemic shocks lead to a short-term drop in the number of patent applications. Crucially, the 
duration of a pandemic has a strong effect on innovation output.  
This thesis makes several contributions: In Chapter 4, we emphasise the importance of stock 
liquidity on firms patent outputs. Especially, we show that increased stock liquidity could 
benefit firms to produce high-quality innovation. In addition, we extend the empirical literature 
on the impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation. While Fang et al. (2014) argued that firm 
managers tend to cut R&D investments when facing the potential threat of hostile takeovers 
and short-term institutional investors caused by increased stock liquidity, we oppose this 
opinion by arguing that although increased stock liquidity may impede R&D investments, it is 
much lighter than the impact on firm innovation outputs. In addition, we improve the 
understanding of the R&D-patents relationship from the perspective of stock liquidity. We 
show that while stock liquidity could indirectly affect firms innovation performance through 
R&D investments, the most impact on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock 
liquidity itself. 
In Chapter 5, we contribute to the literature around the debate of whether stock liquidity 
encourages or impedes firm innovation. While we support Wen et al. (2018)’s opinion that 
increased stock liquidity improves firm innovation, our study employs an international sample 
and includes more patent-based measurements to deeply analyse the impact of stock liquidity 
on firm innovation performance. In addition, we provide evidence to policymakers around how 
firm efficiency can be improved in order to produce better-quality patents by increasing stock 
liquidity. In addition, our research can encourage investors to allocate more investments in 
stock exchanges with higher stock liquidity, as innovation outputs could be capitalised in their 




In Chapter 6, we provide an original view by which to investigate the economic responses to 
pandemic spreads. Our evidence supports the policies designed to reduce the effect of the 
“Great lockdown” on research productivity. We argue that governments need to be prepared to 
support innovators in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic, and patent offices may have to 
speed up the process of approving new patents. Finally, we recommend adopting policies that 
target the more innovative firms as this is expected to help reduce the time it will take for 
innovation to recover from the effects of COVID19. 
In this thesis, we investigate the impacts of macro- and micro-level factors on innovation 
performance from the perspective of financial literature. We specifically emphasise the 
influence of two factors based on the empirical research on international samples. The first is 
stock liquidity. We provide a deep understanding of these factors by exploring how it affects 
innovation outputs and what impact it has on innovation performance. The second is the 
pandemic shocks. We provide an original view by which to analyse the response of innovation 
activities to pandemic spreads and discuss how financial markets affect innovation as a channel 
of exogenous shock. Overall, we show that financial systems could improve innovation 
performance by boosting its efficiency, such as increasing stock liquidity. It could also affect 
innovation activities as a channel of exogenous shocks. 
We organise the remainder of this thesis as follows: In Chapter 2, we review the literature 
studying the relationship between financial markets and firm innovation from the perspective 
of primary markets, equity markets and other financial markets. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate 
the procedure that matches patent data on the PATSTAT database and firm account information 
on the Datastream database. In Chapter 4, we present the data, estimation method and empirical 
results concerning the first research topic, ‘The Effect of Stock Liquidity on R&D-Innovation 
Relationship: A Structure Model Approach’. In Chapter 5, we discuss research methodology 




Evidence’. In Chapter 6, we outline the data, research methodology and the results concerning 
the third research topic, ‘The Road to Economic Recovery: Pandemics and Innovation’.1 In 
Chapter 7, we conclude our investigation results and discuss some limitations.
 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature around the relationship between financial markets and firm 
innovation from the perspective of primary markets, equity markets and other financial markets. 
In section 2.1, the literature relating to the impacts of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the 
primary market and firm innovation is considered. In section 2.2, we consider the literature 
regarding the relationship between equity markets and innovation. Section 2.3 reviews the 
literature around how other financial markets affect firm innovation. 
 
2.1 The relation between the primary market and firm innovation 
In Table 2.1, we review the literature around the relation between IPOs in the primary market 
and firm innovation. Kim and Weisbach (2008) investigated a sample of firms around the world 
and found that substantial funds raised in IPOs were finally invested in Research and 
Development (R&D). Wu (2012) concluded that the number of patents increased among 
medical service firms after they went public. However, a large percentage of these patents 
depends on the firm's previous patents. In other words, firms' innovative strategies move from 
an exploratory search to an exploitative search after going public. Aggarwal and Hsu (2014) 
showed that the number of patents and forward patent citations among biotechnology firms 
tended to decline in terms of short-term performance pressures after going public. This is 
consistent with the information confidentiality mechanisms in which firm innovation outcomes 
are impacted by project selection and information disclosure. The largest information 
disclosures are required by the public after the IPO. Bernstein (2015) suggested that going 
public changes a firm's strategy in their pursuing of innovation. While newly listed firms tend 




the average citations created by old employees decrease in the five years after an IPO filing. In 
addition to these points, Acharya and Xu (2017) noted that going public improves firms' 
innovation when they depend on external finance, and impedes innovation when they are less 
dependent on external finance. Further examination shows that going public releases the 
financial constraints on firms who rely on external finance, thereby improving their innovation 
activities. However, when firms are less dependent on external finance, going public tends to 
hurt them due to short-term pressure coming from peers' competition and analyst estimation.  
*** Table 2.1 *** 
Taken together, although the quantity of innovation is more likely to increase after going public, 
innovation quality measured by the number of patent citations, tends to decline (Wu, 2012; 
Bernstein, 2015; Wies and Moorman, 2015). In other words, compared with keeping private 
ownership, going public is beneficial for a firm’s exploitative search but not exploratory search. 
Scholars explain that firms have to disclose information regularly and subject themselves to 
public ownership following IPO. Management is incentivised to choose projects with stable 
yields in order to make proper reports (Aggarwal and Hsu, 2014). Additionally, based on 
Holmström's (1989) career concerns theory, managers are concerned that shareholders attribute 
innovation failures to their poor managerial skills, even those due to purely stochastic reasons 
(Bernstein, 2015). Although there is a theoretical model that indicates that firms are driven to 
be more innovative following IPO (Schwienbacher, 2008), empirical researches find the 
opposite result. To my knowledge, except for Acharya and Xu (2017), few works of literature 
investigate which type of firms can benefit from IPO, and more research can be carried out 





2.2 The relationship between the equity market and firm innovation 
2.2.1 The effect of the equity market on innovation 
Table 2.2, Panel A reviews the literature which compares the effect of two different financial 
systems (the equity market and the credit market) on innovation. Hsu et al. (2014) show that a 
better-developed equity market improves innovation in industries that rely more on external 
finance and are more high-tech intensive, while a better-developed credit market impedes 
innovation in these industries. Tadesse (2006) found a similar result through a different type of 
innovation indicator – the size of high-tech industries. Hsu et al. found that the growth of a 
country's high-tech sector is improved by stock market development but discouraged by credit 
market development. Tadesse (2006) supports the notion that technological innovation is 
generally improved by a market-based financial system, while innovation in industries with 
greater information-intensive (measured by the level of intangible assets) grows faster in a 
bank-based financial system. Maskus et al. (2012) noted that the development of the domestic 
equity market can prompt R&D in industries that rely on external finance, but this is not related 
to the level of financial constraints (calculated by the level of tangible assets, as innovative 
firms invest highly in R&D and usually have fewer tangible assets, thus they suffer financial 
constraints). Wang and Thornhill (2010) found petroleum firms with a high level of R&D 
investment should finance by common equity. There is a sustained positive impact of R&D 
spending on the use of common stock in capital raising, except the U-shaped effect of R&D 
investment on the utilisation of convertible securities and the inverted U-shaped influence on 




equity market (but not a credit market) can indirectly improve innovation by providing a 
lucrative exit opportunity for venture capital investors.2  
*** Table 2.2 *** 
In conclusion, when compared with the credit market, a better-developed equity market is 
generally more beneficial for innovation, especially in industries that depend on external 
finance, because it has no collateral requirements and provides more efficient information. The 
equity market is more useful in diversifying the risk associated with innovative projects (King 
and Levine, 1993), and offers a higher stock price compared to non-R&D-intensive firms 
(Kapadia, 2006; Pástor and Veronesi, 2009), thereby improving innovation. From the 
perspective of information feedback function, the equity market can provide valuable 
information based on the real trading of stocks. In particular, Tadesse (2006) showed that the 
market-based system was advantageous in identifying and funding new projects, especially 
when a diversity of opinion persists in the market. Banks are more efficient in the handling of 
proprietary information because information-intensive firms have more to lose from 
information leakage when they invest in innovation. 
In Table 2.2, Panel B, the literature focuses on the association between stock markets and firm 
innovation. Brown et al. (2009) show that fluctuations in the supply of both internal (measured 
by cash flow) and external equity finance (computed by stock issue) can explain a large portion 
 
2 It is clear that venture capital funds are beneficial for innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2001). According to Black 
and Gilson (1998), however, the efficiency advantages offered by venture capital to a company is mainly in the 
embryonic stage through financial capital, nonfinancial services and reputational capital. It will gradually reduce 
as company enters maturity. Additionally, venture capital managers’ skill can be valued by exit prices. In 
particular, a successful entrepreneur can achieve control of companies from venture capital investors by IPO, 
which cannot be done in a credit market. Therefore, compared with the credit market, the well-developed equity 
market is more efficient for venture capital investors to exit and then reinvestment in new ideas, thereby indirectly 




of the 1990s boom and subsequent drop in aggregate R&D in the US. In particular, changes in 
both finance supplies are strongly related to the R&D cycle for young high-tech companies 
rather than mature high-tech companies. Following on from Brown et al. (2009), Martinsson 
(2010) found a similar result in the UK, while only the cash flow effect was significant for new 
high-tech firms on continental Europe. This means that although new high-tech firms in the 
UK and continental Europe both experienced a dramatic increase in stock issue in the late 1990s, 
it only mattered for the firms in the UK. Therefore, the market-based financial system 
outperforms bank-based financial system in providing external equity finance for R&D 
investment.3 Brown et al. (2013) support the view that access to stock market funding at 
country level can improve long-term R&D investment, and it is stronger for younger and 
smaller firms. In addition, R&D created by small firms in industries that are highly dependant 
on external finance is greater than firms in industries which are less dependent on external 
finance. Martinsson and Lööf (2013) show that a stable equity supply plays a vital role for 
firms in maintaining a smooth patenting profile over the duration of the business cycle. The 
patenting of firms that efficiently access external equity is impacted little by economic 
downturn, while the decline of patenting can be seen mostly in firms with a middle average 
external equity supply. Brown et al. (2013) found laws are exogenous variations that influence 
stock issues, thereby affecting long-term R&D investment. The impact of the law on stock 
issues and R&D is mainly driven by small firms. Brown et al. (2012) showed that stock markets 
have a significant impact on firms’ innovative activities when their R&D finance faces 
financial constraints. They found that younger firms in market-based systems, such as can be 
found in the UK and Sweden, have higher R&D-intensities. 
 





As a conclusion to Table 2.2, Panel B, we see that access to the stock market is beneficial for 
firm innovation, and that it mainly contributes to younger and smaller high-tech firms rather 
than to mature firms. These young and small R&D-intensive firms are less likely to obtain debt 
finance in terms of their uncertain and volatile returns (Stiglitz, 1985). Additionally, moral 
hazard and adverse selection are likely to be more severe for high-tech firms because they are 
in a high-risk industry and can more easily substitute high-risk for low-risk projects (Brown et 
al., 2009). Finally, high-risk R&D-intensive firms are restricted to using debt finance based on 
the limited collateral value of their intangible assets (Berger and Udell, 1990). Therefore, they 
benefit from the supply of external equity finance and achieve better innovation. 
In addition to this, Table 2.2, Panel C, shows that equity market liberalisation is beneficial for 
innovation. Moshirian et al. (2015) revealed that equity market liberalisation enhances 
innovation output in more equity-dependent industries by releasing financial constraints, 
utilising human capital and transmitting foreign technology. Luong et al. (2017) supported the 
positive effect of equity market liberalisation (on a firm’s innovation) through a positive, causal 
impact of foreign institutional investors.  These investors promote innovation by working as 
active monitors, providing insurance against innovation failures and transmitting foreign 
technology. In a survey of small Italian high-tech firms, Giudici and Paleari (2000) suggested 
that relatively larger but younger firms plan to issue equity on foreign stock markets in the 
future. In some cases, this is viewed as a method by which to establish a corporate image and 
acquire a reputation. 
Taken together, the literature which considers the relationship between equity market 
development and innovation supports the notion that a better developed and open equity market 




be stronger for small and young companies in industries that depend on external finance, and 
in a market-based financial system. 
 
2.2.2 Equity market’s function of evaluating innovation 
This section reviews the literature on the equity market’s function in terms of evaluating 
innovation in Table 2.3, where market reactions to innovation data are usually represented by 
the presence of abnormal returns. In Table 2.3, Panel A, we show that an equity market can 
evaluate innovation based on R&D investment as an input of an innovative process. Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) proved the positive influence of R&D expenditure on the market value of 
the firm in the US. This kind of relationship is also supported by Toivanen et al. (2002) in the 
UK. Regarding this, Hall and Oriani (2006) show a significant positive correlation between 
R&D investment and the stock price of firms in France, Germany, the UK and the US, but not 
in Italy. They found that for firms in a country with weaker protections for minority 
shareholders, such as France and Italy, controlling shareholders could embezzle the profits of 
minority shareholders through asymmetric information generated by R&D activities. Under 
such circumstances, firms with large shareholders are penalised by the stock market via an 
undervaluing of their R&D investment. Booth et al. (2006) supported the notion that the stock 
market evaluation function of R&D investment can be improved by a higher degree of a 
market-based financial system rather than a higher overall level of financial development.  In 
other words, a country's financial structure, rather than its overall level of financial 
development, determines the channel by which the equity market utilises the value of R&D 
spending. The equity market will provide a stronger response to changes in R&D expenditures 




oriented Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) prompts the influence of the acquirer firm’s R&D 
expenditures on its current stock price and future profitability, but not acquired firms. 
*** Table 2.3 *** 
In Table 2.3, Panel B, we present the argument that firm innovation can be evaluated by the 
equity market via event studies of innovation announcements. Woolridge and Snow (1990) 
suggested that the announcement of R&D investment has a positive impact on a stock market 
return. Their argument supports the opinion that stock markets tend to reward well-conceived, 
long-term strategic investment decisions. In addition to supporting this opinion, Sood and 
Tellis (2009) showed that the market reaction to the announcement of initial innovation 
activities is lower than with development activities but higher than in the case of 
commercialisation activities. The negative market returns generated by negative 
announcements across all events are higher in absolute value than positive announcements. 
Smaller firms enjoy more profits attendant to R&D announcements than larger firms. Moreover, 
a firm's return is not subject to the number of prior announcements, the period between 
announcement within a project or research productivity. Finally, Sood and Tellis (2009) 
showed the importance of the first announcement of an innovation event and the negative 
reaction from the market to competitors announcing firms on event days. This is in addition to 
the stock market’s function in evaluating an innovation announcement. Adcock et al. (2014) 
found that more innovation-intensive countries experienced better market reactions to negative 
news during the global financial crisis. These conditions were unique during the crisis, meaning 




In Table 2.3, Panel C, we demonstrate that patent-based indicators can be employed in the 
equity market in order to evaluate a firm’s market value.4 Hall et al. (2005) found that a firm's 
stock price not only depends on R&D but also on the number of patents and patent citations. 
In particular, companies with a high degree of citations per patent produce a disproportionately 
large market value. Past citations are helpful in forecasting future returns. In addition, self-
citations lead to higher valuations than citations from external patents. However, this influence 
decreases with the size of patent portfolios held by the firm. Hsu (2009) proved that 
fluctuations in innovation progress improve expected market returns and premiums at the 
aggregate level, globally. Hirshleifer et al. (2018) demonstrated that innovative originality can 
be a strong predictor of abnormal stock returns.5 Although this information can predict more 
persistent and less volatile profitability in the future, investors tend to neglect it and the reasons 
why are relatively complicated and hard to evaluate. This effect is stronger when the firm has 
a greater level of valuation uncertainty, lower investor attention and a stronger sensitivity to 
the future profitability of innovative originality. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) showed that firms with 
higher efficiency in innovation on average have higher current and future market valuations. 
The new innovative efficiency variable which is represented as the ratio of patents divided by 
R&D expenditure can capture incremental value-related information about future stock returns 
relative to other innovation-related variables, such as R&D growth, R&D intensity, the number 
of patents and the number of patent citations. 
In addition to stock returns, Table 2.3, Panel D shows that stock return volatilities are also 
enhanced by innovation activities. Chan et al. (2001) suggested that companies that are more 
 
4 According to Gu (2005), patent-based indicators, such as the number of patents and patent citations, contain the 
information about firms’ technological advantages. Therefore, they can predict a firm’s stock value even they are 
not dollar-denominated and not subject to the well-defined standards of measurement and disclosures. 
5 According to Hirshleifer et al. (2018), innovative originality is defined as the number of unique technological 




R&D-intensive (the ratio of R&D to sales) generate a larger average monthly return volatility 
than firms without R&D. Gharbi et al. (2014) focused on high-tech firms in France and found 
that both a firm’s total stock volatility and idiosyncratic volatility are positively correlated with 
the intensity of their R&D investment. Shiller (2000) and Perez (2003) suggested that investors’ 
irrationality leads to the high volatility and bubble-like stock prices of firms during 
technological revolutions. Pástor and Veronesi (2009) expounded the argument by underlining 
the uncertainty around the average productivity of new technologies in the rational world. This 
relationship can also be explained as the notion that R&D investment tends to produce a higher 
degree of asymmetric information than tangible investment (Aboody and Lev, 2000), and stock 
volatilities are enhanced with the increased degree of asymmetric information about a firm’s 
prospects and performance (Gennotte and Leland, 1990; Eden and Jovanovic, 1994). 
In Table 2.3, Panel E, there is a debate around whether or not the equity market thoroughly 
evaluates firm innovation. While some scholars show that information embedded in innovation 
is entirely incorporated by the stock market, most of the others find contrary evidence of that. 
From one perspective, Chan et al. (2001) suggested that the full benefits of R&D spending are 
incorporated by stock price on average in several R&D-intensive industries during the period 
between1975 and 1995. The most evident signs of the association are created by stocks with a 
high ratio of R&D to market equity. We can surmise therefore that inventors are very 
pessimistic about the prospects of R&D-intensive firms with a history of poor performance, 
thereby generating mispricing of R&D stocks. 
Conversely, Cohen et al. (2013) found that the stock market tends to ignore information about 
R&D success embedded in past track records even if this information is expected, stable and 
simple to compute. A firm tends to persist with its innovation ability across several years.In 




outcome in patents, patent citations and new product innovation. Gu (2005) showed changes 
in patent citation have a substantial impact on a firm’s future earnings, but is not fully 
incorporated by the stock market. In particular, the positive association is clearer in industries 
with a shorter innovation cycle because firms in these industries can quickly transform their 
research breakthroughs into real profits. Furthermore, a firm’s long-term performances can be 
predicted by the competitiveness of intangible assets. Eberhart et al. (2004) suggested that 
although it is beneficial for firms to spend on R&D projects, the extent of this benefit is only 
slowly being recognised by the market  and investors tend to ‘under-react’. Dong et al. (2017) 
showed that stock market overvaluation is positively related to both the quality and quantity of 
a firm’s innovation activities. Finally, they found R&D investment and innovative outputs in 
firms with good growth prospects, a high stock turnover rate and overvaluation are more 
sensitive to market misevaluation. 
The reason why the stock market misvalues firm innovation is explored by the literature in 
Table 2.3, Panel F. Chambers et al. (2002) show that the measured excess stock returns in 
R&D-intensive firms is due to compensation for risk-bearing rather than mispricing. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2013) support the notion that the positive relationship between innovation 
efficiency (IE) and current/future market valuations cannot be entirely explained by risk and 
mispricing, even though IE is incremental to other innovation-related variables. Further 
examination shows that the ability of IE as a measure for predicting stock returns is made 
stronger by adding the proxies of investor inattention and valuation uncertainty. Thus, this 
relationship cannot be fully explained by rational pricing but can be partly explained by 
psychological bias or constraints. Overall, mispricing is not the main reason for misvaluing 




Taken together, scholars in this area find that innovation is relevant in predicting stock market 
returns and volatilities. However, research also shows that the information about innovation 
activities and outcomes are not entirely embedded in stock prices and the main reason is not 
mispricing. 
 
2.2.3 The relation between trading in the equity market on innovation 
In Table 2.4, we review the literature around the relationship between trading in the equity 
market and innovation from the perspective of market manipulation, takeover and trading by 
institutional investors. In Table 2.4, Panel A reviews the relationship between market 
manipulation (i.e., insider trading, end-of-day dislocation) and innovation. Levine et al. (2017) 
found that the enforcement of insider trading laws improves innovation. They found increased 
innovation in industries which are naturally innovative following the country restricting insider 
trading. Additionally, industries with a more naturally innovative experience have a much 
bigger increase in IPOs and SEOs after a country begins to enforce its insider trading laws 
(when compared to other, less innovative industries).  This supports the hypothesis that the 
enforcement of insider trading laws attracts outside investors who value the firm’s innovation 
activities and decreases the degree of asymmetric information between outside investors and 
insiders. By applying a different proxy (insider trading) and studying a different period, we can 
see that there is no significant relationship between insider trading and innovation, as 
demonstrated by Cumming et al. (2020).6 However, Cumming et al. (2020) demonstrated a 
significantly negative influence in end-of-day manipulation on patenting. Furthermore, 
 
6 In Cumming et al. (2020), insider trading is measured by considering the surveillance data of suspected insider 
trading (computer algorithms that send messages to surveillance authorities), while insider trading in Levine et al. 
(2017) is presented as the dummy variable of enforcement indicators which equal one after the country first 




intellectual property rights and a firm’s age are positively related to subsequent innovation. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) proved that innovation exerts a positive influence on insider gains. 
They demonstrated that R&D makes a big contribution to asymmetric information between 
both corporate insiders and normal investors, leading in turn to insider trading and gains.  
*** Table 2.4 *** 
In Table 2.4, Panel B, we present a debate about the influence of anti-takeover on innovation. 
Atanassov (2013) found that firms experience a reduction in patent citations after passing anti-
takeover laws, especially after two or more years. This effect is mitigated but not eliminated 
by large shareholders, activist pension funds, financial leverage and product market 
competition. By contrast, Chemmanur and Tian (2018) showed that anti-takeover provisions 
(ATPs) can have a positive effect on innovation. This influence is more pronounced when firms 
are subject to a more significant degree of asymmetric information and engage in more 
competitive product markets. They also found that by adopting ATPs, the market value of firms 
participating in innovation will increase, while the market value of firms which do not 
significantly participate in innovation will decrease. Overall, the relationship can be explained 
from two perspectives: On the one hand, regarding moral hazard (Seru, 2014), the threat of 
hostile takeover forces managers to focus on the most innovative and valuable projects. On the 
other hand, there are few incentives for managers to invest in innovation when they have less 
power than shareholders in terms of takeover threats (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In addition, 
shareholders tend to undervalue the stocks of a firm that is investing in innovative projects 
because of asymmetric information.  Under such circumstances, hostile takeovers are required 
earlier in order to achieve control of the firms by buying cheap shares (Stein, 1988). Comparing 
these two papers, the anti-takeover variables are represented separately from the perspective of 




as the proxy of the dependent variable, Chemmanur and Tian (2018) use a regression 
discontinuity design surrounding a firm’s close-call votes about passing or failing to pass an 
ATP in an annual meeting, which eliminates the endogenous effects.  
In Table 2.4, Panel C, we show that trading by institutional investors in an equity market 
influences a firm’s innovative activity.  Bushee (1998) suggests that when institutional 
investors, such as major shareholders, trade based on current earning news, the firm’s managers 
tend to reduce long-term R&D projects and concentrate on myopic investment. However, when 
these investors do not frequently consider a firm’s current information, they tend to reduce the 
managers’ short-term pressures as monitors. Abdioglu et al. (2015) found that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act improves institutional investment in a firm’s R&D expenditures. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, aims to improve the accuracy of a public firm’s disclosures, enables firms with high 
R&D expenditures to attract more institutional investments, and in so doing strengthens the 
relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s R&D spending. They found a higher 
level of passive and dedicated institutional investment in high innovation firms after the 
enactment of this legislation. In other words, this result is mainly driven by a reduction of 
asymmetric information.  
In summary, trading in the equity market can affect firm innovation. There is an association 
between market manipulation, takeover and trading by institutional investors in the stock 
market and a firm’s innovative activities and results. Excepting the aforementioned research,  





2.2.4 The impact of equity market microstructure on innovation 
To the best of my knowledge, current literature largely revolves around the relationship 
between exchange market structures and innovation, and focuses on the impact of stock 
liquidity on innovation. While Fang et al. (2014) found a negative impact of stock liquidity on 
firm innovation, Wen et al. (2018), Tadesse (2006), and Cumming et al. (2020) all support that 
there is a positive relationship between them and Dass et al. (2017) finds the impact to be 
insignificant. Comparing these papers, Fang et al. (2014) ran their tests during the period 
surrounding the large shocks in minimum tick size in order to overcome the interplay between 
stock liquidity and innovation. 7  Their results show that firms which experience a larger 
increase in stock liquidity following decimalisation and movements of minimum tick size 
produce significantly fewer patents and patent citations. Additionally, during the phase-in 
feature of decimalisation that occurred on the NYSE in 2000, they found the number of patents 
generated by pilot firms that converted to decimal pricing in 2000 experienced a large decrease 
in the first year when compared with non-pilot firms that moved in 2001. Following Fang et al. 
(2014)’s approach, however, Wen et al. (2018) applied two different exogenous variations to 
avoid interrelationship, namely, split-share structure policy and the adjustment of stamp duty 
rate. They posit that liquidity improves the valuation of privatised State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and participants of dedicated institutional investors, thereby decreasing agency 
problems and rising innovation amongst SOEs. In addition, Cumming et al. (2020) found that 
a positive impact of stock liquidity on innovation can be mitigated by the presence of end-of-
day manipulation.  
 
7 According to Furfine (2003), changes in minimum tick size can straight affect stock liquidity but less likely 




*** Table 2.5 *** 
Overall, research in this area mainly focuses either on one single country, or on several.  And, 





2.3 The relationship between other financial markets and firm innovation 
Recent papers also analyse how trading in derivative markets, which consists of exchanges and 
over the counter (OTC) markets, influences firm innovation. In Table 2.6. Blanco and 
Wehrheim (2017) found active options trading encourages firm innovation in R&D-intensive 
industries. In particular, firms with active options trading tend to increase the diversity and 
originality of their innovative activities and participate in risk-taking behaviours. Blanco and 
Wehrheim further suggest that the higher the product market competition, the less managerial 
entrenchment there is, the younger CEO, the lower the profitability pressure and the better the 
control of managerial compensation. Chang et al. (2015) supported the argument that non-
executive employee stock options improve corporate innovation, mainly through encouraging 
employees to take the risk rather than just exert effort in order to raise stock value. Employees 
are driven to push innovation based on the nature of R&D investment. In other words, they are 
encouraged to work together, take more risks in the innovation process and stay in the firms 
until innovation brings successes. Chang et al. (2019) suggested the trading of credit default 
swaps (CDS) to lenders is positively associated with a firm’s innovative success. In particular, 
innovation in firms who are more dependent on debt finance and have more continuous lender 
monitoring are more sensitive to the CDS trade initiation. In addition, borrowing firms improve 
innovation by increasing innovation efficiency instead of R&D investment after the 
introduction of CDS trading on them.  
*** Table 2.6 *** 
In summary, derivatives trading (i.e., options, non-executive employee stock options and CDS 
trading) is positively related to both quantity and quality of firm innovation. A common finding 
amongst the aforementioned three papers is that firms which encouraged derivative trading are 




This shows that derivative markets are beneficial to firms seeking to improve their innovation 
activities because the value of derivative products, such as options and CDSs, usually depends 
on the firm’s long-term earnings. For example, an active options market can improve 
information transmission about long-term investment, thereby achieving a more efficient stock 
price and reducing asymmetric information (Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017). In terms of this, 





2.4 Chapter Conclusion 
In terms of the literature review, we can conclude that there are several characteristics in 
innovation. 1) Corporate innovation is risk-taking behaviour that involves a substantial 
probability of failure (Holmström, 1989). 2) Innovation requires long-term, continuous 
investment. Manso (2011) and Ederer and Manso (2013) reveal that for innovation to perform 
better there needs to be a tolerance of early failures. 3) Innovation is a labour-intensive, multi-
stage process. Ederer (2008) suggests that innovation activities tend to succeed when 
innovators are encouraged to team up with others and are rewarded for long-term joint 
achievements. 4) The asymmetric information is between investors and firm managers. 
Adverse selection problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) are more likely in R&D-intensive 
industries because of the inherent riskiness of the investment. Moral hazard problems are also 
severe for high-tech firms because it is easy for them to substitute high-risk projects for low-
risk ventures. In addition, Allen and Gale (1999) argue that it is usually difficult to evaluate 
innovative projects because information about their prospects is either sparse or hard to process, 
which often leads to a variety of opinions. Aboody and Lev (2000) show that R&D makes a 
significant contribution to asymmetric information between corporate insiders and normal 
investors, which leads to insider trading and gains. 5) A high level of intangible assets. R&D 
investment creates intangible assets for the firm (Johnson and Pazderka, 1993) and leads to a 
lack of collateral (Hall, 2002).  
A financial market can enhance firm innovation when it gives the greatest possible 
consideration to the innovation(s) in question. We investigate the impact on innovation 










Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) 
1990-2003 38 countries 
Substantial funds which companies raise in IPO are 
finally invested in R&D.  
WorldScope, Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat Global, 
Compustat North America 
Wies and Moorman 
(2015)  
1980-2011 US 
Going public increases the number and variety of firm 
innovation but decreases the risk of it.  
ProductLaunch Analytics 
Wu (2012) 1980-2008 US 
The number of patents tends to increase among medical 
service firms after going public. However, a large 
percentage of these patents dependents on the firm’s 
previous patents.  
USPTO, Granted database 
Aggarwal and Hsu 
(2013) 
1980-2000 US 
The number of patents and forward patent citations 
among biotechnology firms tends to be declined after 
going public in terms of short-term performance 
pressures.  
IQSS Patent Network database 
(Lai et al. 2011) 
Bernstein (2015)  1985-2003 US 
Going public changes firm's strategy in pursuing 
innovation that decreases the quality of innovation, 
NBER (Hall, Jaffe, and 




namely, relying more on hiring new inventors and 
acquiring external technologies. 
Business School (HBS) 
patent database 
Acharya and Xu 
(2017)  
1976-2006 US 
Going public improves firms’ innovation when they 
depend on external finance and impede innovation 













Country (s) studied Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel A literature that investigates the effect of equity financing on innovation by comparing with other financing methods.  
Hsu et al. (2014) 1976–2006  32 economies 
 A better-developed equity market improves 
innovation in industries that more rely on external 
finance and that are more high-tech intensive, while 
a better-developed credit market impedes 
innovation in these industries.  
NBER 
Brown et al. 
(2017)  
1980–2005  38 countries  
Equity market development improve the overall 
growth of an economy’s high-tech sector 
UNIDO and World Bank 
Development indicators, 
Compustat North 
America, Hsu, Tian, and 
Xu (2014). 
Tadesse (2006) 1980-1995 34 countries 
Technology innovation is generally improved by 
market-based financial systems, while innovation 
in industries with greater intangible assets grows 





Maskus et al. 
(2012) 
1990–2003  18 OECD countries 
The development of the domestic equity market can 
positively impact R&D in industries that rely more 
on external finance but not changes in terms of the 
level of tangible assets. 




1976-2005 US  
It is appropriate for a firm to finance through common 
equity if it has high level of R&D investment.  
Compustat North America 
dataset 
Black and Gilson 
(1998)  
1984-1996 
US, Germany, Japan, 
UK and Other 14 
European 
Countries 
A well-developed equity market but not a credit 
market can indirectly improve innovation by 
providing a lucrative exit opportunity for venture 





Country (s) studied Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel B literature that studies the relationship between the equity market and innovation. 
Brown et al. 
(2009) 
1990-2004 US 
Fluctuations in the supply of both internal and external 
equity finance can explain a significant part of the 
1990s boom and subsequent decline in aggregate 





Martinsson (2010)  1995–2004  
UK and Other 9 
European 
Countries 
Supply shifts in both internal and external equity 
finance during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
explains the R&D cycle for new high-tech firms in 
UK, while only the cash flow effect is significant 
for new high-tech firms in continental Europe. 
Compustat Global database  
Brown et al. 
(2013) 
1990-2007  32 countries 
Law rules are exogenous variations that influence 
stock issues, thereby affecting long-term R&D 
investment. 





1997–2005  Sweden  
A stable equity supply plays an important role for 
firms in maintaining a smooth patenting profile 
over the business cycle. 
PATSTAT  
Brown et al. 
(2012) 
1995–2007 16 countries  
Firms that have better access to stock market finance 
invest more in R&D and achieve more patents.  




Country (s) studied Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel C literature that studies the impact of equity market liberalisation on innovation.  
Moshirian et al. 
(2015)  
1980-2008 
51 developed and 
emerging 
economies  
Equity market liberalisation tends to improve 
innovation output in more equity finance 
dependence industries through releasing financial 





constraints, utilising human capital and 
transmitting foreign technology.  





The entry of foreign institutional investors improves 
the firm’s innovation through active as active 
monitors, providing insurance against innovation 
failures and transmitting foreign technology. 
DWPI database 
Giudici and 
Paleari (2000)  
1997 Italy 
The equity market is more attractive for innovative 
firms which are young but growing rapidly. 
newspapers and specialised 
magazines, the World 
Wide Web, sectorial 
lists, industrial 
associations, scientific 
parks brochures, districts 






Table 2.3 Equity market’s function of evaluating innovation 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 





There is a significant positive relationship 
between firms’ R&D spending and 
subsequent stock returns. 
NBER 
Toivanen et al. 
(2002) 
1988-1995 UK 
Frim R&D spending can significantly improve 
subsequent stock returns. 
Extel's Financial Company 
Analysis  







There is a significantly positive relationship 
between R&D investment and market value 
of firms in France, Germany, the UK and the 
US, but not in Italy. 
ANBERD database 
Booth et al. (2006)  1991-2001 
10 industrial 
countries  
Stock market evaluation function of R&D 
spending can be improved by a higher degree 
of market-based financial system rather than 
a higher overall level of financial 
development.  





Kallunki et al. 
(2009)  
1993–2006 US 
Technology-oriented M&As could improve the 
impact of the acquirer firm’s R&D 
expenditures on its current stock market 
value and future profitability. 
Worldscope 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel B Literature studied how equity market evaluate innovation in terms of innovation announcement 
Woolridge and 
Snow (1990)  
1973-1983 US 
The R&D announcement is positive associated 
with the stock market return 
Wall Street Journal 
Sood and Tellis 
(2009) 
1977-2006 US 
The positive reaction of stock market to 
innovation announcement. 
FACTIVA (which includes 
the Wall Street Journal), 
Lexis-Nexis, and 





newswire services such 











Higher innovation-intensive countries 
experience better market reactions to 
negative news during the global financial 
crisis.  
 Eurostat  
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel C Literature studied how the equity market evaluate innovation in terms of patent-based indicators 
Hall et al. (2005)  1963-1995 US 
A firm’s patent citations could be capitalised in 
its market value. 
USPTO; Compustat 













Technology innovation would increase the 
expected real and excess return of stock index 
in global area.  
USPTO databases, Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg’s 
(2001) data set, 
Compustat database, 
National Science 
Foundation (2005): US; 

















Factbook 2008: Canada, 
Germany, India, Italy, 
Japan, French and U.K  
Hirshleifer et al. 
(2017) 
1981-2006 US 
Innovative originality can predict subsequent 
firm’s profitability and abnormal stock 
market returns. 
NBER (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2001); 
Harvard Business 
School U.S. patent 
inventor database (Li et 
al. 2014) 
Hirshleifer et al. 
(2013)  
1981-2006 US 
A new innovative efficiency measures which is 





market valuation and firm’s future stock 
returns and future operating performance. 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel D Literature studied on impact of innovation on stock return volatilities 
Chan et al. (2001)  1975-1995 US 
Firms with a higher ratio of R&D to sales 
generate larger monthly volatility of return 
than firms without R&D.  
Compustat Active and 
Research files 
Gharbi et al. 
(2014)  
2002–2011 French 
R&D intensity positively affects stock return 
volatility. 





Uncertainty about the average productivity of 
new technologies attributes to the high 
volatility and bubble-like stock prices of 
firms which improve innovation during 
technological revolutions. 
No 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 




Chan et al. (2001)  1975-1995 US 
Full benefits of R&D spending are incorporated 
by stock price on average in several R&D-
intensive industries during the period from 
1975 to 1995.  
Compustat Active and 
Research files 
Cohen et al. 
(2013)  
1980-2009 US 
Stock market tend to ignore the information 
about R&D success which embedded in past 
track records, even this information is 
expectable, stability and simple to compute.   
Compustat; NBER 
Gu (2005)  1983-1999 US 
Changes of patent citation impact have strong 
relationship with firms’ real earnings, which 
is ignored by investors. 
NBER 
Eberhart et al. 
(2004)  
1951-2001 US 
R&D increases are beneficial investment; 
however, the market would like to slowly 
recognise the extent of them. 
COMPUSTAT 
Dong et al. (2017) 1976-2012 US 
Stock market overvaluation is positively related 
with both quality and quantity of firms’ 
innovation activities.  
Kogan et al. (2016) 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 





Panel F Literature studied the reason why the stock market misvalues firm innovation 
Chambers et al. 
(2002)  
1979–1998 US 
The measured excess returns to R&D-intensive 
firms due to compensation of risk-bearing 
rather than mispricing. 
 Compustat 
Hirshleifer et al. 
(2013)  
1981-2006 US 
The positive relationship between innovation 
efficiency (IE) and current (and future) 
market valuations cannot be entirely 
explained by risk and mispricing, even 
though IE is incremental to other innovation-







Table 2.4 The relation between trading in the equity market on innovation 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel A Literature studied the relation between market manipulation (i.e., insider trading, end-of-day dislocation) and innovation 
Cumming et al. 
(2016) 
2003-2010  9 countries  
The end-of-day manipulation is found to 
significantly decrease patenting; however, 
insider trading is not observed to significantly 
impact subsequent patenting. 
PATSTAT 
Levine et al. (2015) 1976-2006  94 economies  
Enforcement of insider trading laws improves 
innovation. 
PATSTAT 
Aboody and Lev 
(2000)  
1985-1997  US 
R&D makes a great contribution to asymmetric 
information between corporate insiders and 
normal investors, which leads to insider trading 
and gains.   
Compustat 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 




Atanassov (2013)  1976-2000 US 
Hostile takeovers are helpful for corporate 
innovation 
NBER (Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2001) 
Chemmanur and 
Tian (2018)   
1990–2006 US 
The positive, causal influence of antitakeover 
provisions (ATPs) on innovation.  
NBER (Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2001) 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use for 
innovation 
Panel C Literature studied on impact of trading by institutional investors in the equity market on firm innovation 
Bushee (1998)  1983-1994 US 
When institutional investors, as major 
shareholders, heavily trade based on current 
earning news, firms tend to focus on managers 
tend to myopic investment rather than R&D 
investment; otherwise, they improve R&D 
projects. 
 the 1995 Compustat PST, 
Full Coverage and 
Research  
Abdioglu et al. 
(2015) 
1998-2009 US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act improves institutional 












Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 
What database they use 
for innovation 
Fang et al. (2014) 1994-2005 US Stock liquidity impedes firm innovation. 
NBER (Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2001) 
Dass et al. (2017)  1994-2006 US 
There is no significant relation between Stock liquidity and 
firm innovation 
NBER (Li et al.,2014) 
Wen et al. (2017)  2006-2013 China 
Stock liquidity improves innovation in state-owned 
enterprises, but not in non-state-owned enterprise. 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) 
Tadesse (2006) 1980-1995 34 countries 
Stock market liquidity positively impacts innovation which 
represented by the rate of technological progress for each 
industry in each country. 
UNIDO database 
Cumming et al. 
(2020) 
2003-2010  9 countries  
 Sock liquidity will positively affect subsequent patenting. 
However, this effect tends to be mitigated by the presence 





Table 2.6 The relation between other financial markets and firm innovation 
Reference Period of study 
Country (s) 
studied 
Main finding (Effects on Innovation) 




1996 -2004 US 
An increasing options trading volume encourages firm 
innovation in R&D-intensive industries. 
NBER 
Chang et al. (2015) 1998-003 US 
Non-executive employee stock options will improve corporate 
innovation. 
NBER 
Chang et al. (2019)  1997-2008 US 
Trading of credit default swaps (CDS) to lenders is positively 
associated with the borrowing firm’s innovative success. 
Noah Stoffman’s website; 
Harvard Business 






Chapter 3 Matching PATSTAT applications to Datastream financial data 
3.1 Introduction 
Technology innovation is widely regarded as a vital driver for a nation’s long-term economic 
growth (Solow, 1956; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and its 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1998). Extensive literature in this field employs patent-based 
measurements to represent innovation performance. This chapter aims to provide a more 
accessible dataset to study firm innovation from an international perspective. With this in mind, 
we have created a list of company names that links the patent data from the PATSTAT database 
with firms’ account information from the Datastream database across 44 countries from 1990 
to 2010. 
Studies in this area are mainly focused on the US market (for example, Fang et al., 2014; 
Chemmanur and Tian, 2018). They extract patent data from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research’s (NBER) Patent and Citation Database, which only covers patents that are granted 
by the US Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) (Moshirian et al., 2015). Other literature in 
this area is generally more relevant to individual countries (Lotti and Marin, 2013; Martinsson 
and Lööf, 2013) or countries in specific regions (Thoma and Torrisi, 2007; Macartney, 2009). 
Some studies represent a firm’s innovative activity through the Research and Development 
(R&D) investment. However, the R&D investment is more likely to describe a firm’s 
innovation input rather than its innovation performance (Ashwin et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2018). 
While the Orbis platform can identify companies from external datasets through the "batch 
search", it usually only covers data from the previous ten years of the current year.8 Although 
 





the Orbis database can offer company account data from 10 years ago and consolidate patent 
data from the PATSTAT database, it is not accessible to most institutions and too expensive 
for individual researchers to afford. 
Regarding the disadvantages of previous literature, we link the worldwide patent database  
(PATSTAT) with one of the most widely used firm accounting information databases 
(Datastream) by modifying the code of Macartney (2009) and Lotti and Marin (2013). Overall, 
we have created a list of 11,371 company names across 44 countries between 1990 and 2010. 
This covers around 42.04% of patents from the PATSTAT database and 14.43% of equities 
from the Datastream database. Three countries/regions merged more than 50% of patents from 
PATSTAT with their firm account data from Datastream; Ten countries merged more than 30% 
of patent applications, and twenty-five countries merged more than 10% of patent applications.  
In this chapter, we provide a more accessible dataset by which to investigate the relationship 
between financial markets and firm innovation from an international perspective. Compared 
with previous researches, this dataset includes patents from patent authorities worldwide rather 
than just USPTO. Thus, it is less like to underestimate the number of patents per company in 
non-US countries. In addition, we collect and calculate patent data in different countries with 
the same standard, which provides a basis for global innovation research through innovation 
outputs.  
In the remainder of this chapter we review existing databases and describe their advantages 
and disadvantages in section 2. We introduce the characteristics of the matched dataset in 




3.2 Review of existing databases 
This section describes previous literature that links a firm’s patent-based measures with their 
account information. First we introduce the NBER Patent and Citation Database, as it is widely 
employed to study the US market. However, this dataset restricts international researches on 
firm innovation outcomes (i.e., patent-based measures). We then demonstrate several studies 
that merge PATSTAT applicants with firms in different databases, which generally focuses on 
individual countries or regions. The Orbis platform contains the firm’s account information 
and can identify companies from an external dataset through "batch search". However, it 
generally only covers the data ten years previous to the current year. Although 
individuals/institutions can take out a subscription to access date from more than 10 years ago, 
the fee is expensive for individual researchers. Compared with this, this chapter can perhaps 
provide a more accessible opportunity for international studies regarding a firm’s innovation 
performance. 
 
3.2.1  NBER and US financial data 
Previous studies have incorporated patent-based data (the number of patent applications, the 
number of patent citations) and merged it with a firm’s account information. The Patent and 
Citation Database is one of researchers’ most used databases, such as Pakes and Griliches 
(1980), Hausman et al. (1984), Hall et al. (1986) and Griliches et al. (1986). It covers the 




citations (Dass et al., 2017).9 The patent data from the NBER database is linked to a firm’s 
account data from different databases. 
The first systematic attempt is NBER’s productivity program from 1978 through to 1988 
(Bound et al., 1982; Hall et al., 1986b). It covers around 2,600 large listed companies in the 
US manufacturing industry in Compustat and then merges this with around 300,000 patent 
applications in the USPTO during the period between 1965 and 1981. ‘Harmonisation’ and 
visual matching remove incorrect results. The matching between USPTO applicants and 
companies in Compustat has been updated by Hall et al. (2001), Cockburn et al. (2009), Li et 
al. (2014) and Arora et al. (2021). Although this matching procedure is effective, Lotti and 
Marin (2013) suggest that it is costly (in money and time) and difficult to extend databases to 
include small and medium-sized enterprises.  
The second example is from Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2010), which merged assignees 
in the NBER Patent and Citation Database with the firms on the Business Register (BR) of the 
Census Bureau. They extended the coverage offered by Hall et al. (2001).  Because the link 
between the datasets of Hall et al. (2001) is based on the 1989 Compustat universe of firms, 
and the ownership changes before or after 1989 it could not reflect the matching result 
accurately. The US Census Bureau spends large sums of money tracking ownership changes 
and thus provides a research opportunity to not only study smaller and unlisted firms but also 
to consider the changes in ownership among patent assignees. However, they only cover the 
US assignees that were not individuals or governments. 
 
9 Except NEBR patent database, KPSS patent dataset, which was constructed by Kogan et al. (2017), also covers 
the information of patents granted by USPTO (Wang, 2017). While the NBER patent database covers a shorter 




Although the NBER Patent and Citation Database is widely used in the literature on intellectual 
property and technological progress, it only covers the patents that are filed in the US and 
granted by the USPTO (Moshirian et al., 2015). A range of research assumes the USPTO 
records all important granted patents around the world, as the US is and has been the largest 
technology consumption market over the past few decades (Hsu et al., 2014). However, Chang 
et al. (2015) argue that many emerging countries do not submit patent applications to the 
USPTO. Luong et al. (2017) found that USPTO does not record about 25% of Japanese patents 
and around 17% of patents from Germany and other countries. Thus, international research 
which uses USPTO tends to underestimate the number of applications per company for non-
US firms. Namely, it restricts international studies which focus on firm innovation performance 
(i.e., patent-based measures), and researchers have to use R&D instead.  
 
3.2.2  PATSTAT and European data 
The PATSTAT database contains more than 80 million patent documents from 100 patent 
offices over the world (Levine et al., 2017). It was created by the European Patent Office (EPO) 
based on the requirements of the Patent Statistics Task Force, which is led by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The PATSTAT database is published 
biannually, and we use the PATSTAT 2016 Autumn Edition. 
Lotti et al. (2005) matched the European Patent Office (EPO) patent applications to around 
115,000 EU15 companies on the AMADEUS database by taking exact matches and visually-
checked matches based on the SOUNDEX algorithm.10  They acknowledge that the data on the 
 
10 The SOUNDEX algorithm ‘produces matches for strings using a weighting scheme, according to which each 




location of firms and applicants were not exploited to improve precision. In addition, the 
possibility of different firms having the same name is neglected both with AMADEUS and the 
patent database. 
For other researches that link corporate account information to the patent data from the 
PATSTAT database, Thoma and Torrisi (2007) merged 2,197 listed European firms and their 
subsidiaries from the AMADEUS database to the patent applications at the EPO.11 In addition, 
the dataset of Macartney (2009) matches corporate applicants across the 15 selected European 
countries to firm account data from AMADEUS from 1978 to 2004. Compared to these, the 
Datastream database only covers the listed companies and their current subsidiaries, but the 
account information is far more detailed than that on AMADEUS and has longer time series 
variation (Macartney, 2009). In addition, the dataset of Martinsson and Lööf (2013) consists 
of patent data and companies registered in the Statistics Sweden dataset from 1997 to 2005. 
Lotti and Marin (2013) merged the patent data with Italian firms on the AIDA database during 
the period 1977 and 2009.12 Compared with them, our dataset contains 44 countries around the 
world until 2010. 
In addition, compared with other methods that match databases through their original name on 
PATSTAT, we utilise the standardised name created by the ECOOM-EUROSTAT-EPO 
PATSTAT Person Augmented Table (EEE-PPAT) Database (Du Plessis et al., 2009; 
Magerman et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2010). The EEE-PPAT dataset was made available in 
2010 and presented the standardised name and sector allocation for all entities in PATSTAT. 
Using this dataset allows us to overcome two problems during the analysis: One of them is 
 
11 The Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk) database includes the financial and business information of the 520,000 biggest 
public and private companies across 43 European countries. 





undercounting or overcounting. In other words, some applicants’ and inventors' names do not 
remain in PATSTAT even though they are recorded in most patents. In addition, one entity 
tends to appear with different names in different patent documents in the patent filing process. 
EEE-PPAT identifies and unifies the names of these entities, which increases the accuracy of 
each entity's patent information. However, they did not thoroughly standardise all names. 
Additionally, the format of the name record in EEE-PPAT is not the same as on the Datastream 
database. We further standardised the company name and made it more suitable for combining 
other datasets, especially the Datastream databases. 
 
3.2.3  Orbis Intellectual Property data 
The Orbis database contains firm data from around the world. It can identify companies from 
external datasets through "batch search". However, this platform only covers data from ten 
years previous to the current year. The time interval available for research is shorter if the delay 
between filing and grant or refusal of patents is taken into account. Although the Orbis database 
offers company account data from more than ten years ago, and consolidates patent data from 
the PATSTAT database, it is not accessible for most institutions around the world and too 
expensive for individual researchers.  Compared with the Orbis database, the Datastream 
database is widely accessed by institutions and covers the data of public companies around the 
world.  
In conclusion, compared with previous literature, this research links one of the largest patent-
based databases around the world, the PATSTAT database, and one of the most widely used 
firm account information databases, the Datastream database. It provides a more accessible 





We demonstrate the matching procedure in Appendix3.13 And then, we describe and analyse 
the matching results in section 3. 
 
13 We describe the process of recording patent applications on PATSTAT in Appendix 1 and measure the number 




3.3 The matched dataset 
In this section, we describe the matching results and analyse the company being merged during 
the matching procedure. In summary, we successfully matched 11,371 listed companies from 
Datastream with their patent-based data from PATSTAT for 44 countries between 1990 and 
2010. It covers around 42.04% of patents on PATSTAT and 14.43% of the universe of firm 
records on Datastream for these countries during the period.  
 
3.3.1 The number of patents and applicants before/after matching 
In Table 3.1, we show the number of patents and applicants in each country before and after 
matching procedures from 1990 to 2012.  
*** Table 3.1 *** 
In order to summarise the matching results, we merged around 42.04% of patents for these 
countries from PATSTAT from 1990 to 2010. Among them, 3 countries/regions merged more 
than 50% of patent applications at PATSTAT with their firm account data on Datastream; 10 
countries merged more than 30% of patent applications, and 25 countries merged more than 
10% of patent applications. Japan was the country with the highest percentage of matched 
patent applications. 62.70% of patent applications in Japan were successfully merged with their 
corporate account information on Datastream.  
It is worth noting that while column (4) shows the number of patents for both private and public 
companies, column (5) only covers this for public companies. Thus, the higher percentage in 
column (6) represents the fact that more patents were applied for by public companies in the 




companies applied for more than half the patents. This means public companies are behind 
more inventions (measured by the number of patents) than private companies in these 
countries/regions from 1990 to 2010. 
The United States covers more than 4,000 companies, namely, contains the highest number of 
merged patent applicants during the whole period. It is followed by Japan, China, Taiwan, and 
South Korea, which merged more than 900 corporate applicants from PATSTAT. Column (8) 
shows the number of all corporate applicants in each country, while column (9) only contains 
the corporate patent applicants as listed companies. Column (10) represents the proportion of 
listed companies in all companies which applied for at least one patent over the period 1990 to 
2010. This is generally below 10% for most countries. Moreover, it is around just 6% even for 
Japan which merged the highest percentage of patents among all the countries considered. It 
shows that most of the companies applying for patents are not listed companies. 
We show the map of public companies’ innovative activities around the world in Figure 3.1 
based on the data in column (9) of Table 3.1. This covers all matched companies across these 
44 countries and represents innovative ability by the number of patents submitted from 1990 
to 2010. 
*** Figure 3.1 *** 
In Table 3.2, we demonstrate the number of applicants that have been matched in different 
steps. There are 11,371 corporate applicants merged in this chapter. It shows that most 
companies are merged through the "full strings" company name and country code, this amounts 
to 4,731. 4,703 follows and this is the number of corporate applicants been merged by original 
name and country codes. In addition, 1,883 firms were merged through the "stem sting" 
company name and address information, 54 firms were added to the dataset through the manual 




*** Table 3.2 *** 
 
3.3.2 The contribution of the top ten percent of applicants 
In Figure 3.2, we present the distribution of the number of applications by matched companies 
from 1990 to 2010.14 On average, each company made 163 applications during the period. 
According to the figure, however, the number of applications from 90% of applicants is less or 
equal to 152. Namely, most of the patents come from the top 10% of corporate applicants. 
Regarding this, we draw particular attention to the contribution of the top 10% of applicants to 
the total number of applications in each country. 
*** Figure 3.2 *** 
In Figure 3.3, we demonstrate the percentage of the number of applications from the top 10% 
applicants with the total number of applications in each country.15 16 The vertical axis is the 
percentage of the number of patents applied for by each type of patent applicants to the total 
number of applications in each country. The horizontal axis represents the name of each 
country. The columns are ordered by the percentage of applications from the top10% applicants 
 
14 See the descriptive statistics of the full sample that is analysed in this thesis in subsection 5.3.3 Descriptive 
Statistics. In this chapter, we describe the method that matches corporate applicants on PATSTAT with firm 
accounting information on Datastream. We report the number of matched applications and corporate applicants 
in each country in row 5 and 9 in Table 3.1. They are different from the full sample analysed in the Chapter 5. It 
is because we restrict our dataset created in this chapter and produce the sample analysed in Chapter 4 and 5. For 
example, we restrict dataset to companies located and listed in the domestic country, and exclude the corporate 
applicants if they applied for fewer than 3 applications from 1990 to 2010 (see detailed restrictions in subsection 
4.3.1 Data and sample selection). 
15 It is a 100% stacked column chart, which is employed to compare the percentages that each value contributes 
to a total. 
16 We define “Top 10% applicants of a country” as the top ten percent of companies with the largest number of 




to the applications from whole applicants in each country. The higher the proportion of patents 
filed by the top 10% of corporate applicants to the total patents is a country, the more to the 
left the country is in the histogram.  
*** Figure 3.3 *** 
Using the country furthest to the left of the histogram, Japan, as an example, the white and light 
grey area represents the percentage of applications applied from the top10% applicants in Japan 
from 1990 to 2010. This amounts to 807,285 applications and covers 93.90% of applications 
in Japan.17 Among them, the white area represents the percentage of applications applied by 
matched applicants. It is about twice the light grey area, which shows the percentage of 
applications which failed to merge with the firm account information on Datastream. While the 
top 10% of corporate applicants apply for more than 90% of patents in Japan, the remaining 
90% of applicants applied for 6.10% of applications, which represented by grey and dark grey 
areas. The grey area shows the percentage of applications from matched applicants (0.40% of 
total applications), and dark grey represents the percentage of applications from unmatched 
applicants (5.7% of total applications). 
Except for Egypt, Malaysia, Chile, Portugal, the Philippines, Colombia, Indonesia and 
Morocco, the top 10% of applicants contribute more than 50% of patents across the country in 
question. In addition, most successfully merged applications come from the top 10% of 
applicants in each country. In other words, for public companies, the contribution of the top 
10% of applicants on a country’s innovation performance is much more significant than the 
remaining 90% of applicants in the country. 
 
 




3.3.3 The number of applications per year 
In Figure 3.4, we present the number of patents applied for by all corporate applicants and 
merged applicants from 1990 to 2010. The straight line in this figure represents the number of 
applications from all corporate applicants in the dataset. It is the sum of patents filed by both 
private and public companies. The dotted line is the number of patents applied for that have 
been matched with firm account information on Datastream. In other words, it represents the 
number of patents filed by public companies. The correlation between the straight line and the 
dotted line is 0.8146. This high correlation means that the innovation ability of public 
companies can represent the innovation ability of all companies. 
*** Figure 3.4 *** 
In Figure 3.3, in the Appendix, we show the number of applications from all companies and 
merged companies in each country.18 These figures are ordered by the number of applications 
filed by all firms in each country (i.e., the blue line). The closer the straight and dotted lines 
are, the fewer patents (in the country in question) are filed by private companies. We also list 
the trend of merged companies' innovation outputs within each country in Table 3.22 in the 
Appendix. The number of applications submitted by merged companies is indexed to equal 
1000 in 1990.  
*** Figure A3.3 *** 
*** Table A3.22 *** 
 
 




3.3.4  The number of patents per industry 
In Table 3.3, we display the total patents between 1990 and 2010 classified by country and the 
2-digital Standard Industrial Classification (hereafter, SIC) code for all matched corporate 
applicants. Column (1) represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes 
according to the WIPO Standard ST.3. Columns (2) to (11) show the number of patents applied 
for by companies in each industry. For example, the value 63 in the first row and fourth column 
means companies in the Austrian construction industry successfully applied for a total of 63 
patents between 1990 and 2010. In this table, 117 corporate applicants (relevant to 1901 patent 
applications) have not recorded any industry information on Datastream. Excepting this, most 
patents come from the manufacturing industry, around 1.6 million. Among them, the number 
of patents applied for by US and Japanese listed companies, number 476,313 and 467,507 
respectively and far exceeds the number of patents applied for by companies in other countries. 
*** Table 3.3 *** 
In Figure 3.5, we show the distribution of the number of patents applied for by companies in 
different industries. These figures also demonstrate the number of companies and the 
mean/minimum/median/maximum number of patents applied for by the companies at the top 
right of the histogram for each industry division. Companies in the manufacturing industry 
applied for an average of 198 patents, the most across all industries. Almost half of the 
companies in this industry applied for fewer than 10 patents between 1990 and 2010. ‘Samsung 
Electronics’ is the company with the most patents in the manufacturing industry, which filed 
70,641 applications over the period.  




These tables show that most of the corporate applicants apply for a small number of patents 
during the whole period. This is because, excepting manufacturing companies, the median 
number of companies applying for patents in the remaining industries is less than or equal to 
5. It shows that while most of the corporate applicants apply for a small number of patents, a 
few companies apply for a large number of patents. 
In Figure 3.6, we introduce the condition of patent and R&D for companies in the 
manufacturing industry. We classify companies in the manufacturing industry into 20 major 
industry groups (i.e., the 2-digit SIC code).19 For each major industry group, the orange bar 
represents the average R&D investment of the companies, and the blue bar shows the average 
number of patents received by the companies. The major industry group is ordered by the 
average number of patents obtained by the companies. Namely, the higher the average number 
of patents filed by companies in this industry, the higher the position of this industry on the 
table. Using the “Transportation Equipment” industry group as an example, companies 
belonging to this industry group invest an average of 3.3 million dollars in R&D projects and 
obtain an average of 451 patents from 1990 to 2010. It is the highest number of patents among 
these industry groups, and thus, it is on the left of Figure 3.6.  
*** Figure 3.6 *** 
The industry on the left and second positions of this figure is “Electronic and Other Electrical 
Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment”. Although companies in this 
industry group obtain slightly fewer than average patents compared to companies in the 
“Transportation Equipment” industry group, they invest much less in R&D projects. It means 
 
19 For example, a company recorded with a 4-digit SIC code ‘3711’ is classified as being in the ‘Motor Vehicles 
and Passenger Car Bodies’ industry. It in turn is included by industry group 371 (a 3-digit SIC code, representing 
‘Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment’), major group 37 (a 2-digit SIC code, 




companies in this industry group have a higher ability to transform the R&D investment into 




3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we created a list of 11,371 company names that merged the patent data from 
PATSTAT with firm account information from Datastream across 44 countries from 1990 to 
2010. It covers around 42.04% of patents from PATSTAT and 14.43% of equities on 
Datastream. Overall, we demonstrate a high correlation between the number of patents applied 
for matched companies with total companies. 3 countries/regions merged more than 50% of 
patents on PATSTAT with their firm account data on DataStream; 10 countries merged more 
than 30% of patent applications, and 25 countries merged more than 10% of patent applications. 
We show that the top 10% of applicants applied for most of the patents from 1990 to 2010. In 
addition, the US and the manufacturing industry are separately the country and the industry 
which contribute most of the patents in our sample. 
We link the worldwide patent database, PATSTAT, with one of the most widely used firm 
accounting information databases, Datastream, through company name. This chapter provides 
a basis for global research by which to investigate the relationship between financial markets 




Table 3.1 The number of patents and applicants in each country from 1990 to 2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AUSTRIA AT 427,122 22,967 1,448 6.31% 4,923 4,095 45 1.10% 
AUSTRALIA AU 397,849 28,015 3,634 12.97% 8,113 6,803 165 2.43% 
BELGIUM BE 419,852 17,234 4,854 28.17% 2,834 2,034 39 1.92% 
BRAZIL BR 458,193 2,567 608 23.69% 1,295 1,018 41 4.03% 
CANADA CA 932,701 51,780 18,079 34.92% 12,844 10,848 422 3.89% 
SWITZERLAND CH 1,076,278 72,131 15,462 21.44% 11,124 8,463 89 1.05% 
CHILE CL 9,557 248 21 8.47% 167 140 2 1.43% 
CHINA CN 1,687,877 322,167 47,367 14.70% 65,269 60,256 992 1.65% 
COLOMBIA CO 144,173 52 0 0.00% 94 39 0 0.00% 
CZECH REPUBLIC CZ 146,685 3,758 394 10.48% 1,788 1,247 27 2.17% 
GERMANY DE 2,033,580 462,422 160,972 34.81% 50,792 45,420 406 0.89% 
DENMARK DK 332,700 15,155 4,998 32.98% 3,640 2,936 56 1.91% 
EGYPT EG 37,789 53 5 9.43% 36 28 2 7.14% 
SPAIN ES 457,768 21,471 740 3.45% 9,312 8,491 59 0.70% 
FINLAND FI 467,601 32,098 2,505 7.80% 4,090 3,491 63 1.81% 
FRANCE FR 1,606,855 186,484 52,750 28.29% 22,840 18,657 421 2.26% 
UNITED KINGDOM GB 1,823,774 97,657 20,514 21.01% 25,065 20,090 353 1.76% 




HONG KONG HK 144,413 6,815 1,839 26.99% 2,302 1,461 10 0.68% 
HUNGARY HU 225,079 3,173 342 10.78% 1,398 1,181 3 0.25% 
INDONESIA ID 31,734 27 1 3.70% 40 17 1 5.88% 
IRELAND IE 315,034 7,365 26 0.35% 2,248 1,869 5 0.27% 
INDIA IN 376,226 4,071 1,506 36.99% 1,038 837 92 10.99% 
ITALY IT 1,177,875 85,509 4,637 5.42% 23,430 20,374 165 0.81% 
JAPAN JP 2,491,555 859,755 539,099 62.70% 27,277 24,028 1,466 6.10% 
SOUTH KOREA KR 1,880,957 308,915 181,446 58.74% 30,114 24,639 959 3.89% 
MOROCCO MA 39,776 204 4 1.96% 194 125 2 1.60% 
MEXICO MX 51,537 693 15 2.17% 345 293 4 1.37% 
MALAYSIA MY 48,960 1,234 48 3.89% 808 718 11 1.53% 
NETHERLANDS NL 898,455 61,452 17,770 28.92% 12,222 10,742 31 0.29% 
NORWAY NO 196,288 9,675 1,009 10.43% 3,304 2,669 62 2.32% 
NEW ZEALAND NZ 48,213 3,159 400 12.66% 1,305 1,034 20 1.93% 
PERU PE 138 6 0 0.00% 19 3 0 0.00% 
PHILIPPINES PH 19,828 72 5 6.94% 58 35 1 2.86% 
POLAND PL 155,335 6,200 128 2.07% 1,976 1,748 49 2.80% 
PORTUGAL PT 56,361 792 3 0.38% 509 465 2 0.43% 
RUSSIA RU 348,256 38,990 1,390 3.57% 10,433 9,878 46 0.47% 




SINGAPORE SG 298,165 9,154 2,152 23.51% 1,331 1,015 31 3.05% 
THAILAND TH 12,670 332 119 35.84% 135 102 5 4.90% 
TURKEY TR 98,833 1,125 1 0.09% 319 282 1 0.36% 
TAIWAN TW 956,315 190,907 118,492 62.07% 12,124 10,085 968 9.60% 
UNITED STATES US 3,959,054 1,427,425 627,682 43.97% 141,634 125,407 4,039 3.22% 
SOUTH AFRICA ZA 224,758 5,588 393 7.03% 1,678 1,454 25 1.72% 
Data source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition. 
Note: (1) refers to the country name. (2) refers to the "PERSON_CTRY_CODE" variable, namely, the corporate applicants' country code. It 
represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf). This is the country part of the correspondence address of applicants and 
inventors on PATSTAT.  (3) refers to the number of patents per country before any processing. The number of patents per country in this column 
is relevant to private and public companies. However, the number of them in this column is overestimated than real data. It is because a corporate 
applicant may be recorded with more than one country on PATSTAT (See detailed explanation in Appendix 3.2 Measuring the number of 
applications and number of citations). By using “Harvard University” (in Table 3.9 in the Appendix) as an example. Harvard University is a 
famous private university in the United States; however, it is recorded along with Italy and United States in the database and identified as a 
company. Around 10% of corporate applicants are recorded with more than one country code before processing (see detailed information in Table 
3.10 in the Appendix). (4) represents the number of patents per country after matching and removing extra country codes. The number of patents 
in this column is relevant to private and public companies. Compared with column (3), the number in column (4) is closer to the real data. It is 
because there is only less than 1% of the corporate applicants are associated with more than one country code after processing (see detailed 
information in Table 3.10 in the Appendix). In other words, most of the corporate applicants are associated with one country code after processing. 
In this column, the number of patents applied by Harvard University is only recorded in the United States. It is because although Harvard 
University is not a company, it is classified by PATSTAT into the company sector. Besides, we remove the link between it and Italy by subsection 




only relevant to the public companies because Datastream only includes public companies. In this column, the number of patents applied by 
Harvard University is not recorded in the United States. This is because Harvard Univeristy is not a public company and it is not matched with 
firm accounting information on Datastream. (6) is the percentage of matched patents to the total patents after matching and removing extra country 
codes (i.e., (5)/ (4)). (7) shows the number of applicants per country before any processing. (8) is the number of applicants per country after 
matching and removing extra country codes. (9) is the number of matched applicants per country after matching. (10) represents the percentage 




Table 3.2 The number of corporate applicants matched by each method 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AT 14 16 15 0 45 
AU 61 33 70 1 165 
BE 16 15 8 0 39 
BR 9 32 0 0 41 
CA 177 151 94 0 422 
CH 38 25 25 1 89 
CL 2 0 0 0 2 
CN 75 912 5 0 992 
CZ 27 0 0 0 27 
DE 143 166 93 4 406 
DK 17 26 13 0 56 
EG 0 2 0 0 2 
ES 34 13 12 0 59 
FI 29 19 14 1 63 
FR 337 53 28 3 421 
GB 125 71 157 0 353 
GR 1 2 2 0 5 
HK 2 7 0 1 10 
HU 0 0 3 0 3 
ID 0 1 0 0 1 
IE 1 4 0 0 5 
IN 25 29 38 0 92 
IT 110 26 29 0 165 
JP 566 878 0 22 1,466 
KR 192 763 3 1 959 
MA 1 1 0 0 2 
MX 1 3 0 0 4 
MY 7 3 1 0 11 




NO 41 9 12 0 62 
NZ 7 10 3 0 20 
PH 1 0 0 0 1 
PL 13 36 0 0 49 
PT 0 2 0 0 2 
RU 31 13 2 0 46 
SE 91 62 32 1 186 
SG 10 10 11 0 31 
TH 0 5 0 0 5 
TR 0 1 0 0 1 
TW 431 529 0 8 968 
US 2,043 787 1,199 10 4,039 
ZA 9 7 9 0 25 
Total 4,703 4,731 1,883 54 11,371 
Note: (1) refers to the "PERSON_CTRY_CODE" variable, it is the corporate applicants' country code, which 
represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the 
correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. The representation of strings in this column 
can be seen in Table 3.1. (2) refers to the number of applicants at PATSTAT successfully merged with their 
firm account information at the Datastream through the original name. (3) refers to the number of applicants at 
PATSTAT successfully merged with their firm account information at the Datastream through the full name. 
(4) refers to the number of applicants at PATSTAT, which is successfully merged with their firm account 
information at the Datastream through stem name. (5) refers to the number of applicants at PATSTAT is 
successfully merged with their firm account information at the Datastream through the manual match. (6) refers 
to the total number of applicants at PATSTAT is successfully merged with their firm account information at the 





Table 3.3 Country-Industry Breakdown of matched patents 1990-2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
AT . . 63 1,350 14 13 2 6 . . 
AU 1 86 . 1,429 140 46 . 17 288 1,416 
BE . 3 1 4,743 . . . 4 101 . 
BR 1 29 . 567 9 1 . . 1 . 
CA 11 498 . 15,417 535 94 . 460 1,014 . 
CH . . . 15,200 106 3 1 4 148 . 
CL . 20 . 1 . . . . . . 
CN 58 480 262 45,176 707 39 8 21 616 . 
CZ . 4 6 330 1 . . . . . 
DE 25 172 242 151,008 2,957 474 46 1,758 4,289 . 
DK 2 2 1 4,572 273 3 6 1 138 . 
EG . . 2 3 . . . . . . 
ES . 16 22 368 186 16 2 7 123 . 
FI 5 . 316 1,821 81 210 . 3 69 . 
FR 30 51 286 46,829 3,002 1,221 9 46 1,267 . 
GB 1 255 141 17,646 1,683 29 28 66 665 . 
GR 5 11 . 33 . . . . . . 
HK . 5 1 1,824 . . . . 9 . 
HU . . . 342 . . . . . . 
ID . . . 1 . . . . . . 
IE . . . 1 . . . . 25 . 
IN . 67 10 1,041 2 . . 23 363 . 
IT . 344 1 4,073 69 39 12 40 59 . 
JP 27 279 3,674 467,507 4,509 4,012 1,107 62 57,916 . 
KR 38 6 889 171,789 6,185 1,224 34 78 1,124 . 
MA . . . . 3 1 . . . . 
MX . . . 14 . 1 . . . . 




NL . 16 32 17,681 3 2 . 2 34 . 
NO . 296 13 593 53 12 . 1 41 . 
NZ 29 . 1 296 10 . 1 . 63 . 
PH . . . 5 . . . . . . 
PL . 15 7 97 2 2 1 . 1 . 
PT . . . 2 1 . . . . . 
RU . 414 52 732 154 11 5 5 . . 
SE . 1 14 18,212 13 1 8 68 372 2 
SG . 3 1 2,109 20 . 4 1 14 . 
TH . 3 . 115 . . . . 1 . 
TR . . . 1 . . . . . . 
TW . . 54 115,566 892 690 119 274 889 . 
US 385 1,771 136 476,313 8,844 2,076 614 3,457 132,637 24 
ZA . 68 . 213 59 14 . 10 6 . 
Total 618 4,946 6,227 1,585,027 30,514 10,234 2,007 6,415 202,281 1,442 
Note: (1) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate applicants’ country code, which 
represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the 
correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. The representation of strings in this column 
can be seen in Table 3.1. Column (2)-(11) are the industry division based on the 2-digit SIC code. (2) represents 
the “Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing” industry division. (3) represents the “Mining” industry division. (4) 
represents the “Construction” industry division. (5) represents the “Manufacturing” industry division. (6) 
represents the “Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services” industry division. (7) 
represents the “Wholesale Trade” industry division. (8) represents the “Retail Trade” industry division. (9) 
represents the “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate” industry division. (10) represents the “Services” industry 
















Figure 3.3 The percentage of the number of patents applied by the Top10% corporate applicants to that applied by all corporate 
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Note: The vertical axis is the number of patents applied by all corporate applicants in the dataset. The horizontal axis represents each year during the period from 1990 to 
2010. The blue line is the number of applications applied by all corporate applicants in the dataset. It is the sum of patents filed by both private and public companies. The 








































Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1 Recording patent applications on the PATSTAT database 
In this section, we describe a process by which the PATSTAT database records a patent 
application after it is submitted to the patent authority. According to Zuniga et al. (2009), there 
are four steps in the application and recording procedure:  
1. When the individual/institution decides to protect their inventions through patents, 
they will file the applications with patent authorities and expect to eventually obtain the 
patent right to their invention. In this step, the individual/institution that submits the 
patent application is the patent applicant; the date they submit the application to a patent 
authority is the application filing date. Additionally, the patent authority is the office 
that checks whether the invention conforms to the relevant laws and regulations and 
decides to grant the patent right or reject the application accordingly. 
2. The patent office will start to search and examine whether the invention is qualified 
for the granting of a patent after the application is filed and will generally publish the 
application 18 months later.20 The period between filing and the granting or refusing of 
patents ranges from two to eight years, and this is substantially different across patent 
offices. In this step, the date that the application goes public is the publication date. 
There is a series of publications for an application. Among them, the publication date 
of the earliest publication is the earliest publication date of that application. 
 
20 On November 29, 2000, the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) reduced the default publication time of 





3. If the application is ultimately granted as a patent, it will be labelled as "Granted". 
The first publication that makes the "Granted" announcement is known as the first 
granted publication. 
4. The applicant submits patent applications for an invention to different countries to 
protect their invention globally. Because patents are territorial, patent laws and 
examination processes are different from country to country. A set of applications that 
protect the same invention belong to a patent family. The earliest of them is the earliest 
application, and the application date is the earliest application date. 
In Figure A3.1, we show the front page of a published patent application from USPTO. We 
can identify the following information: the application authority, the title of the application, 
the investors' names and their correspondence address, assignee name and address, the 
application number, application filing date, publication number, publication date, other related 
patent applications, foreign application priority date, patent classification and abstract of 
application. 21 
*** Figure A3.1 *** 
We use one invention (i.e., identify by DOCDB_FAMILY_ID=3822559) recorded on 
PATSTAT as an example (in Table A3.1). This invention is called 'Unsupervised scene 
segmentation'. It is the title of the patent applications recorded in the 
 
21 The NBER database has been widely used in the innovation literature (e.g., Hall et al., 2005; Aghion et al., 
2013), it covers the patents that are filed in the US and granted by the USPTO (Moshirian et al., 2015). IIP Patent 




TLS202_APPLN_TITLE. 22  In addition to this, PATSTAT records the abstract of these 
applications in the TLS202_APPLN_ ABSTR.23  
*** Table A3.1 *** 
In Table A3.1, we observe that this invention's first application was filed with the Australian 
Patent Authority on 30/06/2000, and recorded with the application ID 2502166. It was 
published by the patent authority on 27/07/2000 through the publication ID 382921116. This 
publication contains ten applicants (i.e., NB_APPLICANTS=10) and zero investors (i.e., 
NB_INVENTORS=0).24 This application is the earliest application filed for this invention (i.e., 
DOCDB patent family). Therefore, this application is titled as the priority filing (or earliest 
filing) with the priority filing date (or earliest filing date), namely, 30/06/2000. 
EARLIEST_FILING_ID and EARLIEST_FILING_DATE are the same for all applications 
that belong to the same DOCDB patent family. 
 
22 TLS202_APPLN_TITLE is a dataset which contains the title of the application when available. It is not been 
introduced in detail in this chapter as the title of an application is less relevant to our research. Table 3.1 in the 
Appendix lists all applications belonging to the DOCDB_FAMILY_ID =3822559 in TLS202_APPLN_TITLE. 
23 TLS202_APPLN_ ABSTR is a dataset which contains the English language abstract when available. We list 
all abstracts of this invention in Table 3.3 in the Appendix. We do not introduce it in detail in this chapter because 
the title of an application is less relevant to our research. 
24 The five applicants are universities (UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, FLINDERS UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND) one is non-
profit governance institution (i.e., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (DEFENCE SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION) and four are companies (i.e., TELSTRA CORPORATION, COMPAQ 
COMPUTER AUSTRALIA, RLM SYSTEMS, CEA TECHNOLOGIES). The detailed information of applicants 
published via PAT_PUBLN_ID “382921116” is listed in Table 3.4 in the Appendix. The remaining applicants 




The second application was filed with the Australian Patent Authority on 28/06/2001 through 
application 1395187, which is in the international phase.25 It was published by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on 10/01/2002 via publication 290186427 and 
includes twelve applicants and two inventors. 
The other six applications were filed with Patent Authorities on 28/06/2001 through 
applications 1395187, 2199353, 2521129, 4785747, 15871796, 37959530, 273925312 and 
49522367. Three of them were finally awarded patents, namely applications 2199353, 
15871796 and 49522367. For the application 15871796, three documents were published by 
the European Patent Office (EP). The first and second publications are 290186429 and 
387625969, which were published separately on 14/05/2003 and 21/01/2009. The patent office 
announces that the application is granted through the third publication 290186433 on the date 
16/12/2009. 
In summary, PATSTAT records the entire process around the application for the patenting of 
an invention from submission, to examination, to the eventual granting or refusal of the 
application. It shows that more than one application may be submitted to protect an invention, 
and more than one publication may be announced for an application. The patent applicants 
recorded on each publication may not be the same.  We cannot measure a firm's innovative 
ability and link it with the account information from Datastream in these instances. It is more 
likely that we will be able to measure a firm's ability to submit applications rather than create 
 
25  PATSTAT database records the routes of an application through the value of attributes INT_PHASE, 
REG_PHASE and NAT_PHASE. The details can be seen in section 6.57 “INT_PHASE” of Data Catalog of 
PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition (). We do not introduce it in this chapter as the routes of an application are less 




an invention when we compute only the number of applications of a company. We describe 






Appendix 3.2 Measuring the number of applications and number of 
citations  
This section describes how to compute the number of patent applications and citations for each 
corporate applicant on PATSTAT. We do this in the following way: 
Step 1 We include global patents and their applicants from 1990 to 2010.26 Although 
PATSTAT (2016 Autumn Edition) covers the patent-based data until 2016, we exclude 
the final six years of the sample to ensure the data is relatively free of truncation-bias 
as the period between filing and granting of patents ranges substantially across patent 
offices (see Zuniga et al., 2009; Dass et al., 2017). Truncation-bias exists in the patent 
database because of the significant lag between a patent's application date and its 
publication date. Especially for the NBER database, the patent appears in this database 
only if it is granted (Fang et al., 2014). Papers, such as Fang et al. (2014), He and Tian 
(2013) and Acharya et al. (2014), correct the truncation-bias associated with the NBER-
2006 patent database (which records the patent-based date until 2006) following Hall 
et al. (2001, 2005)’s method which estimates the number of applications at the end of 
the sample. However, by comparing this with the real patent data at the NBER-2010 
database (which extends the time range to 2010), Dass et al. (2017) found that this 
adjustment performed poorly towards the end of the NBER-2006 sample. Therefore, 
we set a 20-year window between 1990 and 2010 to avoid the truncation-bias problem. 
In addition, we aim to measure a company’s  innovation ability. Thus, we only include 
 
26 The number of all “utility patent” applications submitted to the patent authority from 1990 to 2010 are shown 
in Figure 2 in the Appendix. It includes all applications of “utility patents” no matter whether it is finally granted 




the applications that are finally patented even though PATSTAT covers the application 
whether or not it is granted. 
Step 2 Computing the number of patent applications and patent citations at family-level 
rather than application-level. The patent family is designed to bundle the same 
invention into different patent documents (Kang and Tarasconi, 2016). This is because 
patents are territorial. Applications for an invention that have been filed in one country 
must be filed again in another country as patent laws and the examination processes 
vary among countries. If the innovation performance is measured using the number of 
patent applications, regardless of whether they are relevant to one invention or not, we 
are more likely to be able to calculate a firm's ability to make patent applications rather 
than its ability to innovate. Therefore, we calculate firm innovation at family-level, 
which means an invention is calculated just once no matter how many applications are 
made for it (Levine et al., 2017). Regarding this, we also compute the number of patent 
citations at family-family level. This means patent Family A will be cited only one time 
by Family B no matter how many patents in Family A are cited by patents in Family B. 
We use the patent family identifier which links all directly related patent applications 
on PATSTAT. The applications in this patent family have the same priorities; members 
of the family refer to the same invention.27 PATSTAT provides another patent family 
identifier that includes, directly and indirectly, patent applications. However, we do not 
 
27 According to the Data Catalog of PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition, if two applications claim exactly the same 
prior applications as priorities (these can be, for example, Paris Convention priorities or technical relation 
priorities – for details see Section 4.4.1 “Application replenishment for priorities”), then they are defined by the 




use this identifier because it includes a set of inventions and cannot display the 
company's innovation ability. 28 
Step3 We identify the first time an invention (i.e. with the same patent family identifier) 
is patented and record the patent applicants in that publication (Levine et al., 2017). 
This is because data from patent applications in a patent family may be different. Using 
patent family 3822559 in Table 3.1 in the Appendix as an example, 1) The number of 
patent applications applied for an invention is uncertain (e.g., it contains 9 applications 
submitted to 6 patent authorities). 2) The number of patent applications ultimately 
granted in a patent family is uncertain (e.g., while 3 applications are eventually granted, 
the rest are not). 3) The number of publications for a patent application is uncertain 
(e.g., there are three publications for application 15871796, two publications for 
application 49522367). 4) The applicants recorded in different publications for a patent 
application may be different (e.g., while applicant 47837215 is recorded in publication 
290186433, it is not recorded in publication 290186429 and 387625969).29 Regarding 
these, it would better to confirm a specific application in the patent family, thereby 
avoiding the potential bias in extracting information about applicants. 
Following Levine et al. (2017), we identify the first time an invention (i.e. with the 
same DOCDB patent family identifier) is patented and then use this patent to record the 
country of residence of its primary assignee (i.e., owner) and the country of the 
invention. By using patent family 3822559 in Table 3.1 in the Appendix as an example, 
 
28 An example of these two patent family identifier are listed in Table 3.5 in the Appendix, application 27081238 
(APPLN_ID=27081238) and 28809634 (APPLN_ID=28809634) which have different priorities (i.e., the priority 
application and date for application 27081238 are 27081238 and 06/03/1991, and them for application 28809634 
are 28809634 and 12/03/1991) belong to different DOCDB patent families but the same INPADOC patent family 
(i.e., INPADOC_FAMILY_ID=12564081). 




only publication 382935566, which was published on 13/10/2005, will be included in 
the sample. First, applications which were eventually not patented are excluded from 
the sample (i.e., row 1,2,3,5,9 and 10 are ignored by this research because of 
GRANTED=0 in these rows). Second, publications will be excluded from the sample 
when they do not make the first announcement that the invention is granted by the 
patent authority through the certain application (i.e., row 7,8 and 11 are excluded from 
the sample as PUBLN_FIRST_GRANT=0 in these rows). Finally, publications are 
excluded from this sample if they are published later than others (i.e., row 8 and 12 are 
excluded from the sample as the PUBLN_DATE of both is later than 13/10/2005).  
Step 4 This chapter uses the earliest filing date of the patent family to represent the date 
of the invention. Levine et al. (2017) use the application date of the first granted patent 
in the family to record the date of an invention. However, the earliest filing date is 
closer to the date when an invention occurred than the application date of the first 
granted patent. By using the first granted patent 2521129 in Table 3.1 as an example, 
this application was submitted to protect the invention on 28/06/2001; however, the 
first application to protect this invention was submitted on 30/06/2000. Compared with 
28/06/2001, the date 30/06/2000 is closer to the date when invention occurred. In 
addition, all patent applications in the same patent family have the same earliest filing 
date. Therefore, we chose the earliest filing date of the patent family to record the date 
of invention. 
Step 5 We only follow patent literature and focus on utility patents, like Levine et al. 
(2017). Excepting the utility patent, PATSTAT contains two other minor types of 
intellectual property rights, namely, utility model and design patent. 1) According to 




different rules compared to a utility patent. For instance, the term of a design patent is 
14 years measured from the date of grant, while the duration of a utility patent is 20 
years. 2) By only focusing on the utility patent, this study will be consistent with most 
of the other papers involved in this area because they generally extract innovation data 
from the NBER database, which only covers utility patents.  
Step 6 We follow Blanco and Wehrheim (2017) and count each patent for each firm 
even if the patent is filed by multiple applicants. Most literature in this area extracts 
innovation data from the NBER database (He and Tian, 2013; Fang et al., 2014). To 
the best of our knowledge, for papers that extract innovation data from the NBER 
database, there are two methods by which to measure patenting activity for each 
company when it contains multiple applicants. The first is provided by the NBER 
database, which calculates fractional patent ownership of each patent family by 
multiple  
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 (NBER, 2010). The second methods are provided by 
Blanco and Wehrheim (2017), who count each patent for each firm even if the patent 
is filed by multiple assignees. According to the current PATSTAT database, we have 
not found any variable by which to discern how much contribution is made by each 
applicant to patents, nor how many benefits they will receive from the patent. In terms 
of this, we follow Blanco and Wehrheim (2017) and count each patent for each firm.  
Step 7 The number of self-citations will be excluded from the sample. According to 
Hall et al. (2005), self-citations are defined as citations that comes from patents 
assigned to the same firm as that which holds the cited patent. It tends to be treated 
differently to external citations in many cases (Jaffe et al., 1993; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 
2002). First of all, as self-citations occur within the same economic unit, they cannot 




2005). In addition, self-citations tend to be affected by firms' differential knowledge 
and incentives with respect to internal versus external citations because the decision 
made by a patent examiner is partly based on information provided by the applicant and 
occurs in the process of negotiation with the applicant's lawyers. Therefore, the 
accuracy of the investigation tends to be affected by these self-citations. 
Step 8 Patent citations which occur three years after the earliest publication date of an 
invention will be excluded from the sample.30 Where a patent application was published 
in 1990, and another was published in 2000, it is unfair to compare the quality of their 
innovation through the number of patent citations without setting a time window. The 
earlier application tends to be cited more than the later applications because it has 
existed for longer. Therefore, we set a three-year moving window for counting the 
number of patent citations.  
Step 9 According to our research target, we exclude the patent inventors (i.e., 
APPLT_SEQ_NR > 0) and focus on institutions which belong to “company” sector 
(i.e., SECTOR ="COMPANY", "COMPANY GOV NON-PROFIT", "COMPANY 
GOV NON-PROFIT UNIVERSITY", "COMPANY HOSPITAL", "COMPANY 
UNIVERSITY"). As stated by the EEE-PPAT database, the sector codes are sometimes 
not unique because an entity can belong to multiple sectors. For example, a 
"COMPANY UNIVERSITY" is a company owned by the university but earns profits 
and with limited liability. 
Step 10 The sample will only include companies from the following 44 
countries/regions. We expect to merge patent-based data with a public firm's account 
 




information. However, not all countries have stock exchanges. Therefore, we cover 
certain countries by following the suggestion of Ince and Porter (2006), Griffin et al. 
(2010), Hanauer (2014), and Schmidt et al. (2015). 31 
The total number of patent applicants, applications, and citations relevant to each selected 
country/region before processing are shown separately in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3.8 in 
the Appendix. However, these figures are likely to be overestimated when comparing them 
with real data. This is because sometimes the standardised company name produced by the 
EEE-PPAT database is associated with several countries and is not a company. We use 
"Harvard University" (in Table 3.9 in the Appendix) as an example. Harvard University is a 
famous private university in the United States; however, it is recorded along with Italy and 
United States in the database and identified as a company. For the current dataset, 401,480 
companies are only related to a single country which covers more than 90% of the companies 
in this database (in Table 3.10 in the Appendix).  
*** Table A3.8 *** 
*** Table A3.9 *** 
*** Table A3.10 *** 
 




Appendix 3.3 Introduction to Datastream 
Datastream is a historical financial and macroeconomic database. It contains data on equities, 
stock market indices, company fundamentals, key economic indicators, fixed income securities 
and currencies for 175 countries and 60 markets. It focuses on public companies and their 
current subsidiaries.  
Following Hanauer's list (2014), the initial dataset includes both active and inactive companies 
in 23 developed countries/regions and 21 emerging countries/regions.32  Our initial sample 
includes companies that were listed between 1990 and 2010. It is set based on the time interval 
of the patent-based dataset from the PATSTAT database. 
Datastream includes different financial instruments, such as the American Depository Receipt, 
the Closed-End Fund and Stock Equity.33  We focus on stock equities that cover more than 96% 
of the records in the initial dataset. 
A firm may issue its equity shares on more than one exchange in the domestic country or abroad 
for many reasons. For example, to improve information disclosure, to have better investor 
protection or to overcome international investment barriers (Roosenboom and Van Dijk, 2009). 
Moreover, Datastream records each equity with a single unique ID; in other words, Datastream 
may include more than one record for an individual listed company. This will lead to a multiple 
matching problem. We eliminate this kind of problem by using the “ISINID” and “MAJOR” 
variables. We introduce the detail of this step in “Appendix3.4.4 Resolving Multiple matches”. 
 
32 The list of both active and inactive companies in 23 developed markets and 21 emerging markets is reported in 
Table 3.7 in the Appendix. 




For each unique ID in Datastream, five different name variables are recorded. This dataset 
includes four of them (i.e., WC06001, CNAME, PNAME and ECNAME) to avoid missing 
corporate applicants on the PATSTAT database. 34  In Table 3.12 in the Appendix, we 
demonstrate the description of each named variable and use US company “@POS.COM” 
(which can be identified through the unique ID “360125” on the Datastream database) as an 
example. Its “NAME” is “@POS.COM DEAD - DELIST 19/09/02”, which consists of the 
stem company name “@POS.COM”, its equity status “DEAD”, and its inactive date 
“19/09/02”.35 The “WC06001” name and “ECNAME” name of the company are “@POS.COM, 
INC.”  and “@POS.COM INCO”. They consist of the stem name and two different kinds of 
abbreviated company suffixes of “INCORPORATED”. The “PNAME” name is 
“ATPOS.COM”, and the “ECNAME” is “@POS.COM INCORPORATED”. We extracted 
these four company names from the Datastream database and merged them with corporate 
applicants on the PATSTAT database.  
*** Table A3.12 *** 
Datastream also includes the address information for each unique Datastream ID. Unlike 
address information on PATSTAT which are recorded in one variable, Datastream contains the 
address data through different variables, and these are country (GEOGN), state (WC06024), 
 
34 The company name from ‘NAME’ list is not processed in this paper, although it is a ‘three-star’ name variable 
and available for all institutions. According to the introduction from the Datastream database, it represents the 
name of the equity/company or equity list which is sorted in the database. The relevant information of the 
equity/company, such as current status, event date and share type, are also written in the latter part of the variable.  
However, in order to include these comments, the company name in the ‘NAME’ list tends to be abbreviated. 
There is no obvious sign to separate the abbreviated company name and remark information. Therefore, the 
company name in the ‘NAME’ list is excluded from this dataset to avoid the possible errors. 
35 Stem name is the company name that has removed the corporate extensions. For instance, the stem name of 





city (WC06023), street (WC06022) and postcode (WC06025). We employ this address 
information to identify the corporate applicants where corporate applicants on PATSTAT and 
companies on Datastream can be matched by stem name in the automatic matching procedure. 
It is also used to identify a unique company in order to solve the multiple matching problem. 
PATSTAT focuses on the patent-based information rather than on the account data of corporate 
applicants. In contrast, Datastream covers public companies’ account information rather than 
patent-based data. In this case, this research aims to link the PATSTAT database with the 
Datastream database through company names. We face the following two challenges in this 
chapter, 1) Stings in the name variable of these two databases include not only the company 
name but also the company’s address, explanation and stock status. 2) as we try to process 
companies' names across 44 countries, we need to consider the conversion of language and 
company suffixes in terms of different countries' conditions. We describe how to overcome 




Appendix 3.4 Steps taken in matching 
In this section, we create a dataset which matches corporate applicant name on the PATSTAT 
database with their unique ID on the Datastream database. To do that, we 1) standardise the 
company names from PATSTAT and Datastream separately, and then 2) match them together 
using automated and manual matching procedures. The automated matching procedure 
includes merging standardised "full string" and "stem string" company names in both databases. 
The "full string" company name represents the company names that are standardised and 
stripped out spaces, and the "stem string" company name is the company names that are 
standardised, the corporate extensions removed and then stripped out spaces. By using the 
company name "3DS FAMILY COMPANY" as an example, it is converted to the "full string" 
company name "3DSFAMCO" and "stem string" name "3DSFAM". After doing that, 3) we 
manually match the names of companies that applied for at least 700 patents during the period 
1990 to 2010.  
To obtain accurate results, the matched companies from both databases are required to belong 
to the same country if they are merged by the "full string" company names. Additionally, the 
matched companies are required to belong to the same country and same address (i.e., state, 
city, street or zip code) if they are matched by "stem string" company names.  
 
A3.4.1 Name standardisation  
We divide the name standardisation procedures into three main steps, namely, word 
standardisation (Step1-Step3), name standardisation (Step4-Step5), and creating full/stem 
names (Step6, Step7). Except for some special cases, the name standardisation procedures are 




Step 1: Converting to upper case characters. For example, the lower character "a" is 
converted to the "A".   
Step2 Replacing accented characters as non-accented characters. For example, "Æ" is 
replaced with "A.E.", all words like "ÀÁÂÃÄÅ" becomes "A" and strings like 
"{UMLAUT OVER (X)}" is converted to "X". 
Step3 Unifying the word "AND" of each country to "&".  The conversion of the strings 
"AND" in non-English languages (such as, "UND", "ET" and "Y")  is identified based 
on the official languages of each country and Google Translate. For example, as the 
official language of Germany is German, the "AND" is translated as "UND" from 
English to German by Google Translate. Regarding this, for any German company, we 
convert strings "UND" in name variables to “&”. 
Step4 Cleaning extra strings at the ending of the value. The strings recorded in most of 
the name variables is just company name. However, in part of the name variables, they 
include not only a company’s name but also the company’s information, such as their 
address/explanation and status. In Table 3.13 in Appendix, we show the structure of 
strings recorded at the name variable. 
*** Table A3.13 *** 
Especially regarding the PATSTAT database, strings in name variables have three structures, 
and they are "Company name", "Company Name + address/explanation" and "Company Name 
+ Company Name". 
1) "Company name" represents the strings recorded at name variable and only contains the 




string in the name variable only contains the company name. No action is required for this type 
of variable in this step. 
2) "Company name + address/explanation" is the name variable which consists of the company 
name and its address/explanation, such as 'BODE CHEMIE & COMPANY 22525 
HAMBURG' and 'AGE SCIENCES CORPORATION, A UTAH CORPORATION'. For this 
kind of name, we exclude the address/explanations which follow the company suffix, thereby 
getting the new variable as 'BODE CHEMIE & COMPANY' and 'AGE SCIENCES 
CORPORATION'. 
3) "Company Name + Company Name" means the strings in the company name variable 
includes two company names. This kind of name variable can be identified and split by the 
keyword. Using a record "BENZ COMPANIES, INC., D/B/A BENZ AIRBORNE SYSTEMS" 
as an example, it includes two company names, which are "BENZ COMPANIES, INC.,", 
"BENZ AIRBORNE SYSTEMS", and a keyword "D/B/A", which means "doing business as". 
Therefore, the strings recorded in the name variable means "BENZ COMPANIES, INC.," 
doing business as "BENZ AIRBORNE SYSTEMS". We identify this name variable by the 
"D/B/A", and spilt it into two new name variables, which are "BENZ COMPANIES, INC.," 
and "BENZ AIRBORNE SYSTEMS". 
For the Datastream database, there are two structures of strings in name variables, which are 
"Company Name" and "Company Name + status/explanation". While the "Company Name" 
variable does not need to be processed, the "Company Name + status/explanation" variable 
consists of the company's name and its status/explanation. By using "CENTAUR MINING 
AND EXPLORATION LTD- A.D.R." as an example, "CENTAUR MINING AND 




depositary receipt" which is the status of the company/equity. We exclude the 
"status/explanation" of this type of name variable, thereby getting the new variable. 
Step5 Splitting based on single brackets. In some cases, the unabbreviated company 
name is enclosed in single brackets. It exists after the abbreviation company name in 
the name variable, such as "3COM CORP ( COMPUTERS COMMUNICATION 
COMPATIBILITY CORP )". It consists of the abbreviated name "3COM CORP" and 
the expanded name "COMPUTERS COMMUNICATION COMPATIBILITY CORP". 
However, in other cases, the strings in the single brackets are only part of the company 
name, such as "3CSCAN ( BEIJING ) TECHNOLOGY CO". To cover all "correct" 
company names, we retain all original company names, the strings within the single 
brackets, and without parentheses in this step (in Table 3.14 in the Appendix). We 
manually check each of them if the companies in the databases are matched based on 
the strings within/without the single brackets. 
*** Table A3.14  *** 
Step6 Cleaning punctuations. We substitute all punctuation except "&" with a blank in 
this step. For example, the variable "3D-VIZ.COM "converts to "3D VIZ COM ". 
Step7 Name cleaning. We standardise corporate name by replacing the company suffix 
with their commonly used acronyms. For example, replace "PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED" with "PLC", "LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY" with "LLC". We also 
standardise the name based on the abbreviated words on the Datastream database. As 
an example, "ALUMINIUM" and "ALUMINUM" are replaced with "ALUM", 
"COUNTRY" and "COUNTRIES" are replaced with "CTRY". By doing this, we get 




Step8 Creating the stem name. This is created by removing the corporate legal identifier 
from the standardised full company name. For instance, the standardised full company 
name "3DS FAMILY CO" is produced as a standardised stem name "3DS FAMILY" 
by removing the company suffix "CO". 
Step9 Striping out spaces. As the final step, we strip out spaces from the standardised 
full company name and standardised stem name. As mentioned above, the company 
name "3DS FAMILY COMPANY" is converted to the "full sting" company name 
"3DSFAMCO" and "stem string" company name "3DSFAM". 
We create four lists of name variables after doing the name standardisation procedures at both 
databases, which are "full string" and "stem string" company name from the PATSTAT 
database, as well as the "full string" and "stem string" company name from Datastream database.  
 
A3.4.2 Automatic matching  
We produce automatic matching after the "full string" and "stem string" company names have 
been created on both databases separately. Table 3.15 in the Appendix indicates lists of the 
company name that are going to be merged in each step and the requirements for it. We divide 
the automatic matching procedure into three steps, namely, matching based on the original 
company name, "full sting" company name and "stem string" company name separately.  
*** Table A3.15 *** 
For original name matching, we match the companies on both databases by the capitalised 
name and the country code. The original name is defined as a corporate name that is not 




database and listed companies' names on the Datastream have been capitalised, we still add this 
step to ensure that no characters are missing. The corporate applicants are successfully merged 
with company names if they have the same original name and are in the same country. For 
example, the applicant "SHARP CORPORATION" on PATSTAT is successfully linked to the 
ID "906288" on Datastream, as the strings of this ID's name variable (i.e., WC06001 and 
ECNAME) are also "SHARP CORPORATION". Besides, they are both recorded with the 
same country code "JP" (i.e., Japan).  In terms of the same original name and country code, 
they are regarded as a pair of the successfully merged company name. 
For full name matching, when companies on PATSTAT and Datastream are merged through 
the full name, they have to be recorded within the same country/region, otherwise, they will 
not be defined as a matched company. By using the three observations in Table 3.16 in the 
Appendix as an example, the applicant "STEYR-DAIMLER-PUCH AG, WIEN" on 
PATSTAT and "ADAM OPEL AG" on Datastream are not matched as they do not have the 
same full name string. For the second rows, although the applicant “ "SKY LTD. " ” and the 
company “SKY LTD" have the same full name string, they do not belong to the same country. 
Only the applicant "A. G. V. PRODUCTS CORPORATION" and the company "A.G.V. 
PRODUCTS CORP" satisfies the criterion, because they the same full name string and are 
recorded within the same country/region, namely "TW" (i.e., TAIWAN). 
*** Table A3.16 *** 
For the stem name matching, the merged companies must not only be in the same 
country/region but also be recorded within the same street (i.e., WC06022) /city (i.e., WC06023) 
/state (i.e., WC06024) /postcode (i.e., WC06025). In other words, the value of at least one of 
these four variables on Datastream should tally with part of strings in the variable 




"MOBILE MINI" on PATSTAT and company "130042" on Datastream, which records the 
same stem name and country code, are not defined as matched. This is because the value of 
street, city, state or postcode does not match the part of strings in the "PERSON_ADDESS" 
variable. However, the applicant "ESPIAL GROUP" and company "50547J" in the second 
observation is merged successfully in terms of the same stem name, country code, city and 
state and postcode. 
*** Table A3.17 *** 
 
A3.4.3 Manual matching 
In this step, we manually check corporate applicants who have not successfully merged through 
automatic matching but have filed at least 700 applications to the patent authorities. Firstly, we 
manually search the applicant's name on Datastream and check their address information. We 
then perform an internet search and include observations only when we can confirm that these 
companies are the same. For example, the company "JOHN DEERE" on PATSTAT was 
manually matched with "DEERE & COMPANY"  (Datastream ID= 906189) on the Datastream 
database. This is because John Deere is the brand name of Deere & Company. In this way, we 
ensure that the dataset includes all large corporate applicants who are listed companies. 
 
A3.4.4 Resolving Multiple matches 





1) A company can list and trade its equities in the different financial markets (or even over the 
counter) in different countries. Therefore, a company on Datastream may have more than one 
record. By using the matching result of corporate applicant "ACE HARDWARE 
CORPORATION" (in Table 3.18 in the Appendix) as an example, this is matched with three 
different IDs on Datastream, namely, "28145X", "878063" and "878064". We excluded 
duplicate Datastream company observations like these through ISINID and MAJOR variables 
on Datastream separately.36 By setting primary equity (i.e., ISINID= "P") and major security 
(i.e., MAJOR= "Y"), the dataset excludes the observation "878063" and "878064", namely, the 
applicant "ACE HARDWARE CORPORATION" at PATSTAT is linked to "28145X" on 
Datastream. 
*** Table A3.18 *** 
2) Different IDs on Datastream can have the same standard name or stem name. For instance, 
in Table 3.19 in the Appendix, the entries "86523W" and "902317" have the same standard 
name "PECOENERGYCO". It is as same as the standardised name of the corporate applicant 
on PATSTAT. We identify the unique Datastream ID by matching the address information. In 
this example, "86523W" is in the same city as the patent applicant company. Therefore, we 
exclude the company "902317" from the dataset. 
*** Table A3.19 *** 
The Unresolved multiple matches are excluded from the final output. 
 
36 ISINID is the primary/secondary flag. It returns “P” or “S” when the equity record is the primary/secondary one 
(i.e., the domestic/foreign listing of the share or depository receipt or certificate).  MAJOR is the major security 
flag. It returns “Y” or “N” to indicate whether the security is the one with the most significant market capitalization 




A record on Datastream can also be matched with more than one patent applicant on PATSTAT. 
By using the Datastream company "905047" as an example, it links two patent applicants, 
which are "R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY" and "R. R. DONNELLEY AND SONS 
COMPANY". We add the number of the patent application and the number of patent citations 
of these two applicants together.  
 
A3.4.5 Remove extra country codes 
We delete the country data of patent applicants by following two steps: 
1. We exclude the country code if it does not include any address information.  
2. We count the distinct number of address information for each applicant in a 
specific country. We then include the most frequently appearing countries for 
each applicant in the dataset.   
Using the applicant "02 MICRO" in Table 3.20 in the Appendix as an example, row 2 is 
removed because its address information is empty. For the rest observations, "02 MICRO" is 
relevant to PERSON_CTRY_CODE "TW", and "US". Among them, the "US" which appears 
6 times, is the most common country name for applicant "02 MICRO". Therefore, the "02 
MICRO" is recorded with "US" in the new dataset. It is worth noting that both country codes 
will be recorded if they appear the same number of times. It is not helpful to merge more 
applicants on PATSTAT to the firm account information on Datastream but it is useful to 
understand what percentage of companies are merged within a country. More than 99% of 
companies on PATSTAT are only recorded with one country after the removal of the extra 









Table A3.1 Applicants data belong to DOCDB_FAMILY_ID =3822559 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
1 2502166 AU 30/06/2000 N N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 27/07/2000 382921116 0 3822559 9 10 0 382921116 AU 0 27/07/2000 
2 1395187 AU 28/06/2001 Y N N 30/06/2000 2502166 10/01/2002 290186427 0 3822559 9 12 2 290186427 WO 0 10/01/2002 
3 4785747 CA 28/06/2001 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 10/01/2002 335049588 0 3822559 9 10 2 335049588 CA 0 10/01/2002 
4 2199353 AU 28/06/2001 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 14/01/2002 290186428 0 3822559 9 10 2 290186428 AU 0 14/01/2002 
5 37959530 JP 28/06/2001 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 22/01/2004 290186431 0 3822559 9 0 0 290186431 JP 0 22/01/2004 
6 2521129 AU 28/06/2001 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 13/10/2005 382935566 1 3822559 9 10 2 382935566 AU 1 13/10/2005 
7 15871796 EP 28/06/2001 Y Y N 30/06/2000 2502166 14/05/2003 290186429 1 3822559 9 6 2 290186429 EP 0 14/05/2003 
7 15871796 EP 28/06/2001 Y Y N 30/06/2000 2502166 14/05/2003 290186429 1 3822559 9 6 2 387625969 EP 0 21/01/2009 
7 15871796 EP 28/06/2001 Y Y N 30/06/2000 2502166 14/05/2003 290186429 1 3822559 9 6 2 290186433 EP 1 16/12/2009 
8 273925312 DE 28/06/2001 Y Y Y 30/06/2000 2502166 28/01/2010 317783195 0 3822559 9 6 2 317783195 DE 0 28/01/2010 
9 49522367 US 06/02/2003 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 11/09/2003 290186430 1 3822559 9 1 2 290186430 US 0 11/09/2003 
9 49522367 US 06/02/2003 Y N Y 30/06/2000 2502166 11/09/2003 290186430 1 3822559 9 1 2 290186432 US 1 28/11/2006 
Data Source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition 
Note: (1) refers to the number of applications of this patent family. (2) refers to the "APPLN_ID" variable. It is application identification, representing a unique technical identifier (i.e., a unique 
patent application) on PATSTAT. (3) refers to the "APPLN_AUTH" variable. It is the application authority representing the office where the National, International or Regional application was 
filed. (4) refers to the "APPLN_FILING_DATE" variable; it is the application filing date, which shows the date on which the application was physically received at the Patent Authority. (5)-(7) 
represent the possible routes of an application, and the detail can be seen in the subsection "6.57 INT_PHASE" of "https://research-it.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-




filings at the receiving office as well as all applications based on these filings. (6) refers to the "REG_PHASE" variable; it indicates whether the application is or has been in the regional phase. 
(7) refers to the "NAT_PHASE" variable; it indicates that an application is in the national phase. (8) refers to the "EARLIEST_FILING_DATE" variable; it is the date of earliest filing of an 
invention (i.e., in the same Docdb patent family, only directly related applications are considered). (9) refers to the "EARLIEST_FILING_ID" variable, representing the application identification 
of the earliest filing. It represents the earliest filed application of a group of patent applications which directly related through technical relations and its application continuations. (10) refers to 
the "EARLIEST_PUBLN_DATE" variable; it is the date of the earliest publication of an application. (11) refers to the "EARLIEST_PAT_PUBLN_ID" variable; it is the identification of the 
earliest publication of an application. (12) is the " GRANTED " indicator; it equals "1" if there exists a publication of the grant; "0" otherwise. (13) refers to the "DOCDB_FAMILY_ID" variable. 
It is the identifier of a DOCDB simple family, which means that most probably the applications share specific the same priorities and generally refer to the same invention. (14) refers to the 
"DOCDB_FAMILY_SIZE" variable; it is the size of the DOCDB simple family, which shows the number of applications been covered by the DOCDB family. (15) refers to the 
"NB_APPLICANTS" variable; it is the number of applications of an application according to the most recent publication. (16) refers to the "NB_INVENTORS" variable; it is the number of 
inventors of an application according to the most recent publication. (17) refers to the "PAT_PUBLN_ID" variable, it is the patent publication identification. (18) refers to the "PUBLN_AUTH" 
variable, it is the patent authority that issued the publication of the application. (19) refers to the "PUBLN_FIRST_GRANT" variable, it equals "1" if the publication can be considered as the first 




Table A3.2 Data for all applications belong to DOCDB_FAMILY_ID =3822559 in 
TLS202_APPLN_TITLE 
(1) (2) (3) 
1395187 en UNSUPERVISED SCENE SEGMENTATION 
2199353 en Unsupervised scene segmentation 
2502166 en Unsupervised scene segmentation 
2521129 en Unsupervised scene segmentation 
4785747 en UNSUPERVISED SCENE SEGMENTATION 
15871796 en UNSUPERVISED SCENE SEGMENTATION 
49522367 en Unsupervised scene segmentation 
273925312 de UNÜBERWACHTE SZENENSEGMENTIERUNG 
Data Source: TLS202_APPLN_TITLE, PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition.  
Note: (1) refers to application identification, representing a unique technical identifier (i.e., a unique patent 
application) on PATSTAT. (2) refers to the language of the title of the application selected for and loaded 









Table A3.3 Data for all applications belong to DOCDB_FAMILY_ID =3822559 in 
TLS202_APPLN_ ABSTR 
(1) (2) (3) 
1395187 en A method of segmenting objects in an image is described. The method 
applies a Top Hat algorithm to the image then constructs inner and 
outer markers for application to the original image in a Watershed 
algorithm. The inner marker is constructed using binary erosion. The 
outer marker is constructed using binary dilation and perimeterisation. 
The method finds particular application for first level segmentation of 
a cell nucleus prior to detailed analysis. 
4785747 en A method of segmenting objects in an image is described. The method 
applies a Top Hat algorithm to the image then constructs inner and 
outer markers for application to the original image in a Watershed 
algorithm. The inner marker is constructed using binary erosion. The 
outer marker is constructed using binary dilation and perimeterisation. 
The method finds particular applicatio n for first level segmentation of 
a cell nucleus prior to detailed analysis.</ SDOAB> 
49522367 en A method of segmenting objects in an image is described. The method 
applies a Top Hat algorithm to the image then constructs inner and 
outer markers for application to the original image in a Watershed 
algorithm. The inner marker is constructed using binary erosion. The 
outer marker is constructed using binary dilation and perimeterisation. 
The method finds particular application for first level segmentation of 
a cell nucleus prior to detailed analysis. 
Data Source: TLS203_APPLN_ABSTR, PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition.  
Note: (1) refers to the "APPLN_ID" variable. It is application identification, representing a unique technical 
identifier (i.e., a unique patent application) on PATSTAT. (2) refers to the "APPLN_ABSTRACT_LG" variable, 
representing the language of the abstract of the application selected for and loaded in PATSTAT. (3) refers to 




Table A3.4 Information of patent applicants recorded with PAT_PUBLN_ID 
=382921116 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
382921116 13764063 1 0 UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE UNIVERSITY 
382921116 13668410 2 0 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA 
UNIVERSITY 




382921116 13764068 4 0 FLINDERS UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY 




382921116 14669183 6 0 
COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTRALIA (DEFENCE 




382921116 8807951 7 0 TELSTRA CORPORATION COMPANY 




382921116 14670547 9 0 RLM SYSTEMS COMPANY 
382921116 13764066 10 0 CEA TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY 
Data Source: TLS203_APPLN_ABSTR, PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition.  
Note: (1) refers to "PAT_PUBLN_ID" variable, it is patent publication identification. (2) refers to the 
"PERSON_ID" variable, which is person identification. (3) refers to the "APPLT_SEQ_NR" variable, 
representing the sequence number of applicants. (4) refers to the "INVT_SEQ_NR" variable, representing the 
sequence number of inventors. (5) refers to the "HRM_L2" variable representing the standardised name 
created by the EEE-PPAT database. (6) refers to the "SECTOR" variable at the EEE-PPAT database 




Table A3.5 Part Data for all applications belong to INPADOC_FAMILY_ID=12564081 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
27081238 JP 06/03/1991 06/03/1991 27081238 05/10/1992 393420303 1 12564081 7297826 1 
28809634 JP 12/03/1991 12/03/1991 28809634 07/10/1992 393421563 1 13489253 7297826 1 
34221362 JP 09/08/1991 09/08/1991 34221362 23/02/1993 393514199 1 16421334 7297826 1 
35962935 JP 16/11/1990 16/11/1990 35962935 26/06/1992 393377683 0 17986774 7297826 1 
53490507 US 18/11/1991 18/11/1991 53490507 18/01/1994 301123485 1 27460821 7297826 1 
Data Source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition 
Note: (1) refers to the "APPLN_ID" variable. It is application identification, representing a unique technical identifier (i.e., a unique patent application) on PATSTAT. (2) 
refers to the "APPLN_AUTH" variable. It is the application authority, representing the office where the National, International or Regional application was filed. (3) refers 
to the "APPLN_FILING_DATE" variable. It is the application filing date, which shows the date on which the application was physically received at the Patent Authority. (4) 
refers to the "EARLIEST_FILING_ID" variable, which is the application identification of the earliest filing. It represents the earliest filed application of a group of patent 
applications which directly related through technical relations and its application continuations. (5) refers to the "EARLIEST_FILING_DATE" variable. It is the date of the 
earliest filing of an invention (i.e., in the same Docdb patent family, only directly related applications are considered). (6) refers to the "EARLIEST_PUBLN_DATE" variable. 
It is the date of the earliest publication of an application. (7) refers to the "EARLIEST_PAT_PUBLN_ID" variable. It is the identification of the earliest publication of an 
application. (8) is the " GRANTED " indicator; it equals "1" if there exists a publication of the grant; "0" otherwise. (9) refers to the "DOCDB_FAMILY_ID" variable. It is 
the identifier of a DOCDB simple family, which means that most probably the applications share specific the same priorities and generally refer to the same invention. (10) 
refers to the "INPADOC_FAMILY_ID" variable. It is the identifier of an INPADOC extended priority family. The INPADOC family generally covers one or more DOCDB 
families and covers a set of related inventions. (11) refers to the "DOCDB_FAMILY_SIZE" variable. It is the size of the DOCDB simple family, which shows the number of 




Table A3.6 Information of patent applicants recorded with application 15871796 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
290186429 1142249 1 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE UNIVERSITY Adelaide, S.A. 5005 
290186429 881138 2 0 AU COMPAQ COMPUTER AUSTRALIA COMPANY 139 Frome Street,Adelaide, SA 5000 
290186429 881139 3 0 AU RLM SYSTEMS COMPANY 
23 Lakeside Drive,Burwood East, 
VIC 3151 
290186429 881140 4 0 AU CEA TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY 
65 Gladstone Street,Fyshwick, ACT 
2609 
290186429 1142250 5 0 AU 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
REPRESENTED BY DSTO 
GOV NON-PROFIT Salisbury S.A. 5108 
290186429 73072 6 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA UNIVERSITY North Terrace,Adelaide, S.A. 5000 
290186433 47837215 1 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE UNIVERSITY Adelaide,S.A. 5005 
290186433 881138 2 0 AU COMPAQ COMPUTER AUSTRALIA COMPANY 139 Frome Street,Adelaide, SA 5000 
290186433 881139 3 0 AU RLM SYSTEMS COMPANY 
23 Lakeside Drive,Burwood East, 
VIC 3151 
290186433 881140 4 0 AU CEA TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY 
65 Gladstone Street,Fyshwick, ACT 
2609 
290186433 1142250 5 0 AU 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
REPRESENTED BY DSTO 




290186433 73072 6 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA UNIVERSITY North Terrace,Adelaide, S.A. 5000 
387625969 1142249 1 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE UNIVERSITY Adelaide, S.A. 5005 
387625969 881138 2 0 AU COMPAQ COMPUTER AUSTRALIA COMPANY 139 Frome Street,Adelaide, SA 5000 
387625969 881139 3 0 AU RLM SYSTEMS COMPANY 
23 Lakeside Drive,Burwood East, 
VIC 3151 
387625969 881140 4 0 AU CEA TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY 
65 Gladstone Street,Fyshwick, ACT 
2609 
387625969 1142250 5 0 AU 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
REPRESENTED BY DSTO 
GOV NON-PROFIT Salisbury S.A. 5108 
387625969 73072 6 0 AU UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA UNIVERSITY North Terrace,Adelaide, S.A. 5000 
Note: (1) refers to "PAT_PUBLN_ID" variable, it is patent publication identification. (2) refers to the "PERSON_ID" variable, which is person identification. (3) refers 
to the "APPLT_SEQ_NR" variable, which is the sequence number of applicants. (4) refers to the "INVT_SEQ_NR" variable, which is the sequence number of 
inventors. (5) refers to the "PERSON_CTRY_CODE" variable. It is the corporate applicants' country code, which represents the country name based on the two-letter 
alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the correspondence address 
of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT.  (6) refers to the "HRM_L2" variable, which is the standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (7) refers to the 






Table A3.7 Constituent lists 
Country  Lists  Country Lists 
Panel A Developed markets 
Australia DEADAU Japan  DEADJP 
 WSCOPEAU  WSCOPEJP 
 FAUS  FJAP 
Austria DEADOE  FTOKYO 
 WSCOPEOE  FOSAKA 
 FOST  FJASDAQ 
Belgium DEADBG Netherlands DEADNL 
 WSCOPEBG  WSCOPENL 
 FBDO  FHOL 
 FBEL New Zealand DEADNZ 
Canada  DEADCN1  WSCOPENZ 
 DEADCN2  FNWZ 
 WSCOPECN Norway  DEADNW 
 FVANC  WSCOPENW 
 FTORO  FNOR 
Denmark DEADDK Portugal DEADPT 
 WSCOPEDK  WSCOPEPT 
 FDEN  FPOR 
Finland DEADFN  FPOM 
 WSCOPEFN  FPSM 
 FFIN Singapore  DEADSG 
France DEADFR  WSCOPESG 
 WSCOPEFR  FSIN 




Germany DEADBD1 Spain  DEADES 
 DEADBD2  WSCOPEES 
 DEADBD3  FSPN 
 WSCOPEBD  FSPNQ 
 FGERDOM  FSPDOM 
Greece  DEADGR Sweden DEADSD 
 WSCOPEGR  WSCOPESD 
 FGRMM  FSWD 
 FNEXA Switzerland DEADSW 
 FGRPM  WSCOPESW 
 FGREE  FSWS 





 FHK1  WSCOPEUK 
 FHK2  FBRIT 
 FHKQ UNITED STATES DEADUS1 - DEADUS6 
Ireland  DEADIR  WSUS1 - WSUS20 
 WSCOPEIR  FUSAA - FUSAG 
 FIRL   
Italy DEADIT   
 WSCOPEIT   
 FITA   
Country  Lists  Country Lists 
Panel B Developing markets 
Brazil  DEADBRA  Morocco  DEADMOR 




 FBRA   FMOR 
 DEADCHI  Peru  DEADP 
Chile  WSCOPECL  WSCOPEPE 
 FCHILE   FPERU 
 DEADCH  Philippines  DEADPH 
China  WSCOPECH   WSCOPEPH 
 FCHINA   FPHI 
Colombia  DEADCO   FPHIQ 
 WSCOPECB  Poland  DEADPO 
 FCOL  WSCOPEPO 
Czech Republic DEADCZ   FPOL 
 WSCOPECZ  Russia  DEADRU 
 FCZECH   WSCOPERS 
Egypt  DEADEGY   FRUS 
 WSCOPEEY  South Africa  DEADSAF 
 FEGYPT  WSCOPESA 
Hungary  DEADHU   FSAF 
 WSCOPEHN  South Korea  DEADKO 
 FHUN   WSCOPEKO 
India DEADIND  FKOR 
 WSCOPEIN  Taiwan  DEADTW 
 FINDIA  WSCOPETA 
 DEADIDN   FTAI 
Indonesia  WSCOPEID   FTAIQ 
 FINO  Thailand DEADTH 




 WSCOPEMY   FTHA 
 FMAL   FTHAQ 
 FMALQ  Turkey  DEADTK 
Mexico  DEADME   WSCOPETK 
 WSCOPEMX  FTURK 
 FMEX   





Table A3.8 The number of applications and citations for the selected countries/regions 
before processing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
AT 4,923 427,122 173,668 
AU 8,113 397,849 151,696 
BE 2,834 419,852 173,191 
BR 1,295 458,193 166,810 
CA 12,844 932,701 384,966 
CH 11,124 1,076,278 371,913 
CL 167 9,557 4,110 
CN 65,269 1,687,877 487,802 
CO 94 144,173 34,781 
CZ 1,788 146,685 46,427 
DE 50,792 2,033,580 712,529 
DK 3,640 332,700 135,662 
EG 36 37,789 10,214 
ES 9,312 457,768 181,754 
FI 4,090 467,601 179,689 
FR 22,840 1,606,855 545,609 
GB 25,065 1,823,774 658,570 
GR 216 44,294 17,549 
HK 2,302 144,413 50,128 
HU 1,398 225,079 68,957 
ID 40 31,734 23,157 
IE 2,248 315,034 144,778 
IN 1,038 376,226 157,057 




JP 27,277 2,491,555 819,878 
KR 30,114 1,880,957 594,147 
MA 194 39,776 12,434 
MX 345 51,537 17,014 
MY 808 48,960 13,284 
NL 12,222 898,455 336,352 
NO 3,304 196,288 75,012 
NZ 1,305 48,213 15,385 
PE 19 138 17 
PH 58 19,828 4,721 
PL 1,976 155,335 57,192 
PT 509 56,361 18,875 
RU 10,433 348,256 91,399 
SE 8,838 705,749 281,004 
SG 1,331 298,165 122,221 
TH 135 12,670 4,231 
TR 319 98,833 28,109 
TW 12,124 956,315 278,004 
US 141,634 3,959,054 1,313,642 
ZA 1,678 224,758 97,152 
Data source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition 
Note: (1) refers to the "PERSON_CTRY_CODE" variable, it is the corporate applicants' country code, which 
represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the 
correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. (2) refers to the total number of applicants for 
each selected country/region before the matching process. (3) refers to the total number of patent applications for 
each selected countries/region before the matching process. (4) refers to the total number of patent citations for 




Table A3.9 "HARVARD UNIVERSITY" in EEE-PPAT database 
(1) (2) (3) 
IT HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMPANY 
US HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMPANY 
US HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMPANY HOSPITAL 
US HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMPANY GOV NON-PROFIT 
Data source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition 
Note: (1) refers to the "PERSON_CTRY_CODE" variable, it is the corporate applicants' country code, 
which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the 
correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. (2) refers to the "HRM_L2" variable, 
which is the standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (3) refers to the "SECTOR" variable 





Table A3.10 How many countries an HRM_L2 related to 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 401,480 90.31% 435,374 99.26% 
2 31,238 7.03% 3,072 0.70% 
3 7,079 1.59% 163 0.04% 
4 2,487 0.56% 4 0.00% 
5 1,085 0.24% 4 0.00% 
6 532 0.12% 0 0.00% 
7 279 0.06% 0 0.00% 
8 154 0.03% 0 0.00% 
9 84 0.02% 0 0.00% 
10 60 0.01% 0 0.00% 
11 25 0.01% 0 0.00% 
12 21 0.00% 0 0.00% 
13 12 0.00% 0 0.00% 
14 9 0.00% 0 0.00% 
15 6 0.00% 0 0.00% 
16 3 0.00% 0 0.00% 
17 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 
18 2 0.00% 0 0.00% 
19 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 
20 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 
21 5 0.00% 0 0.00% 




25 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 
29 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Data source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition 
Note: (1) is the number of countries an applicant related to. (2) is the number of 
companies is related to the specific number of countries before any processing. For 
example, observation 1 means 401,480 companies are only associated with one 
country in the initial dataset. (3) is the percentage of companies in the initial dataset 
that is relevant to a specific number of countries before any processing. For example, 
observation 1 is 90.31% of applicants are related to one country before any 
processing at the initial dataset. (4) is the number of companies is related to the 
specific number of countries after matching and removing extra country codes. (5) is 
the percentage of companies at the initial dataset is relevant to a specific number of 





























AUSTRALIA 145 96 3 1 0 0 0 1 4542 4788 
AUSTRIA 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 411 431 
BELGIUM 8 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 517 542 
BRAZIL 106 26 1 0 0 1 0 23 1772 1929 
CANADA 0 105 4 1 0 0 0 5 10349 10464 
CHILE 25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 392 418 
CHINA 32 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5096 5133 
COLOMBIA 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 144 157 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 153 153 
DENMARK 11 19 0 0 0 0 0 115 611 756 
EGYPT 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 327 329 




FRANCE 64 19 1 0 0 5 0 1 2617 2707 
GERMANY 54 11 0 0 0 1 0 0 2962 3028 
GREECE 3 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 537 569 
HONG KONG 102 14 8 0 0 0 0 2 3597 3723 
HUNGARY 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 25 157 192 
INDIA 12 7 1 0 0 2 0 0 5496 5518 
INDONESIA 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 864 872 
IRELAND 14 4 4 0 0 0 0 2 309 333 
ITALY 24 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1234 1262 
JAPAN 91 5 193 0 0 1 0 0 6434 6724 
MALAYSIA 15 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1600 1620 
MEXICO 75 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 687 768 
MOROCCO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 93 
NETHERLANDS 33 21 0 0 23 2 2 15 637 733 
NEW ZEALAND 11 6 5 0 0 0 2 0 441 465 
NORWAY 29 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 936 971 




PHILIPPINES 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 482 490 
POLAND 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1044 1050 
PORTUGAL 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 231 235 
RUSSIA 36 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1031 1068 
SINGAPORE 21 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 1414 1446 
SOUTH AFRICA 56 40 2 0 1 0 2 9 1284 1394 
SOUTH KOREA 12 8 2 0 0 0 3 0 3104 3129 
SPAIN 20 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 702 725 
SWEDEN 32 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1899 1941 
SWITZERLAND 17 63 2 0 0 0 0 0 943 1025 
TAIWAN 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2527 2538 
THAILAND 6 0 5 0 0 0 0 19 2294 2324 
TURKEY 12 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 522 548 
UNITED KINGDOM 201 69 0 0 0 9 778 4 6613 7674 
UNITED STATES 249 595 15 0 1 7 2 2 27206 28077 
Total 1599 1225 250 2 25 35 789 227 104983 109135 




Table A3.12 Description and strings of name variables of ID "360125" on Datastream 
(1) (2) (3) 
Name 
The name of the equity/company or equity list which 
sorted in the database. 
@POS.COM DEAD - DELIST 
19/09/02 
WC06001 
The legal name of the company as reported in the 10-




The name of the equity/company as stored on 
Datastream databases 
@POS.COM INCO. 
PNAME Previous name ATPOS.COM 
ECNAME 




Data source: Datastream database 
Note: (1) refers to the "NAME" variable on Datastream. It is the name of the equity/company or equity 
list, as stored on Datastream databases. It is available for all instruments. (2) refers to the description of 




Table A3.13 Structure of strings recorded at name variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Company Name 21ST CENTURY PLASTICS CORPORATION 21ST CENTURY PLASTICS CORPORATION PATSTAT, Datastream 
Company Name + address BODE CHEMIE & COMPANY 22525 HAMBURG BODE CHEMIE & COMPANY PATSTAT 
Company Name + explanation AGE SCIENCES CORPORATION, A UTAH CORPORATION AGE SCIENCES CORPORATION PATSTAT, Datastream 
Company Name + status CENTAUR MINING AND EXPLORATION LTD- ADR CENTAUR MINING AND EXPLORATION LTD Datastream 
Company Name + Company Name  
BENZ COMPANIES, INC., D/B/A BENZ AIRBORNE 
SYSTEMS 
BENZ COMPANIES, INC., 
PATSTAT 
BENZ AIRBORNE SYSTEMS 
Data source: PATSTAT - 2016 Autumn Edition, Datastream database 
Note: (1) refers to the structure of strings recorded in the name variable. (2) refers to the strings before processing. (3) refers to the strings after processing. (4) refers to which 





Table A3.14 The name variable splits based on single brackets 
(1) (2) 
3COM CORP ( COMPUTERS COMMUNICATION COMPATIBILITY CORP )  
3COM CORP ( COMPUTERS COMMUNICATION COMPATIBILITY CORP )  
3COM CORP 
( COMPUTERS COMMUNICATION COMPATIBILITY CORP )  
 
3CSCAN ( BEIJING ) TECHNOLOGY CO 
3CSCAN ( BEIJING ) TECHNOLOGY CO 
3CSCAN TECHNOLOGY CO 
( BEIJING ) 
Note: (1) refers to the original name variable, namely, the strings in the company name variable before the variable is split based on the single brackets. (2) refers to the 





Table A3.15 Steps of Automatic matching procedure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Step1 Original company name Original company name Same original name, same country 
Step2 
"full string" company 
name 
"full string" company 
name 
Same "full string" name, same country 
Step3 
"stem string" company 
name 
"stem string" company 
name 
Same "stem string" name, same country, 
same address (i.e., state, city, street or zip 
code) 
Note: (1) refers to steps of the automatic matching procedure. (2) refers to the specific kind of company name 
at the PATSTAT database. (3) refers to the specific kind of company name on Datastream. (4) refers to the 





Table A3.16 The sample of the automatic match by “Full string” company names at both databases 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 








(XET) DEAD - 30/05/11 
SKY LTD SKY PLC. 
BRIT.SKY BCAST. 
(XET) 
SKY PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY 
GB SKYLTD SKYLTD ''SKY LTD.'' RU 








TW AGVPRODCORP AGVPRODCORP 
A. G. V. PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION 
TW 
Note: (1) represents Datastream ID, which is the unique ID of record on Datastream. (2) refers to the “NAME” variable on Datastream. It is the name of the equity/company 
or equity list, as stored on Datastream databases. It is available for all instruments. (3) refers to the “WC06001” variable on Datastream, which is the legal name of the company 
as reported in the 10-K for US companies and the annual report for non-US companies. (4) refer to the “CNAME” variable on Datastream, which is the name of the 
equity/company as stored on Datastream databases. (5) refers to the “PNAME” on Datastream, which is the previous name of the security. (6) refers to the “ECNAME” variable 
on Datastream, which is the expanded (unabbreviated) name of the equity/company. (7) refers to the “GEOGN” variable on Datastream, which is a geographical classification 
of company by name, which specifying the home or listing country of company security. (8) refers to the “full strings” company name created by name standardisation on 
Datastream. (9) refers to the “full strings” company name created by name standardisation at the PATSTAT database. (10) refers to the “HRM_L2” variable, which is the 
standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (11) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate applicants’ country code, which represents the 
country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part 





Table A3.17 A sample of resolving multiple matches when a Datastram ID is matched with more than one applicant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS COMPANY US 905047 
R R DONNELLEY & 
SONS 
RR DONNELLEY & SONS 
CO 
R R DONNELLEY & 
SONS CO. 
DONNELLEY R R & 
SONS 
R R DONNELLEY & SONS 
COMPANY 
US P Y 
R. R. DONNELLEY AND SONS COMPANY US 905047 
R R DONNELLEY & 
SONS 
RR DONNELLEY & SONS 
CO 
R R DONNELLEY & 
SONS CO. 
DONNELLEY R R & 
SONS 
R R DONNELLEY & SONS 
COMPANY 
US P Y 
Note: (1) refers to the “HRM_L2” variable, which is the standardised name created by EEE-PPAT database. (2) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate 
applicants’ country code, which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. the 
representation of strings in this column can be seen in Table 3.2. (3) represents Datastream ID, which is the unique ID of record on Datastream. (4)  refers to the “NAME” variable, 
it is the name of the equity/company or equity list, as stored on Datastream’s databases. It is available for all instruments. (5)  refers to the “WC06001” variable on Datastream, 
which is the legal name of the company as reported in the 10-K for US companies and the annual report for non-US companies. (6) refer to the “CNAME” variable on Datastream, 
which is the name of the equity/company as stored on Datastream databases. (7) refers to the “PNAME” on Datastream, which is the previous name of the security. (8) refers to 
the “ECNAME” variable on Datastream, which is the expanded (unabbreviated) name of the equity/company. (9) refers to the “GEOGN” variable on Datastream, which is a 
geographical classification of company by name, which specifying the home or listing country of a company security. (10) refers to the “ISINID” variable on Datastream, which 
is the primary/secondary flag. It returns “P” or “S” when the equity record is the primary/secondary one (i.e., the domestic/foreign listing of the share or depository receipt or 
certificate). (11) refers to the “MAJOR” variable on Datastream, which is the major security flag. It returns “Y” or “N” to indicate whether the security is the one with the most 




Table A3.18 Sample of eliminating the multiple matching problem through “ISINID” and “MAJOR” variable 







































US P N EQ 
Note: (1) refers to the “HRM_L2” variable, which is the standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (2) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate 
applicants’ country code, which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 
(http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. the meaning 
of strings in this column can be seen in Table 3.2. (3) represents Datastream ID, which is the unique ID of record on Datastream. (4) refers to the “NAME” variable on Datastream. It 
is the name of the equity/company or equity list, as stored on Datastream’s databases. It is available for all instruments. (5) refers to the “WC06001” variable on Datastream, which is 
the legal name of the company as reported in the 10-K for US companies, and the annual report for non-US companies. (6) refer to the “CNAME” variable on Datastream, which is 
the name of the equity/company as stored on Datastream databases. (7) refers to the “PNAME” on Datastream, which is the previous name of the security. (8) refers to the “ECNAME” 
variable on Datastream, which is the expanded (unabbreviated) name of the equity/company. (9) refers to the “GEOGN” variable on Datastream, which is a geographical classification 
of a company by name, which specifying the home or listing country of company security. (10) refers to the “ISINID” variable on Datastream, which is the primary/secondary flag. It 
returns “P” or “S” when the equity record is the primary/secondary one (i.e., the domestic/foreign listing of the share or depository receipt or certificate). (11) refers to the “MAJOR” 
variable on Datastream, which is the major security flag. It returns “Y” or “N” to indicate whether the security is the one with the most significant market capitalisation and liquidity 




Table A3.19 A sample that a PATSTAT company is matched with more than one Datastream records 


























































US P Y     CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60680 
PECO ENERGY 
COMPANY 









US P Y 
PHILADELPHI
A 
  CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60680 
Note: (1) refers to the “HRM_L2” variable, which is the standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (2) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate applicants’ country code, 
which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the 
correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. The meaning of strings in this column can be seen in Table 3.1. (3) represents Datastream ID, which is the unique ID of record on Datastream. 
(4) refers to the “NAME” variable on Datastream, it is the name of the equity/company or equity list, as stored on Datastream databases. It is available for all instruments. (5) refers to the “WC06001” variable 
on Datastream, which is the legal name of the company as reported in the 10-K for US companies, and the annual report for non-US companies. (6) refer to the “CNAME” variable on Datastream, which is the 
name of the equity/company as stored on Datastream databases. (7) refers to the “PNAME” on Datastream, which is the previous name of the security. (8) refers to the “ECNAME” variable on Datastream, 
which is the expanded (unabbreviated) name of the equity/company. (9) refers to the “GEOGN” variable on Datastream, which is a geographical classification of a company by name, which specifying the 
home or listing country of company security. (10) refers to the “ISINID” variable on Datastream, which is the primary/secondary flag. It returns “P” or “S” when the equity record is the primary/secondary one 
(i.e., the domestic/foreign listing of the share or depository receipt or certificate). (11) refers to the “MAJOR” variable on Datastream, which is the major security flag. It returns “Y” or “N” to indicate whether 
the security is the one with the most significant market capitalisation and liquidity of the primary quotation of that security. (12) refers to the “PERSON_ADDRESS” variable. It is the address of corporate 
applicants at the PATSTAT database. Column (13)-(16) represent the location of the corporate offices of a company on Datastream. (13) refers to the “WC06022” variable on Datastream. It represents the street 




“WC06024” variable on Datastream. It represents the state of the corporate offices of a company on Datastream. (16) refers to the “WC06025” variable on Datastream. It represents the postcode of the corporate 





Table A3.20 Address information of HRM_L2 “02 MICRO” at PATSTAT database and EEE-PPAT database 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
02 MICRO TW 15 1 Taipei 
02 MICRO US 15 1   
02 MICRO US 15 1 3118 PATRICK HENRY DRIVE SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA 95054 U.S.A. 
02 MICRO US 15 1 3118 Patrick Henry Drive,Santa Clara, CA 95054 
02 MICRO US 15 1 Santa Clara 
02 MICRO US 15 1 Santa Clara,CA 
02 MICRO US 15 1 Santa Clra,CA 
02 MICRO US 15 1 Sunnyvale,CA 
Note: (1) refers to the “HRM_L2” variable, which is the standardised name created by the EEE-PPAT database. (2) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate 
applicants’ country code, which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-
01.pdf), this is the country part of the correspondence address of applicants and inventors on PATSTAT. The meaning of strings in this column can be seen in Table 3.1. (3) refers to the 
number of applications applied by the specific company (i.e., 02 MICRO). (4) refers to the number of citations relevant to the specific company’s applications. (5) refers to the 




Table A3.21 The number of applications contributed by the Top10% applicants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(2) + (3) 
 
(6) 
(4) + (5) 
 
(7) 
(6) + (7） 
 
(8) 






JP 535,609 271,676 3,490 48,980 807,285 52,470 859,755 539,099 93.90% 
TW 116,206 54,319 2,286 18,096 170,525 20,382 190,907 118,492 89.32% 
KR 179,977 87,689 1,469 39,780 267,666 41,249 308,915 181,446 86.65% 




SG 2,110 5,561 42 1,441 7,671 1,483 9,154 2,152 83.80% 
DE 160,390 221,855 582 79,595 382,245 80,177 462,422 160,972 82.66% 
BE 4,808 9,280 46 3,100 14,088 3,146 17,234 4,854 81.75% 
FI 2,408 23,675 97 5,918 26,083 6,015 32,098 2,505 81.26% 
FR 51,932 98,900 818 34,834 150,832 35,652 186,484 52,750 80.88% 
SE 18,483 23,079 222 10,296 41,562 10,518 52,080 18,705 79.80% 




NL 17,744 29,715 26 13,967 47,459 13,993 61,452 17,770 77.23% 
CN 46,360 200,054 1,007 74,746 246,414 75,753 322,167 47,367 76.49% 
HK 1,834 3,338 5 1,638 5,172 1,643 6,815 1,839 75.89% 
TR 0 846 1 278 846 279 1,125 1 75.20% 
DK 4,944 6,020 54 4,137 10,964 4,191 15,155 4,998 72.35% 
CA 17,526 18,504 553 15,197 36,030 15,750 51,780 18,079 69.58% 
GB 20,024 46,604 490 30,539 66,628 31,029 97,657 20,514 68.23% 
AT 1,381 14,109 67 7,410 15,490 7,477 22,967 1,448 67.45% 
PE 0 4 0 2 4 2 6 0 66.67% 
IN 1,375 1,324 131 1,241 2,699 1,372 4,071 1,506 66.30% 
IT 4,466 51,524 171 29,348 55,990 29,519 85,509 4,637 65.48% 
PL 59 3,763 69 2,309 3,822 2,378 6,200 128 61.65% 
AU 3,413 13,764 221 10,617 17,177 10,838 28,015 3,634 61.31% 
RU 1,324 22,217 66 15,383 23,541 15,449 38,990 1,390 60.38% 




TH 114 85 5 128 199 133 332 119 59.94% 
NO 927 4,808 82 3,858 5,735 3,940 9,675 1,009 59.28% 
ZA 339 2,973 54 2,222 3,312 2,276 5,588 393 59.27% 
NZ 389 1,430 11 1,329 1,819 1,340 3,159 400 57.58% 
HU 341 1,480 1 1,351 1,821 1,352 3,173 342 57.39% 
IE 15 4,185 11 3,154 4,200 3,165 7,365 26 57.03% 
CZ 371 1,752 23 1,612 2,123 1,635 3,758 394 56.49% 
ES 697 10,957 43 9,774 11,654 9,817 21,471 740 54.28% 
GR 47 183 2 214 230 216 446 49 51.57% 
MX 13 341 2 337 354 339 693 15 51.08% 
EG 0 22 5 26 22 31 53 5 41.51% 
MY 37 471 11 715 508 726 1,234 48 41.17% 
PT 0 321 3 468 321 471 792 3 40.53% 
CL 20 78 1 149 98 150 248 21 39.52% 




MA 3 75 1 125 78 126 204 4 38.24% 
PH 5 19 0 48 24 48 72 5 33.33% 
ID 0 8 1 18 8 19 27 1 29.63% 
Note: (1) refers to the “PERSON_CTRY_CODE” variable, it is the corporate applicants’ country code, which represents the country name based on the two-letter alphabetic 
codes of WIPO Standard ST.3 (http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-30-01.pdf), this is the country part of the correspondence address of applicants and 
inventors on PATSTAT. the meaning of strings in this column can be seen in Table 2.  (2) refers to the number of applications applied by top10% of applicants to total applicants 
at PATSTAT, which has been matched with companies on Datastream. (3) refers to the number of applications applied by top10% applicants at PATSTAT which not been 
matched. (4) refers to the number of applications applied by the rest of 90% applicants which has been matched with companies on Datastream. (5) refers to the number of 
applications applied by the rest of 90% applicants which is not matched. (6) refers to the number of applications applied by top10% applicants 
(i.e., column (2) + column (3)).  (7) refers to the number of applications applied by the rest 90% of applicants (i.e., column (4) + column (5)). (8) refers to the number of 
applications per country after matching and removing extra country codes. (i.e., column (6) + column (7)).  (9) is the number of matched applications per country after matching 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
AT 1000 955 773 955 1,061 1,379 727 864 909 924 1,121 1,424 1,045 1,136 939 939 939 1,591 1,136 985 1,136 
AU 1000 1,182 1,007 1,063 1,189 1,280 1,238 1,189 895 1,497 1,378 1,189 1,678 1,364 965 1,007 986 1,490 1,503 1,203 1,112 
BE 1000 1,509 1,901 1,845 1,944 2,093 2,087 2,584 2,292 1,776 1,820 1,559 1,702 1,000 994 758 745 652 795 578 516 
BR 1000 810 619 1,238 905 524 1,429 1,381 1,381 1,476 952 1,333 1,238 1,381 2,381 2,381 1,762 2,000 2,095 1,762 905 
CA 1000 815 888 1,006 1,055 1,334 1,881 3,316 3,781 3,793 4,046 3,179 2,848 2,705 3,608 3,438 3,696 3,185 2,532 3,210 3,635 
CH 1000 818 756 690 742 652 741 727 811 982 1,144 1,088 1,081 1,053 1,060 1,102 1,174 1,015 835 814 709 













CZ 1000 218 425 241 460 276 241 253 253 218 103 149 46 103 149 57 103 46 80 103 0 
DE 1000 976 1,059 1,058 1,142 1,282 1,471 1,624 1,713 1,784 1,816 1,768 1,725 1,688 1,702 1,563 1,515 1,490 1,346 1,173 1,103 
DK 1000 867 824 1,079 1,242 1,503 1,782 1,673 2,055 1,770 1,697 1,545 1,655 1,982 1,667 1,515 1,515 1,315 1,224 1,121 1,261 
ES 1000 243 432 568 784 1,000 676 649 1,162 1,081 1,297 784 730 595 946 973 784 1,027 1,189 1,514 2,568 
FI 1000 670 741 830 857 920 804 598 813 679 1,018 1,071 1,241 1,384 1,500 1,357 1,330 1,321 1,241 1,554 1,438 
FR 1000 1,045 1,056 1,163 1,044 1,189 1,193 1,344 1,432 1,565 1,590 1,556 1,560 1,713 1,961 1,904 1,932 2,025 2,039 1,851 1,767 
GB 1000 882 889 834 906 875 986 871 845 809 830 822 927 873 820 752 834 745 821 850 779 















HU 1000 741 815 296 222 407 167 148 111 167 93 111 185 296 352 315 259 370 167 56 56 
IN 1000 200 600 600 200 1,800 4,000 4,800 7,000 6,400 10,400 15,200 23,000 18,000 28,200 26,400 31,200 24,600 34,600 27,600 35,400 
IT 1000 1,066 892 994 1,024 1,151 1,476 1,217 1,235 1,458 1,777 1,205 1,223 1,096 1,205 1,145 1,127 1,470 1,880 2,325 1,970 
JP 1000 822 691 680 568 587 610 597 554 602 656 607 586 594 613 588 548 531 457 403 396 
KR 1000 1,496 2,204 3,071 3,903 7,504 9,271 8,927 2,672 836 1,114 1,156 1,407 1,611 2,301 6,788 8,240 5,357 3,037 3,006 3,342 
MY 1000 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 0 0 1,000 7,000 1,000 1,000 10,000 2,000 5,000 4,000 1,000 1,000 10,000 2,000 
NL 1000 1,261 1,905 1,398 1,137 1,336 1,493 2,284 3,370 6,118 8,441 10,261 9,261 5,801 5,441 4,882 4,464 3,578 4,100 4,071 2,611 
NO 1000 773 500 227 818 1,000 3,045 1,273 2,000 1,909 2,864 3,136 3,818 3,182 5,500 4,318 2,000 2,364 2,091 2,091 1,955 
NZ 1000 778 1,000 444 667 1,444 2,222 2,556 3,111 4,778 5,000 2,333 3,444 2,333 2,333 2,222 1,556 1,778 1,556 1,889 2,000 
PH 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PL 1000 167 1,333 500 1,000 833 2,000 1,000 1,833 1,000 500 500 0 833 0 333 500 2,167 2,333 2,500 1,000 
SE 1000 1,000 1,284 1,767 2,265 3,158 5,302 6,665 6,735 6,707 6,000 4,860 3,228 3,233 3,577 3,847 4,060 5,140 5,800 5,209 6,163 























TR 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

















US 1000 979 1,023 1,057 1,171 1,343 1,517 1,682 1,846 1,932 1,980 1,930 1,964 1,859 1,853 1,897 1,814 1,811 1,781 1,493 1,503 
ZA 1000 1,414 724 1,034 966 448 1,034 1,069 1,034 1,069 793 172 310 172 207 310 310 241 379 241 621 





















Figure A3.3 The number of applications applied by corporate applicants in each country from 1990 to 2010 
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Stock Liquidity on R&D-Innovation Relationship: 
A Structure Model Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
An extensive range of literature has investigated the relationship between R&D and patents. 
They represent different steps in the innovation process and contain different information about 
technological inventions. In this chapter, we study the R&D-patent relationship from the 
perspective of stock liquidity. Especially, we aim to understand whether stock liquidity affects 
innovation outputs through R&D investments. 
A large amount of literature investigates the impact of liquidity in stock markets. The literature 
mainly focuses on the effect of stock liquidity on stock price and returns, the cost of raising 
capital, market efficiency and financial decisions. Excepting these, Fang et al. (2014)  and Wen 
et al. (2018) study the relationship between stock liquidity and innovation outputs (i.e., patent-
based data). However, they do not consider the possibility that stock liquidity affects innovation 
outputs through R&D investments. 
R&D investments and patent-based indicators represent the different steps in the innovation 
process. In this chapter, we first propose that stock liquidity may indirectly affect firm 
innovation outputs through R&D investments. On the one hand, increased stock liquidity may 
improve R&D investment by reducing the cost of raising capital. On the other hand, it may 
impede R&D investment because of the potential threat of hostile takeovers and short-term 
institutional investors. Secondly, stock liquidity could directly affect firm innovation outputs. 
We propose that an increase in stock liquidity improves a firm’s innovation activities by 




facilitate the entry of long-term and/or strategic institutional investors, thereby improving a 
firm’s innovation abilities. 
This chapter is structured three equations to investigate the effects of stock liquidity on the 
R&D-patent relationship. We introduce the HFT start date as an exogenous shock to stock 
liquidity. HFT is a specific kind of Algorithmic Trading (AT) where orders are entered very 
quickly, usually in microseconds. As High-frequency traders mainly focus on high market 
value companies (Brogaard et al., 2014), this chapter only includes the top 30 percentile of 
the largest public companies, by market capitalisation in each exchange. 
We find that although stock liquidity can affect firm innovation through R&D investment, the 
greatest impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock 
liquidity itself. While stock liquidity causes a significant but slight negative influence on a 
firm’s R&D investment, it causes a much larger positive impact on firm innovation output 
directly. It means that increased stock liquidity mainly contributes to reducing asymmetric 
information and the entry of long-term and/or strategic institutional investors. It leads to the 
monitoring of firm managers and extra resources (for example, foreign technology), thereby 
improving both the quantity and quality of firm innovation. 
More specifically, we show that while R&D investment causes larger impacts on firm 
innovation quantity than stock liquidity, it does not significantly improve other patent-based 
indicators. A possible reason is that companies change their innovation strategy after going 
public. These large companies tend to invest in incremental innovation projects and obtain 
disruptive innovation through acquisitions. It may also because our sample does not include 




We observe that stock liquidity significantly improves the patent generality index and 
originality index. This could be an explanation of the positive relationship between stock 
liquidity and firm innovation quality. Increased stock liquidity facilitates the entry of long-term 
and/or strategic institutional investors, who bring extra resources, and who improve the patent 
originality index. Thus, they are more likely to be cited by other patents in different areas. 
In this chapter, we make several potential contributions, outlined below. Firstly, we emphasise 
the importance of both stock liquidity and R&D investments on a firm’s patent outputs. In 
particular, we show that while R&D leads to larger impacts on a firm’s innovation outputs, 
increased stock liquidity could benefit firms in aiding the production of high-quality innovation.  
In addition, we extend the empirical literature on the impact of stock liquidity on firm 
innovation. In this chapter, we find a positive relationship between stock liquidity and firm 
innovation outputs. In terms of this, we support the work Wen et al. (2018) based on an 
international sample. Fang et al. (2014) argue that firm managers tend to cut R&D investments 
when facing the potential threat of hostile takeovers and short-term institutional investors 
caused by increased stock liquidity. Although we observe a negative impact of stock liquidity 
on R&D investments, it is much lighter than the impact on firm innovation outputs. 
In addition, we improve the understanding of the R&D-patents relationship from the 
perspective of stock liquidity. We provide a different explanation for their relationships. We 
show that while stock liquidity could indirectly improve firms innovation performance through 
R&D investments, so too it could directly encourage firm innovation activities.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: In section 4.2, we review the literature around 
the impacts of liquidity in stock markets, the R&D-patent relationship and we propose the 




method. In section 4.4, we present and analyse the empirical results. In section 4.5, we describe 




4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis  
4.2.1 The impact of stock liquidity in financial markets 
In this subsection, we review the literature around the impact of stock liquidity in financial 
markets. There is extensive literature around the impacts of stock liquidity on stock price (for 
example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989; Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2005; Uddin, 
2009). Amihud and Mendelson (1989) argued that a lower bid-ask spread (i.e., higher stock 
liquidity) reflects more information availability. Huang et al. (2013) showed that stock liquidity 
improves the informative stock price by promoting informed trading. 
A series of papers demonstrate that firms can reduce the cost of raising capital by increasing 
their stock liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988, 2000; Butler et al., 2005; Saad and Samet, 
2017). This is the result of reducing trading costs (Brennan et al., 1998). It is also the reason 
behind a decrease in the required illiquidity premium (Jacoby et al., 2000). Amihud and 
Mendelson (1988) found that investors prefer stock markets with higher liquidity because they 
can transfer their ownership efficiently. Butler et al. (2005) argued that investment banks tend 
to charge lower fees for firms with liquid stocks during the Follow on Public Offer (FPO). 
Previous research demonstrates the interplay between stock liquidity and market efficiency (for 
example, Chordia et al., 2008; Ho and Njindan Iyke, 2017; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013). They 
argue that improved stock liquidity decreases frictions and encourages arbitrage activities, 
which in turn increases stock liquidity. In addition, the presence of illiquidity restricts market 
agents in setting up arbitrage trading even if they can identify an arbitrage opportunity.  
Previous literature shows that stock liquidity affects financial decisions. Lipson and Mortal 
(2009) found that firms tend to have lower leverage and prefer to use equity finance to raise 




and Milbourn (2012) investigated the impacts of stock liquidity on managerial payout decisions. 
Banerjee et al. (2007) reported that investors are more (less) likely to receive cash dividends 
for less (more) liquid common stocks.  
Additionally, Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka (2006) 
present stock liquidity as a systematic and non-diversifiable risk measure. Pereira and Zhang  
(2010), Petkova et al. (2011) and Engle et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between 
volatility of liquidity and stock returns. Amihud et al. (1990), Lesmond (2005) and Yeyati et 
al. (2008) explored the impacts of illiquidity shocks on prices during crisis events. 
Separately to the above literature, Fang et al. (2014)  and Wen et al. (2018) investigated the 
impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation. However, they mainly focused on the relationship 
between stock liquidity and innovation outputs (i.e., patent-based data). Although they include 
the R&D investments as control variables, they do not consider the potential endogeneity 
between stock liquidity, R&D and innovation outcomes.  
 
4.2.2 R&D and patents 
In previous literature, innovation is often represented by two indicators: R&D investments and 
patent-based data (Becheikh et al., 2006). The empirical studies which cover the relationship 
between R&D and patent-based indicators is headed by Schmookler (1966) and Scherer (1965). 
They showed positive links between these two variables. Thereafter, a series of literature 
investigated US firms through panel data (Hausman et al., 1984; Hall et al., 1986; Cincera, 
1997). They argued that the relations between R&D and patents almost vanish when 




Several studies propose the existence of reverse causality between R&D and patent indicators 
(for example, Nordhaus, 1969; Pakes, 1985). However, empirical evidence from this research 
does not obtain a consistent result. For example, Pakes (1985) and Hall et al. (1986) showed 
no evidence supporting the reverse causality between these two indicators; Arora et al. (2008), 
Crépon and Duguet (1997), Hall and Ziedonis (2001) found positive reverse links; Sakakibara 
and Branstetter (2001) show the negative reverse relationship. 
In recent years, a growing body of research studying finance and innovation also covers R&D 
and patents. Most of the researches use R&D investments as a control variable and show 
significant positive impacts of R&D on patent-based indicators (for example, Chemmanur and 
Tian, 2018; Fang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2015; Luong et al., 2017; Zhu and Zhu, 2017). In 
this chapter, we follow the recent research in the financial area and focus on the impact of R&D 
investment in the year 𝑡 on patent-based indicators in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛.  
R&D and patent-based data represent different steps in the innovation process. While R&D 
investments measure inputs in the innovation process (Ashwin et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2018), 
patent-based indicators show the ability to create inventions (Coombs et al., 1996; OECD., 
1997; Flor and Oltra, 2004). Compared with patent data, R&D investments do not necessarily 
lead to new technology or improved processes (Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Flor and Oltra, 2004). 
They also include the investments of aborted R&D efforts (Becheikh et al., 2006). On the other 
hand, Gu (2005) demonstrates that patent-based indicators, such as the number of patents and 
patent citations, contain information about a firm’s technological advantages. Therefore, while 





In this chapter, we investigate the effects of stock liquidity on the R&D-innovation relationship. 
We assume that stock liquidity directly affects innovation outputs, and indirectly affects on 
innovation outputs through R&D investments. 
 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 
In this subsection, we propose the hypothesis about the effects of stock liquidity on the R&D-
patent relationship.  
Stock liquidity tends to influence firm innovation outputs through R&D investment. Firms with 
a higher stock liquidity tend to have less cost to fund R&D projects. According to Brealey et 
al. (2012), firms can raise capital through three ways: internal financing (i.e., retained earnings 
plus depreciation), debt financing and equity financing. While a public company can finance 
its investment through an initial public offering (IPO) in the primary market, it cannot obtain 
cash inflow from the trade of shares in the secondary market (Kim and Weisbach, 2008). This 
is because the proceeds from trading in the equity markets go to the traders rather than the 
public company. However, a company with more liquid shares in the equity market can raise 
capital at a reduced cost (Butler et al., 2005). It will be charged lower fees by the investment 
banking firms when issuing additional shares after an IPO. This argument, supported by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), posits that buyers are willing to pay a premium for liquidity 
assets. In addition, as firms with more liquidity shares have a lower cost of equity financing, 
they are more likely to choose equity financing instead of debt financing when raising capital 
(Lipson and Mortal, 2009). While firms with a high leverage ratio are less likely to fund long-
term projects due to the lack of available capital (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989), Lipson and 




ratio. Therefore, increased stock liquidity tends to decrease the firm’s pressure to make long-
term investments, such as R&D investments.  
Hypothesis 1a Stock liquidity could indirectly improve innovation outputs through R&D 
investment. 
On the other hand, increased stock liquidity may decrease R&D investments. Corporate 
innovation is risk-taking behaviour (Holmström, 1989). It is not only a long-term, multi-stage 
process but also involves a large probability of failure (Holmström, 1989; Chang et al., 2015). 
For firms allocating funds heavily in R&D, innovation plays a crucial role in their competitive 
strategies. They have to make a partial disclosure and are subject to a higher degree of 
information asymmetry (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 2002). In terms of this, 
they are more prone to be misvalued by investors (Cohen et al., 2013) and can even experience 
a greater exposure to hostile takeovers (Stein, 1988). When undergoing hostile takeovers, 
managers tend to cut down long-term investment (for example, R&D investment) and focus on 
short-term earnings targets in order to stabilise current share prices (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988). Chemmanur and Tian (2018) support this view by showing the positive impact of anti-
takeover provisions on firm innovation. In particular, this influence is more pronounced when 
firms are subject to a more significant degree of asymmetric information. Kyle and Vila (1991) 
show that potential external acquirers can disguise themselves as common traders when stock 
liquidity is high, which facilities a firm manager’s cutting down of long-term R&D projects 
and concentrating instead on myopic investment. 
In addition, firm managers may cut R&D investments because of the presence of short-term 
institutional investors. The market with higher stock liquidity has lower trading costs. In these 
markets, short-term institutional investors can easily enter and exit public companies based on 




investment (Porter, 1992). A firm’s managers are more likely to pursue near-term earnings 
rather than long-term intangible investments (for example, R&D investment) when they are 
under the pressure from external, short-term institutional investors (Bushee, 1998). In terms of 
these arguments, we suggest the following hypotheses, outlined below: 
Hypothesis 1b Stock liquidity could indirectly impede innovation outputs through R&D 
investment. 
Excepting the above, increased stock liquidity tends to encourage firm managers to engage in 
innovation by reducing asymmetric information. Although firms which invest in innovation 
are subject to a higher degree of information asymmetry (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton 
and Yao, 2002), this tends to be decreased by increasing stock liquidity. According to Chordia 
et al. (2008) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), increased stock liquidity improves market 
efficiency by reducing market frictions and encouraging arbitrage trading (Chordia et al., 2008; 
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). This then decreases the asymmetric information between 
investors and firms which are pursuing innovative activities. For example, Abdioglu et al. 
(2015) found a higher level of passive and dedicated institutional investment in R&D-intensive 
firms after a reduction of asymmetric information (enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
aims to improve the accuracy of public firms’ disclosures). Maug (1998) shows that the rise of 
stock liquidity offers convenient entry to blockholders, which leads to more monitoring 
operations within the company. They can collect private information and trade with this 
information, thereby making the stock price more efficient (Edmans, 2009). This action can 
discipline managers when managerial compensation is closely tied to stock price (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011). 
The increase in liquidity could also improve a firm’s innovation activities by facilitating the 




Bushee (1998) demonstrate the significant and positive impact of pension fund shareholding 
on enterprise innovation.37 In addition, the entry of foreign institutional investors improves the 
firm’s innovation through their actions as active monitors, providing insurance against 
innovation failures and transmitting foreign technology (Luong et al., 2017).  
Hypothesis 2 Stock liquidity could directly affect innovation outputs. 




37 Managers of pension funds tend to enhance long-term value of their protfolios because of the big size and long 




4.3 Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, Descriptive Statistics and 
Estimation method 
4.3.1 Data and sample selection  
We collect the patent-based data from the PATSTAT database and firm account information 
from the Datastream database.38 Following Hanauer's (2014) steps, we restrict our sample to 1) 
both active and inactive companies across 23 developed countries/regions and 21 emerging 
countries/regions (see the selection process in Hanauer (2014)). 2) stocks of type equity, 3) 
companies located and listed in the domestic country, 4) companies quoted as domestic 
currency. 5) the primary quotation of security, 6) the security with the biggest market 
capitalisation and liquidity for companies with more than one equity security. Furthermore, we 
exclude 1) the corporate applicants if they applied for fewer than 3 applications from 1990 to 
2010, 2) securities trade in OTC markets.  
In addition, we collect the exchange’s HFT start date from Aitken et al. (2015) and only include 
exchanges that have reported their HFT start date. High-frequency traders mainly focus on the 
high market value companies (Brogaard et al., 2014). In general, previous papers in this area 
construct sample based on firms’ market capitalization. For example, Brogaard et al. (2014) 
split sample stocks into three market capitalization groups. Malceniece et al. (2019) analyse 
the top 20% of the largest stocks (and 75 stocks) , by market capitalisation in each country. 
However, HFT is a black box (Narang, 2013). High-frequecny traders are less likely to 
announce the range in which high-value companies with market capitalization are their trading 
targets. In this chapter, we mainly focus on the sample which include the top 30 percentile of 
 
38 We describe the detail of these two databases and the matching procedure in Chapter 3 “Matching PATSTAT 




the largest public companies, by market capitalisation in each exchange. 39  We exclude 
companies in finance industries following previous literature in finance and innovation fields. 
Finally, this sample has 15, 202 firm-year observations, including 796 companies from 10 
countries between 1990 and 2010. 
4.3.2 Variable measurement 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
We represent a firm’s innovation outputs using the following four indicators. 1) the number of 
applications made by the firm and eventually granted in a year, representing the quantity of 
innovation. 2) the number of citations received by these patents in the year, which shows the 
quality of the firm’s innovative activity. We also define 3) innovation generality index as the 
extent to which a company’s patents are cited by subsequent citations across a wide range of 
technology fields; 4) innovation originality index as the extent to which a company’s patents 
cite previous patents across a large number of technology fields. We separately explain these 
indicators in this subsection. 
The first measure of innovation, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇, is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
successful applications in the year  𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively.40 According to Fang et 
al. (2014), the patent data are right-skewed with the 75th percentile of the number of patents 
equal to zero. Thus, we use the logarithm of the number of patents. We also add one to the 
number of patents before taking the logarithm to ensure that we do not have missing values for 
 
39 We also test the sample which include the top 20 percentile and 40 percentile of the largest public companies 
in each exchange. The result is similer to the sample which includes the 30% of stocks in each exchange. But we 
do not report it for brevity. 
40 We describe the detailed procedure of measuring the number of patent applications and citations in Appendix 




firms with zero patents.41 We examine the influence of a firm’s stock liquidity on the number 
of patents applied in subsequent years. This is because innovative activity is a long-term, multi-
stage process and generally takes longer than one year.  
The second measure of innovation, LN_CIT, shows the quality of a firm’s innovative activity. 
It is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations received by these patents in the 
year 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively. According to Trajtenberg (1990), it can distinguish 
breakthrough innovation from incremental technological discovery.  
The third measure of innovation, LN_GENERAL, represents the extent to which a company’s 
patents are cited by subsequent citations across a wide range of technology fields (Trajtenberg 
et al., 1997). This is the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of a firm’s generality score in 
the year 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively (Zhu and Zhu, 2017). Following Trajtenberg et al. 
(1997), we measure patent 𝑚’s generality score (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑚) as 








where 𝑚 is the 𝑚𝑡ℎ patent applied for by the corporate applicant in a given year,  𝑘 is the index 
of 4-digital IPC patent classes, 𝑁𝑚 is the number of different 4-digital IPC patent classes to 
 
41 For the same reason, we will use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations, generality index, 
and originality index, separately. These correspond to the innovation measurements in this chapter, namely, 




which the citations belong.4243 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑚 is the number of patents citing the patent 𝑚, and  
𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑚𝑘 is the number of patent 𝑚’s citations that belong to the patent class 𝑘. A higher 
generality value of a patent means the citation to the patent spread over a broader range of 
technological fields.  
The fourth measure of innovation is LN_ORIGINAL. It shows the extent to which a company’s 
patents cites previous patents across a large number of technology fields (Trajtenberg et al., 
1997). It is the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of a firm’s originality score in the year 
𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively (Zhu and Zhu, 2017). Following Trajtenberg et al. (1997), 
we measure patent 𝑚’s originality score (𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑚) as 








where 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑚 is the number of patents cited by patent 𝑚, 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑘 is the number of 
patents cited by patent 𝑚 which belong to the patent class 𝑘. A higher originality value of a 
 
42 Following Levine et al. (2017), we use the International Patent Classification (IPC) to measure the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of the generality and originality value of each patent. By using IPC classification symbol ‘G06K  
19/077’ as an example, the first character ‘G’ represent IPC section ‘Physics'; the next two characters ‘06’ 
identifies the IPC class ‘Computing; Calculating or Counting’; the next character ‘K’ shows the IPC subclass 
‘Recognition of data; Presentation of data; Record carriers; Handling record carriers’ (see more detail information 
in http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/). Although the characters "19" and "077" give more information 
about patent IPC at the main group and subgroup level, we only use the 4-digital IPC patent classes (ie., section, 
class, subclass) when referring to an IPC. It is because not all patents are provided group and subgroup IPC 
information (Levine et al. 2017).  
43 Following Levine et al. (2017), 1) we only cover inventive IPC patent which document discloses a novel subject 
matter rather than the part to the prior art (see more detail information in 
https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4490&plang=EN), which is not designated as 
secondary by a patent authority. 2) we assign equal weight to each IPC subclass of a patent in cases with multiple 
inventive IPCs (see detail explanation in Levine et al. (2017)). 3) To be consistent with the settings in Chapter 3, 




patent means this patent cites previous patents spread over a broader range of technological 
fields. We describe the detailed variable information in Table 4.1, Panel A. 
*** Table 4.1 *** 
 
4.3.2.2 Independent variable 
There is no general definition of liquidity in the financial market. It is not a one-dimensional 
variable but includes several aspects (Lee et al., 1993). According to Kyle (1985), there is 
usually five dimensions of liquidity. The first is depth, which is the size of the spread. The 
second is tightness, which is the ability to buy and sell a certain amount of stocks at the same 
price and at the same time. The third is immediacy, which is the ability to buy or sell a certain 
amount of shares immediately at the prevailing price. The fourth is resiliency, which is the 
ability to trade a certain amount of stocks with litter influence on the current quote. The fifth 
is the breadth, which is the ability to trade a certain amount of stocks without causing influence 
on the current quote. In other words, the stock has higher liquidity when it can be bought or 
sold at a lower cost, narrower spread, higher speed and cause lower influence on current market 
price.  
Stock liquidity is different from funding liquidity and corporate liquidity. According to 
previous research, funding liquidity refers to a trader/investor’s ability to obtain funding 
(capital or cash) in the short term (Strahan, 2008; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). It is also 
defined as banks’ ability to settle obligations as they come due (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2013). 
Similarly, corporate liquidity represents a firm’s ability to meet its short-term financial 




does not directly reflect an entity’s funding ability, as public companies have already raised 
funds through an initial public offering (IPO). 
In this chapter, we measure the stock liquidity of the firm, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, as the natural logarithm 
of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). Fong et al. (2017) 
tested a series of liquidity measures from a global perspective and suggested the Amihud are 
the best monthly/daily cost-per-dollar-volume proxy. Therefore, we represent stock liquidity 
based on this indicator. Although Amihud is used in a large number of subsequent studies, it 










where 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the Amihud measure of firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡. 𝑟𝑖,𝑑 and 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 are the daily return 
and daily dollar trading volume for stock 𝑖  on day 𝑑. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the number of days which is 
available in year 𝑡. A stock with a higher Amihud value suffers a lower level of stock liquidity 
on the equity market. In other words, traders have to pay a higher cost to buy/sell a smaller 
number of shares in the stock market at a slower speed and this causes a more considerable 
price impact on the transaction. We use the natural logarithm of the inverse of Amihud as the 
measure of stock liquidity follows Cumming et al. (2020). We describe the detailed variable 
information in Table 4.1, Panel B. 
 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
In this chapter, we include a series of firm characteristics that may affect a firm’s future 
innovative performance. Brown et al. (2009), Brown et al. (2012) and Brown et al. (2013) find 




argues that large firms tend to have higher incentives and are better able to improve innovation. 
Thus, we introduce firm size, 𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , and firm age, 𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑖,𝑡 , in the regression. Firm size 
is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Wen et al. 2018). Firm age is defined as 
the natural logarithm of one plus firm 𝑖’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on 
Datastream (Cumming et al., 2020).  
It is clear that firms investing more in R&D projects tend to produce more patents and patent 
citations. Therefore, we control investment in R&D,  𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , measured by research and 
development expenditures divided by the book value of total assets (Fang et al., 2014).44 In 
addition, we control investment in fixed assets, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡, measured as capital expenditures 
scaled by the book value of total assets (Cumming et al., 2020); asset tangibility, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 
defined as the property, plant, and equipment expenditure divided by the book value of total 
assets, measured at the end of the year 𝑡 (Fang et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2020).  
Manso (2011) and Atanassov and Liu (2020) show that firms with sufficient cash are more 
likely to tolerate failure and have greater flexibility. This is the key by which to motivate 
innovation. In terms of this, we control the ratio of cash, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑖,𝑡, as cash holdings divided by 
the book value of total assets (Zhu and Zhu, 2017). Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) argued 
that firms with higher leverage ratios are less likely to fund long-term projects, such as R&D 
projects, due to the lack of available capital. Therefore, we control the leverage ratio, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 
as the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets (Fang et al., 2014). 
Booth (1998) shows that firms need investors’ confidence in their ability to create and obtain 
benefits from the intangible assets (i.e., R&D projects) during the long gestation period of the 
 
44 Following from Wen et al. (2018), we do not control 𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 when innovation efficiency is considered as the 




new patents. Better fundamental performance indicators could help the firm's managers gain 
confidence from their investors and earn their continuous support to promote innovation 
(Sriram, 2008). Therefore, following on from previous financial literature, we control growth 
opportunity, 𝑄𝑖,𝑡, defined as firm 𝑖’s market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets (Cumming et al., 2020); 
profitability, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡, defined as the income before extraordinary items divided by book value 
of total assets, measured at the end of year t (Fang et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2020).45 We 
describe the detailed variable information in Table 4.1, Panel C. 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Following Fang et al. (2014), we minimise the effect of outliers by winsorising variables at the 
1% level in each tail of the distribution. Table 4.2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the 
firm-level variables used in this study.46 On average, a firm invests 7% of its total assets in 
R&D projects as the innovation input per year. In addition, as the innovation output, they 
submit an average of 74 applications (which are finally granted) per year, and each patent 
 
45 Although Hall et al. (2005) found that Tobin’s Q is significantly affected by patent-based indicators,  it is widely 
used in financial literature as control variable to investigate the influence on innovation activities (for example, 
Fang et al., 2014; Xin Chang et al., 2015; Chemmanur and Tian, 2018; Wen et al., 2018; Cumming et al., 2020; 
He and Hirshleifer, 2020). Therefore, in this thesis, we follow the most recent financial literature and employ 
Tobin’s Q as a control variable. 
46 It should be noted that the number of different variables in Table 4.2, Panel A are different. It is because of the 
existence of missing value in each firm accounting variables collecting from Datastream. Besides, the number of 
variables in Table 4.2, Panel A is different from the number of firm-year observations in Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 
4.7. The first reason is still the missing value in firm accounting variables collecting from the Datastream. The 
second reason is while we produce the descriptive statistics for firm-level variables in the same year, we run the 
model to analyse the regression of patent-based data in year 𝑡 + 𝑛 on independent variables and control variables 




obtains around 22 non-self-citations. Table 4.2, Panel B presents the correlation of firm-level 
variables in this sample. Among them, there is a 65% correlation coefficient between liquidity 
and total assets. It might be because the sample in this chapter includes the top 30 percentile of 
the largest public companies by market capitalisation in each exchange. Companies with larger 
sizes tend to have higher stock liquidity (Norvaišienė and Stankevičienė, 2014). Following 
previous research in this area (e.g., Fang et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018), we control it in 
regression. Besides, there is a -45% correlation between RDTA and total assets. It is because 
RDTA is R&D scaled by total assets, and we did not control it in equation (4.1b). The rest of 
the variables in this table show a low pairwise correlation between each other. 
*** Table 4.2 *** 
 
4.3.4 Estimation method 
We employ a structure model to investigate the effects of stock liquidity on R&D and patent 
performance. This allows the empirical literature to go beyond the conclusions of the reduced-
form causal relationships (Low and Meghir, 2017). In this chapter, our structure model is 
composed of three equations.  
In equation (4.1a), we introduce the HFT start date as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity. 
HFT is a specific kind of Algorithmic Trading (AT) where orders are entered very quickly, 
usually in microseconds. There is a debate in the literature with respect to the provision or 
consumption of liquidity by HFT. On the one hand, some work argues that HFT can improve 
market liquidity. For example, Hendershott et al. (2011) show that AT can increase stock 
liquidity and decrease adverse selection costs, especially for large stocks. Boehmer et al. (2018) 




support that HFT contributes to higher market quality, leading to lower spreads, higher depth 
and lower short-term volatility. On the other hand, some literature shows the negative aspects 
of HFT and finds it reduces stock liquidity. For instance, Jarnecic and Snape (2014) show that 
high-frequency traders who always adopt order cancellation and small order technologies 
increase the trading cost for long-term investors and reduce quote depth. Brogaard et al. (2017) 
show that although high-frequency traders improve stock liquidity through liquidity supplying 
activities, their liquidity demanding activities cause a larger negative impact on stock liquidity 
than the positive effect. In conclusion, although there is a debate on whether HFT supplies or 
consumes stock liquidity, it is clear that HFT causes a direct impact on stock liquidity. 
Except for the direct impact of HFT on stock liquidity, it is less likely that HFT directly affects 
firm innovation inputs and outputs. Besides, it is unlikely that changes in R&D investments 
and future patent performance affect stock liquidity brought by HFT. Therefore, we use the 
HFT start date as an exogenous shock of stock liquidity. It avoids the possible simultaneity 
between stock liquidity and R&D investments. We create a dummy variable that equals zero 
before the starting date of HFT and equals one after (Aitken et al., 2017). We collect 
information about HFT start date from Aitken et al. (2015) and list them in Table 4.3.  
*** Table 4.3 *** 
 
The equation (4.1b) represents the determinants of R&D investments. We employ the Tobit 
model for this equation to consider the non-negative nature of R&D (Chemmanur and Tian, 
2018). Not all firms participate in R&D activities. We could have a selection bias if we only 
consider firms that invest in R&D projects. Thus, we replace these dependent variables (i.e., 
R&D) with zero if they have a missing value. In other words, we obtain the dependent variables 




outputs. We also employ the Tobit model to consider the non-negative nature of innovation 
outputs (Chemmanur and Tian, 2018). Overall, we introduce model (4.1) following Garcia and 
Mohnen (2010) as below, 
(4.1a) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽10𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡 
, 
(4.1b) 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡




(4.1c)𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
                                                                                                                        +𝛽33𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖3𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛




where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛  represents the patent-based innovation outputs of firm 𝑖 
from country 𝑐  in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛 . It is separately measured by 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 , 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 , 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 and 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡+𝑛. We describe the definition of these variables in 
Table 4.1, Panel A. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,c,𝑡  is the independent variable in this study. It is the natural 
logarithm of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). We 
introduce the detailed definition of this variable in Table 4.1, Panel B. 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is the ratio 
of R&D investment to total assets of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′  are the firm-level 
control variables shown in Table 4.1, Panel C (except 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡). We control 𝐶𝑐, 𝐼𝑗 and 𝑌𝑡 as 
vectors of country, industry and year fixed effect variables in equations (4.1b) and (4.1c). In 




Industry Classifications (SICs). Following Aitken et al. (2017), we do not control industry 







4.4 Empirical results 
We report the marginal effects of determinates of stock liquidity on firm innovation in this 
section. We separately represent innovation outputs by the number of patents, citations, patent 
generality index and patent originality index over the following three years. 
 
4.4.1 Patent quantity 
In Table 4.4, we measure a firm’s innovation outputs via the number of granted patents in the 
next three years.  In columns (1), (4) and (7), we show that HFT causes a significant positive 
impact on stock liquidity. More specifically, this positive trend increases over time. It supports 
Alfaro et al.'s (2020) opinion that HFT improves stock liquidity. 
*** Table 4.4 *** 
In columns (2), (5) and (8), we observe a significant negative impact of stock liquidity on a 
firm’s R&D investments. However, the marginal effect of stock liquidity on R&D investment 
is only -0.004. Compared with the marginal effect of stock liquidity on patent counts in 
columns (3), (6) and (9), which are 0.199, 0.189 and 0.211, we suggest that increased stock 
liquidity causes a slight impact on firms’ R&D investment. It might be because our sample 
only includes the top 30 percentile of the largest public companies by market capitalisation in 
each exchange. These big companies are more likely to be monitored and trusted by financial 
analysts and investors. Thus their managers tend to make investment decisions based on long-
term targets rather than short-term earnings. 
In columns (3), (6) and (9), we observe significant positive impacts of R&D and stock liquidity 




liquidity and R&D are separately 10.704 and 0.199. This means R&D causes larger positive 
impacts on innovation outputs than stock liquidity. Besides, we show that stock liquidity causes 
a direct increase of 0.199 in the firm’s innovation outputs, while there is a decrease of 0.04 (-
0.004 × 10.704) due to the indirect effect through R&D investments. Overall, this table shows 
that stock liquidity causes a positive impact on firm innovation quantity (0.195 = 0.199 – 0.04). 
This means that although stock liquidity could indirectly affect firm innovation through R&D, 
the greatest impact on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock liquidity. 
In addition, a firm’s patent count improves with an increase of the firm size, measured by a 
higher number of total assets. This finding is consistent with most research in this field (for 
example, Wen et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2015; Zhu and Zhu, 2017) which finds that a firm’s 
ability to generate patents is affected by its size.  
We support the findings from most previous literature that the increased leverage ratio will 
impede the firm’s innovation output (for example, Fang et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018; 
Chemmanur and Tian, 2018). This is consistent with Baysinger and Hoskisson's (1989) 
argument that highly leveraged firms are less likely to be involved in long-term projects (for 
example, R&D projects) and get an increasing number of patents. 
There are controversial opinions about the relationship between asset tangibility and firm 
innovation.47 The table in this chapter supports Cumming et al. (2020), and Zhu and Zhu 
(2017)’s finding that firms with a higher ratio of asset tangibility do not cause significant 
influences on firm innovation outputs in the future. Besides, we show that firms with a higher 
ratio of asset tangibility invest less in R&D projects. According to Bhattacharya et al. (2017), 
 
47 While Fang et al. (2014), Chemmanur and Tian (2018) reported the positive influence of asset tangibility on 
the number of firm’s patent applications, Wen et al. (2018) found that firms with a higher ratio of asset tangibility 




innovation is regarded as a long-term investment in intangible assets. It is different from regular 
investments in tangible assets in terms of its long-term and high-risk character. Therefore, a 
higher ratio of asset tangibility may lead to a lower ratio of asset intangibility (i.e., R&D 
projects). 
We show the positive impacts of capital expenditure on innovation. It is also observed in 
Chemmanur and Tian (2018), Luong et al. (2017) and Zhu and Zhu (2017). Except for this, 
Cumming et al. (2020) find negative relationships. 
In this table, we report that firms produce fewer patents the older they get. We should note that 
we measure the firm’s age by the number of years listed on Datastream. As the Datastream 
only records the public company, the firm age in this chapter is more likely to represent the 
years since the company went public. However, this does not mean that going public impedes 
the firm’s innovative performance.48 Bernstein (2015) suggests that going public changes a 
firm's strategy in pursuing innovation. Bernstein found that IPO companies tend to achieve 
patents through acquisitions due to the increased access to capital.  
We find that better fundamental indicators, such as growth opportunities and cash holding, 
could encourage firms to invest in R&D investments. This supports the previous argument that 
managers gain the confidence to participate in innovative activities from their investors through 
better fundamental indicators (Sriram, 2008). However, this does not mean the firms could 
produce more patents over the following three years.  
In addition, these firm characteristics cause similar impacts on R&D investments and other 
patent-based indicators in the tables in the following subsections. 
 
48 If a public company achieves patent through acquisition, it is not recorded in the PATSTAT. Therefore, it is 




4.4.2 Patent quality 
In Table 4.5, we represent the firms’ innovation performance by the number of patent citations 
from the year 𝑡 + 1 to the year 𝑡 + 3. This measures the quality of firms’ innovation outputs. 
In this table, we show a significant positive impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation quality. 
The marginal effect of stock liquidity for firms’ patent counts citations is shown in Table 4.5, 
Column (3) is 0.184. It is not a low figure as the mean of LN_CIT is 1.36.  
*** Table 4.5 *** 
In addition, we observe a positive but insignificant impact of R&D investments on firm 
innovation quality. A possible reason is that these large companies tend to invest in incremental 
innovation projects and obtain disruptive innovation through acquisitions. According to Wu 
(2012), incremental innovation is an incremental refinement of existing technologies, while 
disruptive innovation is a process of creating dramatic changes. This is supported by 
Bernstein's (2015) finding that companies change their innovation strategy after going public. 
While newly listed firms achieve a large number of high-quality patents through acquisitions, 
the average citations created by old employees decrease in the five years after an IPO filing. 
However, PATSTAT does not record patent assignment that public company obtain patents 
through acquisition. In addition, this might be because our sample does not include self-
citations. In terms of this, companies’ self-citation during the process of incremental innovation 
is not recorded in our sample.   
Overall, firm innovation quality is not significantly affected by R&D but it is significantly 
improved by stock liquidity. A possible explanation is the entry of long-term and/or strategic 
institutional investors following the increased stock liquidity. They lead to extra resources (i.e., 





4.4.3 Patent generality index 
In Table 4.6, we represent firms’ innovation performance using the patent generality index. 
The table shows that increased stock liquidity continuously improves a firm’s patent generality 
index from the year 𝑡 + 1 to the year 𝑡 + 3. The greater generality index means the knowledge 
of this patent is cited by other patents belonging to a broader range of technology areas. This 
may be one of the results of the increasing quality of the patent. Namely, the patent is cited by 
other patents in different technological fields because of its high quality. 
*** Table 4.6 *** 
 
4.4.4 Patent originality index 
In Table 4.7, we represent a firm’s innovation performance by the patent originality index. This 
index increases in the next year after firms experience an increase in stock liquidity. It means 
the knowledge of this patent is cited by other patents belonging to a broader range of technology 
areas. It may be one of the results of the increasing quality of the patent. In other words, the 
patent is cited by other patents in different technological fields because of its high quality.  
*** Table 4.7 *** 
In summary, we show that although stock liquidity can affect firm innovation through R&D 
investment, the most impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation comes from the direct impact 
of stock liquidity itself. While stock liquidity causes a significant negative influence on firm 




We show that there is a larger impact from R&D investment on firm innovation quantity than 
stock liquidity. Additionally, while R&D investments do not significantly affect either 
innovation quality, the generality index, nor the originality index, an increase in stock liquidity 




4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of stock liquidity on the R&D-innovation relationship. 
By employing a structure model, we find that although stock liquidity can affect firm 
innovation through R&D investment, the greatest influence on firm innovation comes from the 
direct impact of stock liquidity. Although stock liquidity causes a significant negative influence 
on firm R&D investment, it is much lighter than the impact on firm innovation outputs. In 
terms of this, we support the argument that increased stock liquidity decreases asymmetric 
information between investors and innovative firms and encourages the entry of long-term 
and/or strategic institutional investors. It leads to the monitoring of firm managers and extra 
resources, thereby improving both the quantity and quality of firm innovation.  
In addition, we find that R&D leads to larger impacts on firm innovation outputs than stock 
liquidity. However, we do not observe a significant improvement of R&D on other patent-
based indicators. In addition, we show that there is increased patent quality, the generality index 
and the originality index following the rise of stock liquidity. Firms with higher stock liquidity 
are more likely to cite patents in different technology fields and thus more likely to be cited by 
other patents in different areas. They support our opinion that increased stock liquidity leads to 
a greater degree of monitoring and extra resources being channelled to the company, thereby 
encouraging them to produce high-quality patents. 
Overall, we contribute to the empirical literature on the relationship between stock liquidity 
and firm innovation. By employing an international sample, we suggest the opposite opinion 
to Fang et al. (2014) by arguing that growth in stock liquidity could improve firm innovation 
outputs. We also improve the understanding of the R&D-patents relationship from the 
perspective of stock liquidity. We explain their relationship through the direct impacts of 




However, there are a number of limitations to this conclusion. First, we only included the top 
20 percentile of the largest public companies in each exchange. This limits how representative 
our research is. Besides, we do not include the data of subsidiaries. It is because Datastream 
only focuses on the current subsidiaries. However, firms may raise funding in their home 
country while conduction innovation activity in other countries. We do not capture these effects 
in the current framework of the thesis. In addition, while Fang et al. (2014) and Wen et al. 
(2018) are of the opposite opinion regarding whether stock liquidity improves or impedes firm 
innovation in different countries, we do not consider the impact of country characters in this 




Table 4.1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 
𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
successful applications submitted by firm 𝑖 in the year  𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 +
2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively. 
𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 
𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
citations made to the firm 𝑖’s patent in the year  𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2 and 
𝑡 + 3 respectively. 
𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑛) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 is the natural logarithm of one plus sum of a 
firm’s generality score (i.e., 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛) in the year  𝑡 + 1, 
𝑡 + 2  and 𝑡 + 3  respectively. 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛  is the sum of 
generality score of patents belonging to the firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡 +
1 , 𝑡 + 2  and 𝑡 + 3  respectively. A patent 𝑚 ’s generality score 
(𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑚) as 








where 𝑚 is the 𝑚𝑡ℎ patent applied for by the corporate applicant 
in a given year,  𝑘 is the index of 4-digital IPC patent classes, 𝑁𝑚 
is the number of different 4-digital IPC patent classes to which the 
citations belong. 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑚  is the number of patents citing the 
patent 𝑚, and  𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑚𝑘 is the number of patent 𝑚’s citations 
which belong to the patent class 𝑘. 
𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 
𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑖,𝑡+𝑛  is the natural logarithm of one plus the sum 
of a firm’s originality score (i.e., 𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 ) in the year  𝑡 +
1, 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 respectively. The 𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 is the sum of 
originality score of patents belonging to the firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡 +













Where 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑚  is the number of patents cited by patent 𝑚 , 
𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑘  is the number of patents cited by patent 𝑚  which 
belong to the patent class 𝑘. 
Panel B: Independent Variable 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the Amihud 
measure of firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑁 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡









                    (2) 
where 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the Amihud measure of firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡. 𝑟𝑖,𝑑 and 
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑 are daily return and daily dollar trading volume for stock 
𝑖 on day 𝑑. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days which is available in year 𝑡.  
Panel C: Firm-level Control Variables 
𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  
Firm size, 𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (Wen et al., 2018). 
𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑁(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  
Investment in R&D, 𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , measured by Research and 
development expenditures divided by the book value of total assets 
measured at the end of year 𝑡. 
𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅&𝐷




Asset tangibility, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , defined as the property, plant, and 
equipment expenditure divided by the book value of total assets, 
measured at the end of the year 𝑡. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡, 𝐴𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  






Leverage ratio, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡, defined as the book value of debt divided 
by book value of total assets, measured at the end of year 𝑡.  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  
Investment in fixed assets, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , measured as capital 
expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets, measured at 
the end of year 𝑡. 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑄 𝑖,𝑡 
Growth opportunity, 𝑄 𝑖,𝑡 , defined as Firm 𝑖 ’s market-to-book 
ratio during calendar year t, calculated as the market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets, 
measured at the end of year 𝑡. 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠    
 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑖,𝑡  
Firm age, 𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑖,𝑡, measured as the natural logarithm of one 
plus firm 𝑖’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on 
Datastream. 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑁(1 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒) 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑖,𝑡 
Cash, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑖,𝑡, defined as the ratio of cash holdings to book assets 
in year t. 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝑖,𝑡 =
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
Profitability, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡, defined as the income before extraordinary 





Table 4.2 Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables in our analysis. The sample 
contains 15,202 firm-year observations, which includes 796 companies from 10 countries during 
the period between 1990 and 2010. The definition of variables is listed in Table 4.1. All firm-
level variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1% of variables’ distribution. Panel A shows 
the summary statistics of firm-level variables. Panel B represents the pairwise correlations 
between firm variables after removing country-means. ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively.   
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Variables 
  Variables N Mean St.Dev p5 Median p95 
LN_PAT 15,202 1.87 1.77 0.00 1.39 5.18 
LN_CIT 15,202 1.36 1.64 0.00 0.69 4.61 
LN_GENERAL 15,202 0.74 1.09 0.00 0.00 3.11 
LN_ORIGINAL 15,202 0.69 1.05 0.00 0.00 2.99 
 LIQUIDITY 15,043 9.08 2.46 4.64 9.25 12.89 
 LN TA 14,588 13.88 2.04 10.42 14.05 17.25 
 PPETA 14,457 0.57 0.38 0.10 0.49 1.30 
 LEV 14,578 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.54 
 CAPEXTA 13,789 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.13 
 RDTA 12,231 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.24 
 Q 14,543 2.26 2.09 0.88 1.51 6.22 
 LN AGE 15,202 2.82 0.68 1.39 3.00 3.64 
 CASH 12,234 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.37 




Table 4.2 (continued) 
Firm-level Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. Correlation of Firm-Level Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  (1) LIQUIDITY 1          
  (2) LN_TA 0.65*** 1         
  (3) PPETA 0.01* 0.30*** 1        
  (4) LEV 0.12*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 1       
  (5) CAPEXTA 0.02** 0.02* 0.41*** 0.04*** 1      
  (6) RDTA -0.13*** -0.45*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.04*** 1     
  (7) Q 0.01 -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.24*** 0.04*** 0.42*** 1    
  (8) LN_AGE 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.31*** 0.18*** -0.12*** -0.32*** -0.36*** 1   
  (9) CASH -0.11*** -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.17*** 0.36*** 0.27*** -0.20*** 1  




Table 4.3 HFT starting date 
Exchange name HFT start date 
Stockholm Stock Exchange 2005/April 
Swiss Stock Exchange 2004/January 
Toronto Stock Exchange 2005/May 
NASDAQ 2003/January 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 2005/May 
Australia Stock Exchange 2006/April 
XETRA Germany 2003/January 
NYSE 2003/May 
London Stock Exchange 2006/February 
New Zealand Stock Exchange 2004/November 
OLSO Norway 2005/April 




Table 4.4 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝒏 




















HFT 0.959***     0.991***     1.081***     
  [0.036]     [0.039]     [0.044]     
RDTA     10.704***     12.712***     11.863*** 
      [3.730]     [3.611]     [3.770] 
LIQUIDITY   -0.004*** 0.199**   -0.004*** 0.189**   -0.004*** 0.211*** 
    [0.000] [0.084]   [0.000] [0.083]   [0.000] [0.078] 
LN_TA 0.959***   0.487*** 0.956***   0.493*** 0.955***   0.467*** 
  [0.010]   [0.082] [0.010]   [0.080] [0.011]   [0.075] 
PPETA -0.847*** -0.011*** 0.039 -0.847*** -0.010*** 0.065 -0.841*** -0.010*** 0.069 
  [0.053] [0.002] [0.105] [0.056] [0.002] [0.105] [0.058] [0.002] [0.103] 
LEV -0.997*** -0.024*** -0.435** -1.107*** -0.025*** -0.411** -1.263*** -0.027*** -0.399** 




CAPEXTA 4.326*** 0.097*** 3.206*** 4.383*** 0.106*** 2.752*** 4.675*** 0.107*** 3.375*** 
  [0.459] [0.016] [0.780] [0.471] [0.016] [0.804] [0.487] [0.017] [0.827] 
Q 0.283*** 0.008*** -0.056 0.277*** 0.008*** -0.059 0.264*** 0.007*** -0.043 
  [0.009] [0.000] [0.046] [0.009] [0.000] [0.043] [0.009] [0.000] [0.041] 
LN_AGE -0.315*** -0.001 -0.155*** -0.301*** 0 -0.195*** -0.286*** 0 -0.202*** 
  [0.032] [0.001] [0.043] [0.033] [0.001] [0.043] [0.034] [0.001] [0.042] 
CASH -0.237 0.079*** -0.456 -0.253* 0.079*** -0.722* -0.338** 0.076*** -0.605 
  [0.145] [0.005] [0.394] [0.152] [0.005] [0.387] [0.159] [0.005] [0.390] 
ROA 0.336*** -0.206*** 2.315** 0.332*** -0.211*** 3.201*** 0.319*** -0.210*** 3.092*** 
  [0.113] [0.004] [0.969] [0.117] [0.004] [0.958] [0.122] [0.004] [0.994] 
No. of observations 9,070 8,450 7,816 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of determinants of stock liquidity to firm innovation, 
(4.1a) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽10𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡, 
(4.1b) 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡






(4.1c) 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 =
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ > 0
. 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is represented by 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 in column (1), (2) and (3), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2 in column (3), (4) and (5), 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 in column 
(6), (7) and (8). The marginal effects of equation (4.1a) are recorded in column (1), (4), and (7); the marginal effects of equation (4.1b) are recorded in column (2), (5), 
and (8); the marginal effects of equation (4.1c) are recorded in column (3), (6), and (9). 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,c,𝑡 is the independent variable in this study. It is the natural logarithm 
of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡 is the research and development investment (R&D) of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the 
year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′  are the firm-level control variables shown in Table 4.1, Panel C (except 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡). Marginal effects are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the 
brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. Prob > χ2show the significance of the overall model and their corresponding p values. 




Table 4.5 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑪𝑰𝑻𝒕+𝒏 




















HFT 0.959***     0.991***     1.081***     
  [0.036]     [0.039]     [0.044]     
RDTA     6.839     3.786     4.823 
      [6.215]     [8.240]     [7.414] 
LIQUIDITY   -0.004*** 0.184**   -0.004*** 0.194**   -0.004*** 0.121 
    [0.000] [0.092]   [0.000] [0.094]   [0.000] [0.087] 
LN_TA 0.959***   0.388*** 0.956***   0.359*** 0.955***   0.424*** 
  [0.010]   [0.084] [0.010]   [0.083] [0.011]   [0.077] 
PPETA -0.847*** -0.011*** -0.083 -0.847*** -0.010*** -0.077 -0.841*** -0.010*** -0.124 
  [0.053] [0.002] [0.127] [0.056] [0.002] [0.143] [0.058] [0.002] [0.132] 
LEV -0.997*** -0.024*** -0.620*** -1.107*** -0.025*** -0.709** -1.263*** -0.027*** -0.723** 
  [0.097] [0.003] [0.229] [0.101] [0.003] [0.292] [0.106] [0.003] [0.285] 




  [0.459] [0.016] [1.019] [0.471] [0.016] [1.295] [0.487] [0.017] [1.198] 
Q 0.283*** 0.008*** -0.033 0.277*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.264*** 0.007*** 0.021 
  [0.009] [0.000] [0.069] [0.009] [0.000] [0.085] [0.009] [0.000] [0.072] 
LN_AGE -0.315*** -0.001 -0.065 -0.301*** 0 -0.100** -0.286*** 0 -0.123*** 
  [0.032] [0.001] [0.043] [0.033] [0.001] [0.042] [0.034] [0.001] [0.041] 
CASH -0.237 0.079*** 0.378 -0.253* 0.079*** 0.674 -0.338** 0.076*** 0.559 
  [0.145] [0.005] [0.629] [0.152] [0.005] [0.826] [0.159] [0.005] [0.719] 
ROA 0.336*** -0.206*** 1.788 0.332*** -0.211*** 1.323 0.319*** -0.210*** 1.776 
  [0.113] [0.004] [1.600] [0.117] [0.004] [2.169] [0.122] [0.004] [1.942] 
No. of observations 9,070 8,450 7,816 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of determinants of stock liquidity to firm innovation, 
(4.1a) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽10𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡, 
(4.1b) 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡
∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ > 0
, 
(4.1c) 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 =
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛






𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is represented by 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+1 in column (1), (2) and (3), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_CI𝑇𝑡+2 in column (3), (4) and (5), 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+3 in column 
(6), (7) and (8). The marginal effects of equation (4.1a) are recorded in column (1), (4), and (7); the marginal effects of equation (4.1b) are recorded in column (2), (5), 
and (8); the marginal effects of equation (4.1c) are recorded in column (3), (6), and (9). 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,c,𝑡 is the independent variable in this study. It is the natural logarithm 
of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the research and development investment (R&D) of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the 
year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′  are the firm-level control variables shown in Table 4.1, Panel C (except 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡). Marginal effects are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the 
brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. Prob > χ2show the significance of the overall model and their corresponding p values. 




Table 4.6 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑳𝒕+𝒏 




















HFT 0.959***   0.991***   1.081***   
 [0.036]   [0.039]   [0.044]   
RDTA   -0.969   5.018   1.514 
   [5.972]   [5.372]   [7.417] 
LIQUIDITY  -0.004*** 0.104*  -0.004*** 0.137**  -0.004*** 0.142** 
  [0.000] [0.063]  [0.000] [0.061]  [0.000] [0.064] 
LN_TA 0.959***  0.247*** 0.956***  0.241*** 0.955***  0.213*** 
 [0.010]  [0.053] [0.010]  [0.053] [0.011]  [0.051] 
PPETA -0.847*** -0.011*** -0.121 -0.847*** -0.010*** -0.037 -0.841*** -0.010*** -0.075 
 [0.053] [0.002] [0.101] [0.056] [0.002] [0.093] [0.058] [0.002] [0.113] 
LEV -0.997*** -0.024*** -0.521*** -1.107*** -0.025*** -0.330* -1.263*** -0.027*** -0.408 
 [0.097] [0.003] [0.194] [0.101] [0.003] [0.188] [0.106] [0.003] [0.262] 




 [0.459] [0.016] [0.820] [0.471] [0.016] [0.826] [0.487] [0.017] [1.075] 
Q 0.283*** 0.008*** 0.036 0.277*** 0.008*** -0.022 0.264*** 0.007*** 0.011 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.064] [0.009] [0.000] [0.055] [0.009] [0.000] [0.070] 
LN_AGE -0.315*** -0.001 0.02 -0.301*** 0 -0.004 -0.286*** 0 0.001 
 [0.032] [0.001] [0.028] [0.033] [0.001] [0.027] [0.034] [0.001] [0.027] 
CASH -0.237 0.079*** 0.769 -0.253* 0.079*** 0.19 -0.338** 0.076*** 0.519 
 [0.145] [0.005] [0.589] [0.152] [0.005] [0.537] [0.159] [0.005] [0.706] 
ROA 0.336*** -0.206*** -0.447 0.332*** -0.211*** 1.268 0.319*** -0.210*** 0.425 
  [0.113] [0.004] [1.539] [0.117] [0.004] [1.417] [0.122] [0.004] [1.946] 
No. of observations 9,070 8,450 7,816 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of determinants of stock liquidity to firm innovation, 
(4.1a) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽10𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡, 
(4.1b) 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡
∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ > 0
, 
(4.1c) 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 =
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛






𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is represented by 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+1in column (1), (2) and (3), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+2 in in column (3), (4) and (5), 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+3 in  in column (6), (7) and (8). The marginal effects of equation (4.1a) are recorded in column (1), (4), and (7); the marginal effects of equation (4.1b) 
are recorded in column (2), (5), and (8); the marginal effects of equation (4.1c) are recorded in column (3), (6), and (9). 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,c,𝑡 is the independent variable in this 
study. It is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the research and development investment 
(R&D) of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖,c,𝑡 are the firm-level control variables shown in Table 4.1, Panel C (except 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡). Marginal effects are shown, and 
their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. Prob > χ2show the significance of the overall 




Table 4.7 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑶𝑹𝑰𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑳𝒕+𝒏 




















HFT 0.959***     0.990***     1.081***     
  [0.036]     [0.039]     [0.044]     
RDTA     2.653     -10.18     -8.621 
      [6.325]     [6.274]     [6.307] 
LIQUIDITY   -0.004*** 0.201***   -0.004*** 0.104   -0.004*** 0.075 
    [0.000] [0.065]   [0.000] [0.064]   [0.000] [0.061] 
LN_TA 0.959***   0.163*** 0.956***   0.188*** 0.955***   0.218*** 
  [0.010]   [0.055] [0.010]   [0.054] [0.011]   [0.051] 
PPETA -0.847*** -0.011*** 0.025 -0.847*** -0.010*** -0.176* -0.841*** -0.010*** -0.185* 
  [0.053] [0.002] [0.105] [0.056] [0.002] [0.107] [0.058] [0.002] [0.105] 
LEV -0.997*** -0.024*** -0.27 -1.107*** -0.025*** -0.695*** -1.263*** -0.027*** -0.716*** 
  [0.097] [0.003] [0.203] [0.101] [0.003] [0.221] [0.106] [0.003] [0.236] 




  [0.459] [0.016] [0.866] [0.471] [0.016] [0.973] [0.487] [0.017] [0.976] 
Q 0.283*** 0.008*** -0.029 0.277*** 0.008*** 0.111* 0.264*** 0.007*** 0.105* 
  [0.009] [0.000] [0.067] [0.009] [0.000] [0.065] [0.009] [0.000] [0.061] 
LN_AGE -0.315*** -0.001 0.034 -0.301*** 0 0.007 -0.286*** 0 0.006 
  [0.032] [0.001] [0.029] [0.033] [0.001] [0.033] [0.034] [0.001] [0.032] 
CASH -0.237 0.079*** 0.443 -0.253* 0.079*** 1.671*** -0.338** 0.076*** 1.450** 
  [0.145] [0.005] [0.624] [0.152] [0.005] [0.635] [0.159] [0.005] [0.613] 
ROA 0.336*** -0.206*** 0.516 0.332*** -0.211*** -2.727 0.319*** -0.210*** -2.186 
  [0.113] [0.004] [1.629] [0.117] [0.004] [1.658] [0.122] [0.004] [1.658] 
No. of observations 9,070 8,450 7,816 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of determinants of stock liquidity to firm innovation, 
(4.1a) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽10𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡, 
(4.1b) 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡 = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡
∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∗ > 0
, 
(4.1c) 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 =
{
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛
∗ = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽32𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑍𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖,c,𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛






𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is represented by 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+1 in column (1), (2) and (3), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+2 in in column (3), (4) and (5), 
𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+3  in  in column (6), (7) and (8). The marginal effects of equation (4.1a) are recorded in column (1), (4), and (7); the marginal effects of equation (4.1b) 
are recorded in column (2), (5), and (8); the marginal effects of equation (4.1c) are recorded in column (3), (6), and (9). 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,c,𝑡 is the independent variable in this 
study. It is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020). 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the research and development investment (R&D) 
of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. 𝑍𝑖,c,𝑡 are the firm-level control variables shown in Table 4.1, Panel C (except 𝑅&𝐷𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡). Marginal effects are shown, and their 
standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. Prob > χ2show the significance of the overall 




Chapter 5 Stock liquidity and firm innovation: international evidence 
5.1 Introduction 
There is a debate about the relationship between stock market liquidity and firm innovation. 
While Fang et al. (2014) found there exists a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
firm innovation in the U.S. market from 1994 to 2005, Dass et al. (2017) found no significant 
relationship, and Wen et al. (2018) demonstrated the positive impact of stock liquidity on 
innovation in the Chinese market. In this chapter, we analyse the relationship between them 
from a global perspective. 
We employ the multilevel model (i.e., the hierarchical linear model or HLM) to separate the 
within-country and cross-country impacts of firms’ stock liquidity on their innovative 
performance (Greene, 2003; Griffin et al., 2019). To examine a global sample of 71,689 firm-
year observations from 5,511 companies across 36 countries between 1990 and 2010, we firstly 
support our findings in Chapter 4, namely that rising stock liquidity can improve firms’ patent 
quantity, quality, generality index and originality index. In addition, by using this much larger 
sample, we find that while other firm-level factors, such as firm size, market-to-book ratio and 
leverage, cause a stable level effect on a firm’s innovation performance, the positive influence 
of stock liquidity on firm innovation increases over the following five years. 
To explore estimation results in greater depth, we investigate stock liquidity's impact from the 
perspective of firm innovation efficiency. We show that firms obtain continuously increased 
efficiency to produce high-quality patents rather than more patents following a rise in stock 
liquidity. This is explained by the hypothesis in Chapter 4 wherein increased stock liquidity 
facilitates the entrance of long-term strategic institutional investors into firms. It brings extra 




efficiency to produce high-quality patents. This argument is supported by the growth originality 
index following stock liquidity. We propose that rising stock liquidity provides opportunities 
for firms to acquire knowledge from a wider range of technology areas. Moreover, after firms 
experience an increase in stock liquidity, their patents are more likely to be cited by other 
patents belonging to a broader range of technology areas. This may be one of the ways in which 
firms produce high-quality patents. 
At country-level, our results show that the development of credit markets and a high degree of 
economic freedom continuously improve firm innovation performance across a five-year 
period. In addition, the size of the economy and trade liberalisation leads to a short-term 
positive influence on firm innovation quantity and quality. Cutting corporate income tax tends 
to improve firm efficiency to produce high-quality patents. In particular, we show that a firm’s 
innovation performance can be encouraged by the protection of property rights over a five-year 
period; by the smaller size of government expenditures, enterprises, and tax, or lower and less 
volatile inflation over the following three years.  
We make several potential contributions in this chapter. Firstly, our results contribute to the 
debate on whether stock liquidity encourages or impedes firm innovation based on a global 
sample (Fang et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018). Compared with the latter, our research provides 
within- and cross-country evidence of the effect of stock liquidity on firm innovation over a 
more extended period. While we support Wen et al. (2018)’s opinion that increased stock 
liquidity improves firm innovation, our study includes more patent-based measurements by 
which to analyse in depth the impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation performance. 
Additionally, we provide evidence to policymakers on whether they should improve or impede 
stock liquidity from the perspective of encouraging innovation activities. As technology 




and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), policymakers in the financial area are expected 
to encourage innovation outputs through financial systems. Our evidence could help to reduce 
their confusion on the current debate and support policies to increase stock liquidity. We show 
that while a growth in stock liquidity encourages firms to produce more patents, it mainly 
contributes to a firm’s efficiency in producing better patents. 
Our research provides advice to investors and firm managers regarding how to make 
investment decisions based on the policy of stock liquidity. Investors tend to invest in firms 
with better innovation performances, as innovation outputs can be capitalised in their market 
value and predict a firm’s real return in the stock market (Hall et al., 2005; Hsu, 2009). 
Therefore, our research can encourage investors to allocate more investments in stock 
exchanges with higher stock liquidity. We would also encourage public companies to continue 
their R&D activities following policies that increase stock liquidity. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: We review the previous literature and 
propose a hypothesis about the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation in the 
next section. We describe the sample, variable construction, and estimation method in the third 
section. In the fourth section, we present our estimation results and provide some analysis. In 





5.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
This section reviews the literature about firm innovation from the perspective of the 
macroeconomy, corporate ownership, corporate governance, and financial markets. Although 
a lot of research has covered this, few focus on the impact of market microstructure. Notably, 
there is still debate about the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation (Fang et 
al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018). 
We will mainly focus on the literature that studies firm innovation from the perspective of 
innovation output (i.e., patent-based data). A lot of literature has considered firm innovation 
by R&D investment, but this literature generally considers a firm's innovation input without 
capturing the innovation outcomes (Fang et al., 2014). In addition, previous research has shown 
a high correlation between a firm’s investment in R&D projects and the number of patents 
issued by it (Griliches, 1984). 
 
5.2.1 Macro-environment factors 
Previous research shows that firms' innovative outcomes tend to be affected by a country's legal 
system, government policies, culture, taxes and trade liberalisation. A host of literature studies 
the response of corporate innovation to law and policy, such as Intellectual Property Right (IPR, 
hereafter) protection rules (Fang et al., 2017; Cohen et al., 2019), Labour laws (Acharya et al., 
2013, 2014), Bankruptcy laws (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009; Cerqueiro et al., 2017); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Acts (Gao and Zhang, 2017), Uncertainty of government 
policy (Bhattacharya et al., 2017) and government spending and subsidies (Jaffe and Le, 2015; 
Howell, 2017; Kong, 2020). In addition, Mukherjee et al. (2017) and Dechezleprêtre et al. 




activities. Bloom et al. (2016) and Coelli et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between 
trade liberalisation and corporate innovation. In addition to this, a group of literature 
investigates the influence of national culture on innovative activities from the perspective of 
power distance (Shane, 1992; Kaasa and Vadi, 2010), individualism/collectivism (Jones and 
Davis, 2000; Kaasa and Vadi, 2010; Desmarchelier and Fang, 2016), masculinity/femininity 
(Rhyne et al., 2002; Kaasa and Vadi, 2010), Confucian dynamism (Rossberger, 2014), 
uncertainty avoidance (Allred and Swan, 2004; Bradley et al., 2013), and indulgence (Griffith 
and Rubera, 2014). 
 
5.2.2 Corporate governance 
A series of papers explores the relationship between corporate-level factors and firm innovation. 
Battaggion and Tajoli (2000) and Lee (2005) studied the influence of ownership concentration 
on firms' innovative activities. A group of literature investigates how a firm’s innovation 
performance can be affected by the identity of ownership, such as institutional investment 
(Aghion et al., 2013; Qi, 2015), hedge funds (Brav et al., 2018), foreign ownership (Luong et 
al., 2017), venture capital (Chemmanur et al., 2014; Tian and Wang, 2014), firm stakeholders 
(Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2016; Chu et al., 2019), mergers and acquisitions [M&A] (Zhao, 
2009; Atanassov, 2013; Bena and Li, 2014; Seru, 2014). 
Previous literature also covers the influence of human character on a firm’s innovative 
behaviour. Among them, Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Custódio et al. 
(2019), Sunder et al. (2017), and Baranchuk et al. (2014) studied how characteristics and 
compensations of the chief executive officers (CEOs) affect a firm’s innovative performance. 
Liu et al. (2017), Chemmanur et al. (2019), Chang et al. (2015) and Sauermann and Cohen 




In addition to this, researches show that a firm’s innovation performance tends to be affected 
by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Li et al., 2016); 
frequency of financial reporting (Fu et al., 2020) and coverage by financial analysts (He and 
Tian, 2013), 2013). 
 
5.2.3 Financial market structure 
A series of literature studies a firm’s innovation performance before and after going public 
(Wu, 2012; Aggarwal and Hsu, 2014; Bernstein, 2015; Acharya and Xu, 2017). Other studies 
investigate the effect of equity markets on firm innovation and compare it with other financing 
methods (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Hsu et al., 2014; Moshirian et al., 2015). In addition to 
this, Blanco and Wehrheim (2017) and Chang et al. (2015) analysed how trading in the 
derivatives market, which consists of derivative exchanges and over the counter (OTC) markets, 
influences firm innovation. 
 
5.2.4 Market microstructure in the equity market 
Few papers involved studies about the relationship between market microstructure and firm 
innovation. 49 To the best of our knowledge, the literature in this field has involved research 
from the perspective of market manipulation (i.e., insider trading, end-of-day dislocation; 
Aboody and Lev, 2000; Levine et al., 2017; Cumming et al., 2020), takeover (Atanassov, 2013; 
Chemmanur and Tian, 2018), trading by institutional investors (Bushee, 1998; Abdioglu et al., 
 
49 According to Harris (2003), market microstructure is a branch of financial economics that researches trading 




2015) and stock liquidity (Tadesse, 2006; Fang et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018; Cumming et al., 
2020). 
 
5.2.5 Previous empirical research about the impacts of stock liquidity on firm innovation 
and hypothesis 
There is a debate about the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation. While 
Fang et al. (2014) demonstrate the negative influence of stock liquidity on firm innovation, 
Wen et al. (2018), Tadesse (2006), and Cumming et al. (2020) support that there is a positive 
relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation.  
Fang et al. (2014) analysed selected firms which traded on NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ from 
1994 to 2005. They employed the large movements of minimum tick size as exogenous shocks 
to stock liquidity and found that firms experiencing a larger increase in stock liquidity produced 
fewer patents and patent citations. They also argued that a larger exogenous increase in stock 
liquidity following decimalisation leads to a higher probability of facing hostile takeover and 
the increased participation of nondedicated institutional investors. They found that firm 
managers under pressure tended to abandon long-term investment in innovation in order to 
improve current profits.   
However, the reliability of this result is weakened by Dass et al. (2017) via an extended data 
set. While Fang et al. (2014) correct the truncation problems by estimating the patent counts in 




real data set, which includes the actual data of the last six years of Fang et al's. (2014) sample.50 
However, they found no significant relationship between stock liquidity and innovation.  
Following Fang et al. (2014)’s method, Wen et al. (2018) found a positive relationship between 
stock liquidity and innovation in the Chinese stock markets (i.e., Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). They applied two different exogenous variations to avoid inter-
relationship, namely, split-share structure policy and the adjustment of stamp duty rate. The 
research posits that liquidity improves the valuation of privatised State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and also the participation of dedicated institutional investors, thereby decreasing 
agency problems and increasing innovation amongst SOEs. In addition to this literature, 
Tadesse (2006) shows that stock market liquidity is positively related to technological 
innovation. Cumming et al. (2020) found the positive impact of stock liquidity on innovation 
can be mitigated by the presence of end-of-day manipulation.  
In summary, these two papers analyse the relationship between stock liquidity and firm 
innovation in different countries using the same approach but finding opposite conclusions. 
This may be due to the different institutional approaches within the US and China, such as 
industry background, economic regulation, and the policy environment. For example, Jiang 
and Kim (2020) demonstrate that ownership in Chinese companies is highly concentrated 
compared to the US and other developed countries’ companies. It is also true that the sample 
of Fang et al. (2014) is less relevant to the actual data. 
 
50 Fang et al. (2014) follow the method of Hall et al. (2001, 2005) to correct the truncation problems associated 
with the NBER patent database (which is the database collect the patent-based data). The truncation problem 
arises as the patent can be seen in the NBER database only after it is granted, however, there is a lag between 
patent application date and granted date. Therefore, many patent applications filed during the later year of the 




In addition to this, many researchers have shown that a smaller tick improves the price 
discovery process (Beaulieu et al., 2003; Chou and Chung, 2006; Chen and Gau, 2009). 
Moreover, innovative companies may be encouraged to invest more in R&D in a market with 
a low level of informational asymmetry. For example, Abdioglu et al. (2015) found a higher 
level of passive and dedicated institutional investment in R&D-intensive firms after a reduction 
of asymmetric information (brought about by the enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
aims to improve the accuracy of public firms' disclosures). In terms of this, it is possible that a 
decrease in the minimum tick size could affect firm innovation by influencing the price 
discovery process. This argument is opposite to that of Fang et al. (2014) which utilises the 
decimalisation and movements of minimum tick size as exogenous variations to overcome the 
interplay between stock liquidity and innovation.  
Therefore, there is still a debate around the impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation. To the 
best of knowledge, we do not find any research investigate the effect of stock liquidity on firm 
innovation activities considering both firm-level and country-level control factors. However, 
as we described in subsection 5.2.1 and 5.3.2.3, firm innovation performance is affected by 
country-level factors. It is necessary to include the country-level control factors.  
In this chapter, we aim to employ the multilevel model to analyse within and cross-country 
effects of liquidity on innovation. To investigate the impact of stock liquidity on firm 
innovation based on an international multi-level sample, we propose a hypothesis:  
Hypothesis An increase in stock liquidity improves firm innovation performance. 
In the following sections, we analyse the relationship between stock liquidity and firm 




5.3 Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, Descriptive Statistics and 
Estimation method 
5.3.1 Data and sample selection  
In addition to patent-based data and firm account data employed in Chapter 4, we collected 
national accounts data (for example, GDP, inflation rate) and worldwide governance indicators 
(WGI) from the World Bank database; the Corporate income tax rate from Tax Foundation; 
Education rate from Barro and Lee (2013); Economic freedom of the world (EFW) index from 
The Fraser Institute; and secrecy indicators from Hope et al. (2008). 
 
5.3.2 Variable measurement 
5.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
We consider firm innovation performance by following six indicators. Including the four 
indicators employed in Chapter 4, we include two additional indicators in this chapter to 
represent innovation efficiency. 
Innovation efficiency (IE) reflects a firm’s ability to produce patents and obtain patent citations 
for every one percent increase in R&D expenditures in year 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, 𝑡 + 3 and 𝑡 + 5, 
respectively.51 Following Wen et al. (2018), we represent it as the ratio of patents to the natural 
logarithm of R&D investment. According to Hirshleifer et al's. (2013) suggestion that the 
number of citations made to a patent can better reflect the patent’s technological or economic 
 
51 In this chapter, we also run the regression on year 𝑡 + 4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. 
However, we do not report it for brevity. We are able to run the model to analyse the regression on year 𝑡 + 4 and 




significance, we also represent the IE as the ratio of patent citations to the natural logarithm of 
R&D investment. We describe the detailed variable information in Table 5.1, Panel A. We also 
provide summary statistics of these two variables in Table 4.2, Panel A.  
*** Table 5.1 *** 
 
5.3.2.2 Independent variable 
In this chapter, we use the same liquidity variable as in Chapter 4. As we describe in subsection 
4.3.2.2 Independent variable in Chapter 4, the Amihud ratio is the best monthly/daily cost-per-
dollar-volume proxy to measure stock liquidity in international research (Fong et al., 2017). 
Therefore, in this chapter, we still measure the stock liquidity of the firm, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, as the 
natural logarithm of the inverse of the Amihud measure of illiquidity (Cumming et al., 2020).  
 
5.3.2.3 Control variables 
In this chapter, we employ the same firm-level control variables as in Chapter 4. We also follow 
the previous literature and measure these variables for firm 𝑖 at the end of each calendar year. 
We describe the detailed variable information in Table 4.1, Panel C.  
Except for this, we control investment in R&D,  𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , measured by research and 
development expenditures divided by the book value of total assets (Fang et al., 2014). 
Following from Wen et al. (2018), we do not control 𝑅𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 when innovation efficiency is 
considered as the dependent variable in the estimation. We describe the detailed variable 




For country characteristics, we follow Levine et al. (2017) and control for the size of the 
economy, Gross Domestic Product ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐,𝑡 ) (according to Levine et al., 2017, in natural 
logarithm). It is likely to shape innovation and influence the degree to which firms file patents 
with the patent office in more developed countries (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009; Levine 
et al., 2017).  
We control the level of domestic stock market capitalisation, 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 (Titman et al., 2013), 
and domestic credit market capitalisation, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐,𝑡 (Tadesse, 2006; Hsu et al., 2014). This is 
because firms’ innovative activity is more likely to be encouraged by a well-developed stock 
market and discouraged by the development of the credit market (Hsu et al., 2014). 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 
is the trading value of shares traded in country 𝑐 scaled by country 𝑐’s GDP in year 𝑡. The 
trading value of shares is equal to the total number of domestic and foreign shares traded in 
country 𝑐, multiplied by their respective matching prices. Only one side of the transaction is 
considered in the calculation. Besides, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐,𝑡, is the ratio of domestic credit provided by 
financial sectors in country 𝑐 to country 𝑐’s GDP in year  𝑡. Domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis as well as the net credit to 
the central government. The ratio shows development of financial sector and depth of banking 
sector in terms of size. 
We control the intensity of international trade, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐,𝑡, computed as the import and export of 
goods and services as a fraction of country c’s GDP in year 𝑡 (Levine et al., 2017), as trade 
liberalisation tends to improve firm innovation (Gorodnichenko et al., 2015; Coelli et al., 2016). 
Bloom et al. (2016) argue that import competition from Chinese companies motivates 
European companies to upgrade their technology. Coelli et al. (2016) find that trade 





We also control the country’s inflation rate, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 , as it is a kind of hidden tax 
(McMullen et al., 2008). It is found by Zhu and Zhu (2017), which shows that inflation plays 
an essential role in impeding firms’ innovative activities. We collect these country-level control 
variables from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database and the Financial 
Development and Structure (FDS) database through the World Bank.  
We control the economic freedom index, 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑐,𝑡. This shows the degree to which a country’s 
institutions and policies are consistent with economic freedom. Gwartney and Lawson (2003) 
measure the EFW index from the following five major areas and argue that a country will have 
a higher rating on the EFW index when it has 1) smaller size of government expenditures, 
enterprises, and tax; 2) better structure and security of property rights; 3) an easier way to 
access sound money; 4) A higher degree of freedom to exchange with foreigners; 5) a better 
regulation of credit, labour, and business. Using the EFW index, Zhu and Zhu (2017) found 
firms are willing to participate in innovative activities when they are in countries with a limited 
government, sound and efficient regulatory systems, and open markets. We collected the EFW 
index from Gwartney and Lawson (2003), which covers 162 countries from 1970 to 2017 
(broken down into five-year intervals between 1970 and 2000). Following Picci (2010), the 
observation for the year will be used for four adjacent years. For example, the observation for 
the year 1990 is used for the year 1991, 1992; the year 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 are set equal 
to the observation for the year 1995. A country with a higher level of this index represents a 
higher economic freedom level.  
We control the corporate income tax rate in line with Atanassov and Liu (2020)’s finding that 
the corporate tax impedes firms’ innovation by reducing their pledgeable income. Brown et al. 
(2009) showed that innovative firms prefer to invest in R&D projects using after-tax internal 




firms respond to an increase in corporate tax by reducing future patenting activities. They 
empirically document that an increase in corporate income taxes reduces not only the quantity 
and quality of firms’ innovation but also the number of new product announcements.52 In terms 
of this, following Atanassov and Liu (2020), we controlled for corporate income tax, 𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑐,𝑡, 
as the tax rate in country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. We collected the corporate income tax rate around the 
world from the Tax Foundation dataset.53 It provides the corporate tax rate for countries over 
the total sample period.  
Varsakelis (2006) shows that society will produce more innovative outcomes when it invests 
highly in the quality of education. In terms of this, we use 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑐,𝑡 to represent the level of 
country 𝑐’s educational attainment, it is the ratio of the population (age 15 and over) that have 
completed at least tertiary education in the year 𝑡. Barro and Lee constructed the dataset in 
2013 (Barro and Lee, 2013). It covers 146 countries/regions from 1950 to 2010 (broken down 
into five year intervals).  
Hope et al. (2008) constructed a secrecy indicator, 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐, based on Hofstede’s (1980) national 
culture indicators. It is measured as below, 
 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐 = 𝑈𝐴𝑐 + 𝑃𝐷𝑐 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐  
Where 𝑈𝐴𝑐  represents the uncertainty avoidance score of country 𝑐 , 𝑃𝐷𝑐  represents power 
distance score of country 𝑐 and  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐  represents individualism score of country 𝑐 (Hofstede, 
1980). According to Hofsted et al. (2010), a country with a higher 𝑈𝐴𝑐  is more concerned with 
threats from ambiguous or unknown situations. To avoid conflict and competition and preserve 
 
52 The database of major new product introductions is hand-constructed by Mukherjee et al. (2017) through a 
textual search of the LexisNexis News database for company press releases. 





security, the country prefers to restrict information disclosure, which increases the 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐 (Gray, 
1988). A higher 𝑃𝐷𝑐 means people in the country are more accepting of a hierarchical order 
and less likely to break down power barriers (Hofsted et al., 2010). This kind of country is 
more likely to restrict information disclosure to preserve power inequalities (Gray, 1988). In 
addition to this, a country with high scores of 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐  means people in this country are focussed 
only on the individual needs of themselves and their family (Hofsted et al., 2010). This 
contrasts with collectivism and secrecy because people in an individualistic culture are less 
likely to concern themselves with the well-being of their firms and more willing to share 
information with external parties (Gray, 1988). In summary, countries with a higher score of 
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐 have a lower level of information disclosures. Hope et al. (2008) showed that firms in 
these countries are less likely to hire high-quality audits and more likely to receive low-quality 
financial reporting. It increases information asymmetries and agency conflicts between a firm’s 
management team and their stockholders or potential investors (for example, Francis and 
Wilson, 1988; Craswell et al., 1995). Firms tend to be sensitive to this impact when they are 
processing innovative activities. Therefore, we collect data from Hofstede (1980) and control 
for this variable. The detailed variable information is described in Table 5.1, Panel B. 
 
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
In this chapter, we collect firm-level data following Chapter 4. However, we construct a larger 
sample in this chapter. Therefore, we report the firm-level descriptive statistics in this chapter 
again. Table 5.2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the firm-level variables used in this 
study. In this table, the number of different variables is different. It is because of the existence 
of missing value in each firm accounting variables collecting from Datastream. On average, a 




as the innovation output, they submit an average of 13.8 applications (which is finally granted) 
per year, and each patent obtains around 7.1 non-self-citations. Table 5.2, Panel B presents the 
correlation of firm-level variables in this sample. Although there is a 0.58 correlation between 
stock liquidity and total assets, following previous research in this area (e.g., Fang et al., 2014; 
Wen et al., 2018), we still control total assets in regression. The rest of the variables in this 
table show a low pairwise correlation between each other. 
*** Table 5.2 *** 
While we report the firm-level descriptive statistics in Table 5.2, we report the country-level 
descriptive statistics in Table 5.3. In Table 5.3, Panel A, we report the mean value of the 
country/region variables used in this study. On average, the US produces the highest GDP 
(10.589 trillion dollars per year), financial sectors in Japan provides the highest domestic credit 
(229% of GDP per year), the value of stock traded is largest in Hong Kong (517% of GDP per 
year). Table 5.2, Panel B shows the correlation of country-level variables in the sample.  
*** Table 5.3 *** 
 
5.3.4 Estimation method 
This sample contains multilevel data (i.e., firm-level variables and country-level variables). It 
includes 71,689 firm-year observations of 5,511 firms from 36 countries between 1990 and 
2010. According to the literature review, it is also clear that firms’ innovative outcomes are 
affected by both country-level and firm-level factors. Therefore, we follow Greene (2003)  and 
Griffin et al. (2019) and employ the HLM approach to separate the firm-level (i.e., within-
country) and country-level (i.e., cross-country) impacts of firms’ stock liquidity on their 




HLM is a complex form of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Woltman et al., 2012). 
We employ this approach in order to distinguish between within-country and cross-country 
effects (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 2011; Li et al., 2013). While OLS regression 
equally weights each firm-level observation, the HLM framework weights country-level 
regression based on the precision of firm-level data rather than the sample size across countries. 
It adjusts the standard errors to reflect the cross-correlations between firm-level data due to 
within-country clustering.  
Using the HLM approach, variables at the lowest hierarchical level (i.e., level 1) are nested 
within a higher hierarchical level (i.e., level-2) groups and have in common the impact of level-
2 variables (Woltman et al., 2012). In this chapter, following Griffin et al. (2019), we employ 
firm-level variables as the level 1 variables and country-level variables as the level 2 variables. 
In other words, in our sample, firms (level 1) are situated within countries (level 2). Notably, 
we measure the patent-based variables at level 1 as the dependent variable is always situated 
at the lowest hierarchical level in HLM (Castro, 2002).  
We estimate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) through a null (or unconditional) model 
(using 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1  as dependent variable) to investigate whether there is a significant 
variation in the intercept across countries (i.e., whether this research should employ the 
multilevel model). The ICC ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the proportion of the total 
variance at level 1 (i.e., firm-level in this research) caused by group membership at level 2 (i.e., 
country-level in this research) (Anderson, 2012). It is unnecessary to use the HLM if the ICC 
is lower than 0.055 (Bliese, 2000). In this research, ICC is 0.065, which is larger than 0.055; 
therefore, we employ the HLM model as a baseline test. 
According to Griffin et al. (2019), we use the following HLM model, 
(5.1a)                                        𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡




(5.1b)                                       𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐  
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 is the patent-based innovation outcomes of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 +
𝑛 ; 𝛼𝑐  represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  shows a vector of firm-level 
characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level 
characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 5.2. To obtain the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 
on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛  in equation (5.1a), we remove the country-year mean from all firm-level 
observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 , in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the 
within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship 
between 𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-
year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐.  
We employ two information-theoretic indices: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), to access the model fit in this chapter (Schwarz, 1978; 
Akaike, 1987). They are widely used to decide whether adding predictors represent 
improvements. A reduction of AIC or BIC tends to represent a more favourable result for the 
new model (Glaser and Hastings, 2011). The AIC and BIC of our null model separately equal 
235,060 and 235,087. We will report these two indicators in the following tables to determine 
whether new models provide a better fit for the data. 
In addition to the HLM approach, we employ the Tobit model as a robustness test in subsection 
5.5.1 to consider the non-negative nature of patent counts (Chemmanur and Tian, 2018). As 
we describe in subsection 4.3.4, not all firms have innovation outputs. Therefore, we employ 




5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Patent-based measurement 
This subsection evaluates the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovative 
performance using the HLM approach. We separately examine the impact of stock liquidity on 
firms’ patent quantity, quality, generality index, originality index and efficiency from year 𝑡 +
1 to year 𝑡 + 5. 
 
5.4.1.1 Patent quantity  
In Table 5.4, we investigate the impact of stock liquidity on firms’ innovation outputs, which 
we measure by the number of granted patents over a five year period. We report a positive and 
significant relationship between the stock liquidity and the number of granted patents from the 
first to fifth year. Notably, the regression coefficient on stock liquidity grows over time (i.e., 
there is an increase from 0.04 and 0.06 in year 𝑡 + 1 to 0.10 and 0.11 in year 𝑡 + 5). This means 
the improvement of stock liquidity causes a continuously increased positive influence on a 
firm’s innovative activities. 
*** Table 5.4 *** 
We also find that a firm with an increasing innovation input, measured by a higher R&D-to-
assets ratio in year t, will experience a larger innovation output over the coming year. It is 
reported by other literature in this area (e.g., Fang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2015; Luong et al., 
2017; Zhu and Zhu, 2017; Chemmanur and Tian, 2018). This result means the investment in 




For other firm-level variables in this table, similar to Chapter 4, we show that a firm’s 
innovation outputs are improved by a growth in capital expenditure, growth opportunity and 
firm size. Moreover, they are impeded by increased leverage ratio and firm age.  
Except for this, we show a positive impact of asset tangibility on the number of granted patents. 
As described above, there are controversial opinions about the relationship between asset 
tangibility and firm innovation. In this table, our results support Fang et al. (2014) and 
Chemmanur and Tian (2018), who also report this same positive influence. One possible 
explanation is that tangible assets, such as property, plant and equipment, are more suitable for 
collateral (Lim et al., 2020) and thereby making it easier to secure funding in order to support 
the firm’s innovative activities. 
At country level, we show that firms are encouraged to produce more patents when they are in 
countries with more developed credit markets. As this chapter only covers public companies, 
it means that a developed credit market is a powerful tool with which to promote corporate 
innovation even for listed companies.  
We also show that patent quantity is not associated with equity market development. However, 
this does not necessarily mean the development of the equity market is less associated with the 
firm’s innovative performance. For example, Black and Gilson (1998) suggested that a well-
developed equity market (but not a credit market) can indirectly improve innovation by 
providing a lucrative exit opportunity for venture capital investors. The insignificant 
relationship maybe because that the PATSTAT database underestimates the number of patents 
held by public companies. Bernstein (2015) suggests that going public changes a firm's strategy 
in pursuing innovation. IPO companies tend to achieve patents through acquisitions due to the 
increased access to capital. However, if a public company achieves patent through acquisition, 




incremental innovation projects and obtain disruptive innovation through acquisitions, our 
sample does not include the self-citations (See detailed reason why we not include the self-
citations in Step 7 in Appendix 3.2 Measuring the number of applications and number of 
citations). 
Additionally, we report that the quantity of firm innovation increases in countries with a higher 
level of economic freedom. Similarly, Zhu and Zhu (2017) find that firms are willing to 
participate in innovative activities when they are in a country with a limited government, a 
sound and efficient regulatory system, and open markets. We analyse the impact of each of 
these economic freedom indicators in a later subsection.  
In addition, we find that firms in countries with a higher level of economic development and 
international trading tend to produce more patents in the short term. Larger economies are more 
likely to provide a better environment for firms to participate in innovation activities.  These 
results support Gorodnichenko et al. (2015) and Coelli et al. (2016) arguing that trade 
liberalisation encourages corporate innovation outputs. The first possible explanation is that 
rising import competition pushes domestic companies to engage in innovation activities and 
produce more patents (Bloom et al., 2016). The second explanation is that the entry of foreign 
institutional investors tends to improve a firm’s innovation as active monitors provide 
insurance against innovation failures and transmit foreign technology (Luong et al., 2017). We 
do not find continuously and/or significant impacts of other country-level indicators on firm 
innovation outputs in this table.  
Overall, the coefficients of stock liquidity in year 𝑡 + 1 are larger in cross-country regression 
than within-country regression. However, this difference decreased over time (from 0.02 in the 




affect firm innovation outputs, they only cause small influences on the relationship between 
stock liquidity and firm innovation in the long term. 
 
5.4.1.2 Patent quality  
In Table 5.5, we report that a firm’s stock liquidity improves its quality of innovation output 
measured by the number of citations made to its patents across a five year period. We show 
that a firm experiences a higher level of stock liquidity in the year 𝑡 and produces better quality 
patents from the year 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 5. Besides, in comparison to Table 5.4, stock liquidity causes 
larger impacts on a firm’s innovation quality rather than on its quantity in the year 𝑡 + 1 but 
has a similar impact in the year 𝑡 + 5.  
*** Table 5.5 *** 
We demonstrate that companies holding more cash can continuously produce higher quality 
patents over the following five years. This is consistent with the estimation results of Zhu and 
Zhu (2017). Sufficient cash holding implies that firm can access more easily internal fundings 
and/or external fundings. Managers in these kind of companies tend to be more confident when 
facing innovation failures and more willing to participate in innovation activities. This 
increases the probability that firms will produce high-quality patents. 
Similar to Table 5.4, firm innovation quality is improved by the country’s credit development 
level and economic freedom indexes across the following five years, and economy size and 





5.4.1.3 Patent generality index  
In Table 5.6, we show that a firm’s patent generality index will increase following the 
improvement of its stock liquidity. The patent generality index represents the breadth of 
applicability of an invention across different technology fields. The greater the index, the more 
this patent is cited by other patents belonging to a broader range of technology areas. It may be 
one of the results which increases the quality of the patent. Namely, the patent is cited by other 
patents in different technological fields because of its high quality. 
*** Table 5.6 *** 
 
5.4.1.4 Patent originality index  
In Table 5.7, we report the positive relationship between a firm’s stock liquidity and its patent 
originality index. An increasing originality index means the knowledge of its patent comes 
from a broader range of technology fields. It shows a possible reason why the patent has a 
higher quality (i.e., is cited by more patents) following the increase of stock liquidity. The 
knowledge coming from different technology areas improves the quality of the patent and 
thereby is cited by more parties.  
*** Table 5.7 *** 
In Tables 5.6 and 5.7, both the patent generality index and the originality index are improved 
by increased GDP, credit markets and economic freedom indexes. Compared with Table 5.4 
and 5.5, these two indicators are not significantly affected by the international trading level. 
Thus, we argue that the invention breadth embodied in patents is less likely to be affected by 





5.4.1.5 Innovation efficiency 
We investigate the relationship between a firm’s stock liquidity and its innovative efficiency 
in Table 5.8 and 5.9. In Table 5.8, we observe the negative impact of stock liquidity on 
𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 in the year 𝑡 + 1 and insignificant impact from the year 𝑡 + 2 to the year 𝑡 + 5. 
We observe the significant positive influence of stock liquidity on firm innovation in Table 5.4, 
which implies that while the firm’s R&D investment increases, the number of patent 
applications does not increase dramatically.  
*** Table 5.8 *** 
In Table 5.9, we show a continuous positive relationship between stock liquidity and 
𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛  between the year  𝑡 + 1  and the year 𝑡 + 5 . It is important to note that the 
coefficients of 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 are significantly higher than other patent-based measurements in 
previous tables. This means that firms become more efficient at producing high-quality patents 
after experiencing a growth of stock liquidity.  
*** Table 5.9 *** 
According to observations in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.8 and 5.9, while stock liquidity increases both  
𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+𝑛  and 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+𝑛 , it only improves 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 . In other words, although stock 
liquidity improves the patent quantity, its main contribution is to the efficient production of 
high-quality innovations. 
We also report that the innovation efficiency would increase from the year t+1 and the year t+3 




(2020) finding and suggests that cutting the corporate tax improve a firm’s efficiency to 
produce high-quality patents. 
Overall, stock liquidity improves a firm’s innovation ability presented by the patent-based 
measurements. Most notably, this positive influence grows over time from the year 𝑡 + 1 to 
the year 𝑡 + 5. To investigate these tables, we argue that while stock liquidity increases the 
patent quantity, it mainly contributes to efficiency in the production of high-quality patents. 
One of the possible reasons for the growth in innovation quality is that this firm cite patents in 
different technology fields. In terms of increasing quality, the firm’s patents are also cited on 
other patents in different fields. 
In these six tables, we show that a firm’s innovation performance is improved by growth in 
total assets, R&D investments, capital expenditure, growth opportunity and cash holding. 
Moreover, they are impeded by an increased leverage ratio. It is different from Chapter 4 that 
we do not observe significant impacts of growth opportunity and cash holding on innovation 
outputs in Chapter 4. It may be because we use different samples which cover the different 
number of companies. 
In addition, country-level characters in these six tables cause similar impacts on patent-based 
indicators. We argue that the development of credit markets and a level of high economic 
freedom would continuously improve a firm’s innovation performance over the following five 
years. In addition, the size of the economy and trade liberalisation leads to a short term positive 
influence on firm innovation quantity and quality. Cutting corporate income tax tends to 
improve firm efficiency to produce high-quality patents. We do not find continuously and/or 





5.4.2 Economic Freedom  
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of economic freedom on corporate innovation from 
different perspectives. According to Gwartney and Lawson (2003), the EFW index shows the 
degree to which a country’s institutions and policies are consistent with economic freedom. 
There is an average of around 45 indicators from 5 areas. Each area represents one perspective 
of a country’s economic freedom. In subsection 5.4.1, we observe significantly positive 
relationships between the EFW index and firm innovation performance through the HLM 
frameworks. However, we do not know which part of the EFW indexes improves firm 
innovation. In this subsection, we specifically test the impact of economic freedom. 
In Table 5.10, we observe that 𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑐,𝑡  could continuously improve firm innovation 
outputs from year 𝑡 + 1 to year 𝑡 + 5. This means that firms are continuously encouraged to 
produce more patents when they are in a country with better protection of persons and their 
rightfully acquired property. As we described in Chapter 4, innovative firms feel they have to 
make only a partial disclosure because information about their invention(s) may benefit their 
competitors (Cumming et al., 2020). In terms of this, they are more prone to be misvalued by 
investors (Cohen et al., 2013) and face the potential threats of short-term institutional investors 
and hostile takeovers (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 2002). Countries with 
better protection of property rights could overcome this problem and encourage firms to 
disclose detailed information about their innovation activities. Under such conditions, 
increased stock liquidity could facilitate the entry of long-term and/or strategic institutional 
investors (Wen et al., 2018), thereby improving firm innovation performance. 




In addition, we find countries with smaller government expenditures, enterprises, and tax 
(𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑆𝐺𝑐,𝑡 ) or lower and less volatile inflation ( 𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑆𝑀𝑐,𝑡 ) could encourage firms to 
produce more patents from year 𝑡 + 1 to year 𝑡 + 3. 
Countries with a higher degree of freedom to exchange with foreigners (i.e., 𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝐹𝑇𝐼𝑐,𝑡); or 
fewer restrictions on exchange in credit, labour, and product markets (i.e., 𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑅𝑐,𝑡) could 
also improve firms’ innovation quantity. However, these influences only exist in the following 
years. 
In summary, we support Zhu and Zhu (2017) that more economic freedom enhances firm 
innovation. In addition, while all EFW indicators could lead to positive impacts on firm 
innovation outputs, we have specifically emphasised the importance of protection of property 
rights and access to sound money, as they could cause positive influences over a longer period 




5.5 Robustness results 
In this section, we take alternative models and variables to ensure the robustness of our 
empirical result. Overall, we make firm the result of our analysis in Section 4. 
 
5.5.1 Tobit model 
Following Fang et al. (2014), we employ a Tobit model as a robustness test on the relationship 
between stock liquidity and the number of patents. In Table 5.11, we find that the stock liquidity 
would significantly improve the firm’s patent counts from year 𝑡 + 1 to year 𝑡 + 5. These 
influences increase over the years, which is similar to the resultgained using HLM in Table 5.4.  
*** Table 5.11 *** 
For country characters, we find that GDP and international trading have longer-term impacts 
on patent counts in this table than in Table 5.4. The increased economic freedom index still 
leads to positive impacts on firm innovation outputs. In this Table, however, this positive 
impact only exists across the following three years. We do not observe the continuous impacts 
of credit markets on firm innovation. 
Except for these, we observe longer-term significant relationships between country-level 
variables and firm’s patent quantity in this table than in Table 5.4. For example, while we find 
a negative but insignificant relationship between stock market development and patent quantity 
in Table 5.4, we show a negative and significant relationship between them in Table 5.11. 
Besides, while we observe a positive impact of corporate tax on a firm’s patent quantity in the 
next year in Table 5.4, there is a continuous positive relationship between them from year 𝑡 +




activities in countries with higher corporate tax rates due to the R&D tax relief. It improves a 
firm’s ability to produce more patents but impedes its ability to produce higher-quality 
patents.54 
In addition, while the coefficient of secrecy indicator on patent counts is close to 0 but 
insignificant in Table 5.4, it is close to 0 and significant in this table. Therefore, we argue that 
this table supports our estimation results of secrecy indicators using the HLM approach in 
subsection 5.4.1. 
Overall, the Tobit model supports our analysis results obtaining from the HLM framework in 
subsection 5.4.1. We show the increased positive impacts of stock liquidity on firm innovation 
performance. In addition, we support that firms could produce more patents in larger economies 
where this is a higher level of international trading and economic freedom. 
 
5.5.2 R&D expenditure  
This subsection uses R&D expenditure as an alternative variable of the firm’s patent-based 
measurement. It displays the input of the innovative process. In Table 5.12, we represent the 
R&D expenditure as the natural logarithm of the firm’s R&D investment in the year 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 
𝑡 + 2 , 𝑡 + 3  and 𝑡 + 5,  respectively. In this table, we observe that firms increase R&D 
investments following a rise in their stock liquidity. Moreover, this influence gradually expands 
with the year. 
*** Table 5.12 *** 
 
54 There is a negative relationship between increased corporate income tax and firms’ efficiency to produce high-




5.6 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we employ the HLM method to investigate a global sample of 71,689 firm-year 
observations from 5,511 companies across 36 countries from 1990 to 2010. Compared with the 
latter, our research provides within- and cross-country evidence of the effect of stock liquidity 
on firm innovation over a more extended period. These evidences support the positive 
relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation performance. This enhances our 
arguments in Chapter 4 wherein there is an increased positive influence of stock liquidity on 
firm patents’ quality, quantity, generality index and originality index. In addition, by using this 
much larger sample, we find that while other firm-level factors, such as firm size, market-to-
book ratio and leverage, cause a stable level effect on a firm’s innovation performance, the 
positive influence of stock liquidity on firm innovation increases over the following five years. 
Our main findings in this chapter come from the perspective of innovation efficiency. We find 
that while increased stock liquidity improves a firm’s innovation performance, and it mainly 
contributes to firms’ efficiency of producing high-quality patents rather than more patents. One 
of the explanations for this is the increased patent originality index following improved stock 
liquidity. Firms produce high-quality patents by acquiring knowledge from a wider range of 
technology areas. And as a result, their patents tend to be cited by other patents belonging to a 
broader range of technology areas. 
In addition, from the country character’s perspective, we successfully argue that firms could 
produce more patents in larger economies with a higher level of international trading and 
economic freedom. For economic freedom levels across five different areas, we find that 
countries with better protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property would 




According to these results, we contribute to the debate on whether stock liquidity improves or 
impedes firm innovation. While we support Wen et al. (2018)’s opinion that increased stock 
liquidity improves firm innovation, our study includes more patent-based measurements to 
deeply analyse the impact of stock liquidity on firm innovation performance. Moreover, we 
provide evidence that policymakers could encourage innovation performance through 
increased stock liquidity. Innovation could benefit the development of the economy as it plays 
an essential role in improving economic growth. In addition to this, we suggest that investors 
could allocate more investments to stock exchanges with higher liquidity, and public 





Table 5.1 Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 is represented as  
1) the ratio of patents scaled by the natural logarithm of R&D investment 





2) the ratio of citation scaled by the natural logarithm of R&D investment 





Panel B: Country-level control variables 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐,𝑡 
The size of the economy, Gross Domestic Product (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐,𝑡), defined as 
the natural logarithm of the GPD of country 𝑐, measured at the end of 
year 𝑡. (Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI)) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡 
Domestic stock market capitalisation, 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡, is the  trading value of 
shares traded in country 𝑐  scaled by country 𝑐’s GDP in year 𝑡. The 
trading value of shares is equal to the total number of domestic and 
foreign shares traded in country 𝑐 , multiplied by their respective 
matching prices. Only one side of the transaction is considered in the 
calculation. (Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI)) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐,𝑡 
Domestic credit market capitalisation, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐,𝑡, is the ratio of domestic 
credit provided by financial sectors in country 𝑐 to country 𝑐’s GDP in 
year  𝑡. Domestic credit provided by the financial sector include all credit 
to various sectors on a gross basis as well as the net credit to the central 
government (see more detail information in 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS). The ratio 
shows development of financial sector and depth of banking sector in 
terms of size. (Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI)) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐,𝑡 
The intensity of international trade, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐,𝑡, computed as the import 
and export of goods and services as a fraction of country c’s GDP in year 





Inflation rate, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡, computed as the annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as 
a whole. (Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI)). 
𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑐,𝑡 
The corporate income tax rate, 𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑐,𝑡, as the corporate income tax rate 
in country 𝑐  in the year 𝑡. Following Atanassov and Liu (2020), this 
chapter represents the corporate income tax rate via the actual change in 
it in the year (Data source: Tax Foundation). 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑐,𝑡 
Education rate, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑐,𝑡, represents the level of country 𝑐’s educational 
attainment in the year 𝑡. It is the ratio of the population (age 15 and over) 
that have at least completed tertiary education in the year 𝑡 (Data source: 
Barro and Lee, 2013). 
𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑐,𝑡 
Economic freedom of the world index, 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑐,𝑡, refers to the degree to 
which a country’s institutions and policies are consistent with economic 
freedom. The higher score represents a higher level of economic freedom 
in the country. It is the summary of five indicators, which are ‘Size of 
Government’ 
(i.e., 𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑆𝐺𝑐,𝑡 ), ‘Legal System and Property Rights’ (i.e., 
𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑐,𝑡), ‘Sound Money’ (i.e.,𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑆𝑀𝑐,𝑡), ‘Freedom to Trade 
Internationally’ (i.e.,𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝐹𝑇𝐼𝑐,𝑡 )  and ‘Regulation’ (i.e.,𝐸𝐹𝑊_𝑅𝑐,𝑡 ). 
These five indicators separately represent countries’ economic freedom 
level in one area. According to Gwartney (2017),  for ‘Size of 
Government’, countries with low levels of government spending as a 
share of the total, a smaller government enterprise sector, and lower 
marginal tax rates earn the higher ratings in this area. For ‘Legal System 
and Property Rights’, countries with better protection of persons and 
their rightfully acquired property earn the higher ratings in this area. For 
‘Sound Money’, countries can easier access the sound money earn higher 
ratings in this area. It is because inflation erodes the value of rightfully 
earned wages and savings. Sound money is thus essential to protect 
property rights. When inflation is not only high but also volatile, it 
becomes difficult for individuals to plan for the future and thus use 
economic freedom effectively. For ‘Freedom to Trade Internationally’, 
countries have fewer restrictions for their businesses and individuals to 
freedom exchange (e.g., buying, selling, making contracts) with 




area. For ‘Regulation’, countries with fewer restriction on exchange in 
credit, labour, and product markets earn higher ratings in this area. 
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐,𝑡 
Secrecy indicator, 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐 , based on Hofstede’s (1980) national culture 
indicators. It is measured as below, 
 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑐 = 𝑈𝐴𝑐 + 𝑃𝐷𝑐 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐 
Where 𝑈𝐴𝑐  represents the uncertainty avoidance score of country 𝑐 , 
𝑃𝐷𝑐  represents power distance score of country 𝑐 and  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐  represents 
individualism score of country 𝑐 (Hofstede, 1980). According to Hofsted 
et al. (2010), a country with a higher 𝑈𝐴𝑐 is more concerned with threats 
from ambiguous or unknown situations, with a higher 𝑃𝐷𝑐  means people 
in the country are more acceptable to follow a hierarchical order and less 
likely to break down power barriers; with a high scores of 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑐  means 




Table 5.2 Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables in our analysis. The 
sample contains 71,689 observations, which includes 5,511 companies from 36 countries 
during the period between 1990 and 2010. The definition of variables is listed in Table 4.1 
and Table 5.1, Panel A. All firm-level variables are winsorised at top and bottom 1% of 
variables’ distribution. Panel A shows the summary statistics of firm-level variables. Panel B 
represents the pairwise correlations between firm variables after removing country-means. 
***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Variables  
  Variables N Mean St.Dev p5 Median p95 
LN_PAT 71,689 1.17 1.44 0.00 0.69 4.29 
LN_CIT 71,689 0.73 1.26 0.00 0.00 3.58 
LN_GENERAL 71,689 0.36 0.77 0.00 0.00 2.13 
LN_ORIGINAL 71,689 0.35 0.75 0.00 0.00 2.07 
IE_PAT 69,264 7.84 3.02 2.74 7.90 12.69 
IE_CIT 65,097 13.00 2.01 9.89 12.85 16.67 
LIQUIDITY 63,343 0.57 0.37 0.09 0.51 1.27 
LN_TA 65,032 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.54 
PPETA 60,475 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.15 
LEV 47,496 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.24 
CAPEXTA 64,229 1.95 1.73 0.74 1.37 5.21 
RDTA 71,689 2.43 0.79 1.10 2.49 3.56 
Q 47,502 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.37 
LN_AGE 62,951 0.01 0.17 -0.33 0.04 0.17 
CASH 47,502 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.37 




Table 5.2 (continued) 
Firm-level Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. Correlation of Firm-Level Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  (1) LIQUIDITY 1          
  (2) LN_TA 0.58*** 1         
  (3) PPETA -0.03*** 0.24*** 1        
  (4) LEV 0.06*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 1       
  (5) CAPEXTA 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.37*** 0.09*** 1      
  (6) RDTA -0.14*** -0.38*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.08*** 1     
  (7) Q 0.10*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.21*** 0.04*** 0.42*** 1    
  (8) LN_AGE 0.17*** 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.14*** -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.24*** 1   
  (9) CASH -0.07*** -0.26*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.18*** 0.36*** 0.28*** -0.18*** 1  




Table 5.3 Country-Level Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for country-characteristics variables in this sample; the definition of these variables is shown in Table 5.1, 
Panel B. Panel A shows the summary statistics of country-level variables. Panel B represents the pairwise correlations between firm variables after 
removing country-means.***,**,* represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Country-Level Variables 
Country_Name GDP Credit Equity Trade Inflation EFW CTR EDU SEC no_obs 
AUSTRALIA 27.05 1.11 1.04 0.40 0.03 8.16 0.32 0.16 -1.00 905 
AUSTRIA 26.29 1.25 0.23 0.84 0.02 7.73 0.31 0.07 26.00 271 
BELGIUM 26.51 1.10 0.59 1.36 0.02 7.61 0.37 0.16 84.00 271 
BRAZIL 27.39 0.83 0.53 0.22 3.51 5.61 0.31 0.04 107.00 232 
CANADA 27.50 1.21 1.21 0.69 0.02 8.19 0.39 0.16 7.00 2,006 
CHINA 28.56 1.30 0.56 0.51 0.04 6.02 0.30 0.03 90.00 3,096 
CZECH REPUBLIC 24.95 0.54 0.16 0.90 0.07 6.72 0.35 0.05 73.00 107 
DENMARK 26.10 1.43 0.46 0.83 0.02 7.93 0.30 0.13 -33.00 361 
FINLAND 25.88 0.99 1.19 0.72 0.02 7.92 0.28 0.11 29.00 401 




GERMANY 28.53 1.35 0.40 0.60 0.01 7.84 0.46 0.10 33.00 3,211 
GREECE 26.04 1.09 0.51 0.50 0.04 7.04 0.33 0.17 125.00 59 
HONG KONG 25.84 1.42 5.17 2.91 0.01 8.93 0.17 0.13 72.00 104 
HUNGARY 25.06 0.66 0.24 1.23 0.10 7.09 0.19 0.11 48.00 33 
INDIA 27.16 0.56 0.83 0.33 0.07 6.26 0.37 0.04 69.00 726 
IRELAND 25.92 1.80 0.53 1.60 0.02 8.06 0.16 0.21 -7.00 16 
ITALY 28.08 1.18 0.45 0.47 0.03 7.32 0.40 0.05 49.00 899 
JAPAN 29.14 2.29 0.71 0.22 0.00 7.84 0.44 0.16 100.00 17,948 
MALAYSIA 25.81 1.24 1.38 1.89 0.05 6.60 0.27 0.05 110.00 9 
MEXICO 27.10 0.36 0.26 0.48 0.15 6.54 0.33 0.07 133.00 28 
NETHERLANDS 27.02 1.72 0.88 1.17 0.02 7.88 0.32 0.13 11.00 194 
NEW ZEALAND 25.27 1.25 0.35 0.60 0.03 8.46 0.32 0.17 -8.00 82 
NORWAY 26.13 0.84 0.45 0.71 0.04 7.58 0.29 0.10 12.00 251 
PHILIPPINES 25.18 0.50 0.47 0.86 0.08 6.83 0.34 0.06 106.00 21 




RUSSIAN FEDERATION 27.47 0.28 0.62 0.55 0.17 6.12 0.24 0.22 149.00 158 
SINGAPORE 25.44 0.72 1.82 3.69 0.02 8.63 0.23 0.15 62.00 163 
SOUTH AFRICA 25.84 0.68 1.74 0.49 0.09 6.40 0.40 0.00 . 175 
SOUTH KOREA 27.26 1.11 0.58 0.71 0.03 7.19 0.28 0.21 127.00 5,486 
SPAIN 27.42 1.76 0.63 0.50 0.04 7.46 0.34 0.11 92.00 426 
SWEDEN 26.54 0.96 0.84 0.78 0.02 7.64 0.29 0.14 -11.00 759 
SWITZERLAND 26.61 1.62 1.93 0.95 0.01 8.49 0.25 0.12 24.00 768 
TAIWAN . . . . . 7.43 0.24 0.07 110.00 3,878 
THAILAND 25.96 1.20 0.55 1.20 0.03 6.76 0.30 0.08 108.00 26 
UNITED KINGDOM 28.22 1.33 1.17 0.51 0.03 8.36 0.31 0.13 -19.00 2,083 
UNITED STATES 29.94 0.85 1.13 0.24 0.02 8.47 0.39 0.23 -5.00 23,750 
Mean (firm-year level) 28.84 1.37 0.89 0.39 0.03 7.87 0.38 0.16 51.18  




Table 5.3 (continued) 
Country-Level Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. Correlation of Country-Level Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  (1) LN_GDP 1         
  (2) Credit 0.02*** 1        
  (3) Equity 0.23*** -0.26*** 1       
  (4) Trade -0.66*** -0.14*** 0.14*** 1      
  (5) Inflation -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.01** -0.01** 1     
  (6) EFW 0.49*** -0.15*** 0.54*** -0.20*** -0.13*** 1    
  (7) CTR 0.43*** 0.39*** -0.18*** -0.57*** -0.05*** 0.26*** 1   
  (8) EDU 0.54*** -0.19*** 0.36*** -0.20*** -0.06*** 0.65*** 0.13*** 1  




Table 5.4 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝒏: HLM 
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   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




AIC 235,060 96,390 82,858 217,116 87,491 75,478 199,511 78,493 67,527 165,657 61,344 52,577 
BIC 235,087 97,486 83,724 217,143 88,566 76,325 199,538 79,528 68,338 165,683 62,315 53,331 
Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-
level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 
5.1, Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 
in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 
𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed 
effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report it for brevity. We report the AIC and BIC of null 




Table 5.5 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑪𝑰𝑻𝒕+𝒏: HLM 


























Firm Characteristics             
LIQUIDITY  0.06*** 0.07***  0.07*** 0.08***  0.08*** 0.09***  0.10*** 0.11*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] 
LN_TA  0.42*** 0.42***  0.41*** 0.41***  0.40*** 0.40***  0.38*** 0.38*** 
  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] 
PPETA  0.05 0.04  0.07* 0.06*  0.05 0.05  0.04 0.05 
  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.04] 
LEV  -0.40*** -0.34***  -0.40*** -0.34***  -0.39*** -0.34***  -0.33*** -0.28*** 
  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.05]  [0.05] [0.05]  [0.06] [0.06] 
CAPEXTA  2.22*** 2.35***  2.22*** 2.36***  2.45*** 2.53***  2.59*** 2.73*** 
  [0.17] [0.19]  [0.18] [0.21]  [0.19] [0.22]  [0.22] [0.25] 




  [0.10] [0.10]  [0.11] [0.11]  [0.12] [0.12]  [0.15] [0.15] 
Q  0.07*** 0.06***  0.07*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.05*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] 
LN_AGE  -0.06*** -0.04***  -0.07*** -0.04***  -0.06*** -0.04**  -0.07*** -0.05** 
  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.02] [0.02] 
CASH  0.30*** 0.36***  0.34*** 0.38***  0.31*** 0.34***  0.21* 0.23** 
  [0.06] [0.06]  [0.06] [0.06]  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.08] [0.08] 
ROA  0.32*** 0.21***  0.43*** 0.30***  0.47*** 0.32***  0.56*** 0.38*** 
  [0.05] [0.05]  [0.05] [0.06]  [0.06] [0.06]  [0.07] [0.07] 
Country Characteristics             
LN_GDP   0.18**   0.08   0.06   0.07 
   [0.06]   [0.07]   [0.07]   [0.08] 
Credit   0.41***   0.54***   0.53***   0.46*** 
   [0.06]   [0.07]   [0.07]   [0.09] 
Equity   -0.05   -0.04   -0.09*   -0.15** 




Trade   0.27*   0.25*   0.23   0.29* 
   [0.12]   [0.13]   [0.13]   [0.14] 
Inflation   0.88   1.3   0.56   -1.96 
   [0.72]   [0.83]   [0.91]   [1.06] 
EFW   0.28***   0.20**   0.22***   0.23** 
   [0.06]   [0.06]   [0.07]   [0.08] 
CTR   -0.73   -0.87*   -0.51   0.47 
   [0.40]   [0.44]   [0.52]   [0.59] 
EDU   0.81   0.66   -0.37   -2.29* 
   [0.63]   [0.74]   [0.97]   [1.06] 
SEC   0   0   0   0 
 
  [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




AIC 214,101 89,727 78,024 197,757 81,340 70,990 181,557 72,797 63,464 150,273 56,590 49,210 
BIC 214,128 90,823 78,890 197,784 82,414 71,837 181,584 73,832 64,275 150,299 57,560 49,964 
Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-
level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 
5.1, Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 
in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 
𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed 
effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐿𝑁_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report it for brevity. We report the 





Table 5.6 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑳𝒕+𝒏: HLM  


























Firm Characteristics             
LIQUIDITY  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.05*** 0.05***  0.06*** 0.06*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
LN_TA  0.26*** 0.27***  0.26*** 0.26***  0.25*** 0.26***  0.24*** 0.25*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] 
PPETA  0.02 0.02  0.03 0.02  0.01 0.01  0 0 
  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.03] 
LEV  -0.25*** -0.23***  -0.25*** -0.23***  -0.26*** -0.23***  -0.24*** -0.21*** 
  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.04] [0.04] 
CAPEXTA  1.13*** 1.22***  1.17*** 1.29***  1.37*** 1.52***  1.38*** 1.54*** 
  [0.11] [0.13]  [0.12] [0.14]  [0.13] [0.15]  [0.15] [0.17] 




  [0.06] [0.07]  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.08] [0.08]  [0.10] [0.10] 
Q  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.03*** 0.03*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
LN_AGE  -0.01 0  -0.01 0  -0.01 0  -0.02 -0.01 
  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] 
CASH  0.15*** 0.16***  0.17*** 0.18***  0.14** 0.15**  0.08 0.09 
  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.05]  [0.05] [0.06] 
ROA  0.10** 0.05  0.15*** 0.09*  0.17*** 0.10*  0.21*** 0.12* 
  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.05] [0.05] 
Country Characteristics             
LN_GDP   0.08*   0.06   0.02   0.02 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05] 
Credit   0.35***   0.40***   0.40***   0.33*** 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05]   [0.06] 
Equity   -0.04   -0.04   -0.04   -0.04 




Trade   0.11   0.12   0.06   0.07 
   [0.08]   [0.08]   [0.08]   [0.09] 
Inflation   1.02*   1.03   0.28   -0.6 
   [0.48]   [0.55]   [0.60]   [0.71] 
EFW   0.21***   0.16***   0.15***   0.14** 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05] 
CTR   -0.14   -0.17   0.17   0.42 
   [0.27]   [0.29]   [0.34]   [0.39] 
EDU   0.63   0.49   0.18   -0.65 
   [0.41]   [0.48]   [0.63]   [0.69] 
SEC   0   0   0   0 
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




AIC 150,928 64,098 56,173 140,111 58,450 51,394 129,273 52,589 46,195 107,942 41,503 36,434 
BIC 150,955 65,195 57,039 140,138 59,525 52,241 129,299 53,624 47,006 107,968 42,474 37,187 
Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 
𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics 
of country 𝑐 shown in Table 5.1, Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-
level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-
level relationship between 𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 
2-digit SIC industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance 
at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐿𝑁_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report 





Table 5.7 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑶𝑹𝑰𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑳𝒕+𝒏: HLM  


























Firm Characteristics             
LIQUIDITY  0.03*** 0.03***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.06*** 0.05*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
LN_TA  0.28*** 0.28***  0.28*** 0.28***  0.27*** 0.27***  0.26*** 0.27*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] 
PPETA  0.04* 0.04*  0.04* 0.04*  0.04 0.03  0.02 0.01 
  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.03] 
LEV  -0.27*** -0.24***  -0.28*** -0.24***  -0.27*** -0.23***  -0.26*** -0.22*** 
  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.04] [0.04] 
CAPEXTA  1.08*** 1.13***  1.15*** 1.27***  1.26*** 1.42***  1.42*** 1.57*** 
  [0.11] [0.13]  [0.12] [0.14]  [0.13] [0.15]  [0.15] [0.17] 




  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.08] [0.08]  [0.10] [0.10] 
Q  0.04*** 0.03***  0.04*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.03***  0.03*** 0.03*** 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
LN_AGE  -0.02** -0.01  -0.03*** -0.01  -0.03*** -0.01  -0.03** -0.02* 
  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] 
CASH  0.15*** 0.18***  0.18*** 0.20***  0.16*** 0.18***  0.07 0.08 
  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.05] [0.05]  [0.06] [0.06] 
ROA  0.08* 0.03  0.12*** 0.06  0.16*** 0.09*  0.20*** 0.12* 
  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.05] [0.05] 
Country Characteristics             
LN_GDP   0.12**   0.03   -0.01   -0.02 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05] 
Credit   0.30***   0.36***   0.40***   0.39*** 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05]   [0.06] 
Equity   -0.05*   -0.04   -0.05   -0.02 




Trade   0.1   0.02   0.01   0.02 
   [0.08]   [0.07]   [0.08]   [0.09] 
Inflation   -0.29   1.02   1.54*   -0.59 
   [0.48]   [0.55]   [0.60]   [0.71] 
EFW   0.25***   0.18***   0.15***   0.07 
   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.04]   [0.05] 
CTR   0.23   0.2   0.44   0.45 
   [0.27]   [0.28]   [0.34]   [0.39] 
EDU   0.68   1.04*   1.16   -1.08 
   [0.41]   [0.47]   [0.61]   [0.70] 
SEC   0   0   0   0 
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes  Yes     Yes 
   
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
   
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
   




AIC 150,558 64,472 56,050 140,724 59,023 51,438 130,194 53,265 46,340 109,130 42,033 36,505 
BIC 150,586 65,568 56,916 140,751 60,098 52,285 130,221 54,300 47,151 109,156 43,004 37,259 
Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 
𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics 
of country 𝑐 shown in Table 5.1, Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-
level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-
level relationship between 𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 
2-digit SIC industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance 
at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐿𝑁_𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report 




Table 5.8 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑰𝑬_𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝒏: HLM  


























Firm Characteristics             
LIQUIDITY  -0.10*** -0.08**  -0.07** -0.04  -0.03 -0.01  0.04 0.05 
  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03] 
LN_TA  2.25*** 2.19***  2.27*** 2.19***  2.30*** 2.24***  2.32*** 2.30*** 
  [0.03] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.05] [0.05] 
PPETA  -0.05 -0.09  -0.01 0  -0.06 -0.01  -0.21 -0.03 
  [0.14] [0.15]  [0.16] [0.17]  [0.17] [0.18]  [0.20] [0.22] 
LEV  -2.34*** -2.22***  -2.49*** -2.43***  -2.57*** -2.58***  -2.93*** -2.91*** 
  [0.23] [0.24]  [0.25] [0.26]  [0.28] [0.28]  [0.33] [0.34] 
CAPEXTA  11.12*** 9.74***  10.88*** 9.62***  12.20*** 11.00***  13.85*** 12.07*** 
  [0.97] [1.07]  [1.03] [1.14]  [1.13] [1.24]  [1.32] [1.47] 




  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03] 
LN_AGE  0.03 0.12  -0.04 0.08  -0.08 0.05  -0.14 -0.03 
  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.07] [0.07]  [0.08] [0.08]  [0.09] [0.09] 
CASH  1.07** 0.73*  1.03** 0.71*  0.78* 0.51  0.47 0.21 
  [0.33] [0.33]  [0.36] [0.36]  [0.40] [0.40]  [0.49] [0.49] 
ROA  -3.86*** -4.10***  -3.80*** -4.09***  -3.89*** -4.29***  -3.85*** -4.50*** 
  [0.24] [0.25]  [0.26] [0.26]  [0.29] [0.29]  [0.36] [0.36] 
Country Characteristics             
LN_GDP   -0.23   -0.49   -0.67   -0.43 
   [0.30]   [0.31]   [0.35]   [0.41] 
Credit   1.49***   1.83***   2.14***   1.70*** 
   [0.34]   [0.35]   [0.40]   [0.51] 
Equity   0.29   0.3   0.27   0.05 
   [0.20]   [0.21]   [0.23]   [0.33] 
Trade   -0.38   -0.55   -0.9   -0.7 




Inflation   0.51   0.93   2.46   -9.31 
   [4.01]   [4.68]   [5.22]   [6.31] 
EFW   0.92**   0.62   0.52   0.69 
   [0.31]   [0.33]   [0.36]   [0.45] 
CTR   2.13   -0.17   -4.2   -3.62 
   [2.17]   [2.32]   [2.80]   [3.30] 
EDU   0.47   2.64   -3.8   -12.82* 
   [3.28]   [3.84]   [5.20]   [5.94] 
SEC   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01 
   [0.01]   [0.01]   [0.01]   [0.01] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 43,396 28,795 25,034 40,655 26,153 22,827 37,819 23,595 20,546 32,042 18,747 16,276 
AIC 282,441 184,620 159,407 265,517 168,764 146,080 248,600 153,831 132,644 212,666 124,091 106,718 




Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1, 𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-
level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 
5.1, Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 
in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 
𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed 
effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐼𝐸_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report it for brevity. We report the 




Table 5.9 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑰𝑬_𝑪𝑰𝑻𝒕+𝒏: HLM  


























Firm Characteristics             
LIQUIDITY  0.10*** 0.09***  0.13*** 0.11***  0.16*** 0.14***  0.20*** 0.18*** 
  [0.01] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02] 
LN_TA  1.01*** 1.07***  0.99*** 1.04***  0.97*** 1.04***  0.93*** 1.01*** 
  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.03]  [0.03] [0.03] 
PPETA  -0.07 -0.12  -0.09 -0.12  -0.13 -0.17  -0.23 -0.25 
  [0.09] [0.10]  [0.10] [0.11]  [0.11] [0.12]  [0.12] [0.14] 
LEV  -1.40*** -1.37***  -1.41*** -1.42***  -1.45*** -1.44***  -1.49*** -1.46*** 
  [0.15] [0.16]  [0.16] [0.17]  [0.17] [0.18]  [0.20] [0.21] 
CAPEXTA  7.29*** 7.12***  7.60*** 7.59***  8.31*** 8.50***  9.11*** 9.23*** 
  [0.61] [0.70]  [0.65] [0.74]  [0.70] [0.81]  [0.80] [0.94] 




  [0.01] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02]  [0.02] [0.02] 
LN_AGE  0.07 0.07  0.04 0.04  0.01 0  -0.05 -0.07 
  [0.04] [0.04]  [0.04] [0.05]  [0.05] [0.05]  [0.06] [0.06] 
CASH  0.49* 0.44*  0.56* 0.49*  0.4 0.31  0.34 0.25 
  [0.21] [0.22]  [0.22] [0.23]  [0.25] [0.26]  [0.30] [0.31] 
ROA  -1.53*** -1.87***  -1.45*** -1.83***  -1.45*** -1.89***  -1.23*** -1.75*** 
  [0.15] [0.16]  [0.17] [0.17]  [0.18] [0.19]  [0.22] [0.23] 
Country Characteristics             
LN_GDP   0   -0.01   0.01   -0.04 
   [0.17]   [0.18]   [0.19]   [0.19] 
Credit   1.02***   1.06***   0.87***   0.58* 
   [0.21]   [0.22]   [0.24]   [0.29] 
Equity   -0.2   -0.14   -0.19   -0.50** 
   [0.12]   [0.13]   [0.14]   [0.19] 
Trade   -0.09   -0.14   -0.16   -0.13 




Inflation   3.1   1.86   -0.41   -5.23 
   [2.58]   [3.00]   [3.33]   [3.91] 
EFW   0.78***   0.53*   0.45*   0.63* 
   [0.20]   [0.21]   [0.23]   [0.27] 
CTR   -4.48**   -5.78***   -5.90***   -3.4 
   [1.38]   [1.46]   [1.72]   [1.93] 
EDU   2.31   2.91   2.74   2.04 
   [2.02]   [2.34]   [2.98]   [3.16] 
SEC   0   0   0   0.01 
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 43,396 28,795 25,034 40,655 26,153 22,827 37,819 23,595 20,546 32,042 18,747 16,276 
AIC 240,515 157,895 137,860 225,768 144,213 126,372 211,172 131,277 114,808 179,671 105,559 92,174 




Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 
𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+1, 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-level 
characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 5.1, 
Panel B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, in 
other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 
𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed 
effect and year fixed effects. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
two-tailed level. We also run the regression on 𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑡+4 and get similar results with regressions on other years. We do not report it for brevity. We report the 




Table 5.10 The impact of Economic Freedom on 𝑳𝑵_𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒏+𝒕: HLM 
Dependent variable 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Characteristics                     
LIQUIDITY 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Country Characteristics                     
EFW_SG 0.16***     0.12**     0.12**     -0.01     
 [0.04]     [0.04]     [0.04]     [0.05]     
EFW_LSPR  0.06*     0.07*     0.09**     0.10*    
  [0.03]     [0.03]     [0.03]     [0.04]    
EFW_SM   0.27***     0.31***     0.28***     0.11   
   [0.05]     [0.05]     [0.06]     [0.07]   
EFW_FTI    0.10**     0.04     0.02     0.02  
    [0.03]     [0.03]     [0.04]     [0.04]  
EFW_R     0.17***     0.09     0.07     0.15* 
     [0.05]     [0.05]     [0.05]     [0.07] 
LN_GDP 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.22*** 0.37*** 0.12 0.15* 0.18* 0.08 0.19** -0.08 0.06 0.05 0 0.07 0 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.13 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] 
Credit 0.21** 0.34*** 0.22** 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.49*** 0.39*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.57*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.88*** 0.64*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] 
Equity 0.07 0.02 0 0.10** 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0 -0.08 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
Trade 0.25 0.44*** 0.48***  0.48*** 0.16 0.37** 0.41**  0.38** -0.05 0.22 0.2  0.22 0.18 0.26 0.25  0.24 
 [0.14] [0.12] [0.13]  [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13]  [0.13] [0.15] [0.13] [0.14]  [0.14] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15]  [0.15] 
Inflation 0.61 -0.46  -0.62 -0.73 3.15*** 1.34  1.18 1.23 3.15*** 2.11*  1.79 1.95 -2.47* -1.8  -2.05 -1.84 
 [0.75] [0.80]  [0.79] [0.80] [0.84] [0.91]  [0.91] [0.92] [0.93] [1.00]  [1.00] [1.00] [1.07] [1.18]  [1.18] [1.18] 
CTR  0.34 0.11 0.43 0.81  0.5 0.41 0.35 0.51  0.14 0.18 0.13 0.21  0.28 -0.07 0.39 0.78 
  [0.42] [0.40] [0.42] [0.46]  [0.46] [0.43] [0.47] [0.48]  [0.54] [0.52] [0.58] [0.56]  [0.62] [0.58] [0.67] [0.66] 
EDU -0.22 0.49 0.18 1.28 0.5 0.37 0.98 0.48 2.14** 1.43 -0.88 -1.11 -1.7 0.53 0.04 -4.84*** -5.06*** -3.94*** -3.68** -4.45*** 




SEC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Firm control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed effects                     
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 26,371 26,087 26,087 26,087 26,087 23,905 23,622 23,622 23,622 23,622 21,299 21,017 21,017 21,017 21,017 16,417 16,146 16,146 16,146 16,146 
AIC 84,036 82,882 82,856 82,886 82,874 76,618 75,488 75,461 75,500 75,492 68,635 67,533 67,519 67,542 67,540 53,573 52,579 52,581 52,584 52,579 
BIC 84,895 83,748 83,714 83,744 83,740 77,459 76,336 76,300 76,339 76,339 69,448 68,345 68,322 68,345 68,351 54,328 53,332 53,327 53,330 53,332 
Note: This table reports the estimation result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 
𝛼𝑐 represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-level characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Panel B and C of Table 1, Chapter 4. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Panel D of Table 
1, Chapter 4. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, in other words, we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of 
equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation (5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed effect and year 




Table 5.11 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑷𝑨𝑻𝒕+𝒏: Tobit Model 
Dependent variable 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LIQUIDITY 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
LN_TA 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
PPETA 0.08*** 0.06* 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
LEV -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.22*** 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] 
CAPEXTA 2.15*** 2.45*** 1.99*** 2.21*** 2.17*** 2.48*** 2.08*** 2.33*** 
 [0.19] [0.21] [0.20] [0.23] [0.22] [0.24] [0.25] [0.28] 
RDTA 3.03*** 2.76*** 3.02*** 2.75*** 3.21*** 2.98*** 3.76*** 3.54*** 




Q 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
LN_AGE -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
CASH 0.19*** 0.12* 0.21*** 0.12* 0.23*** 0.14* 0.13 0.04 
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.10] 
ROA 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.64*** 0.48*** 0.75*** 0.60*** 0.86*** 0.71*** 
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] 
LN_GDP  0.11***  0.11***  0.13***  0.15*** 
  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.03] 
Credit  0.02  0.07**  0.05  -0.11** 
  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.04]  [0.05] 
Equity  -0.11***  -0.14***  -0.13***  -0.15*** 
  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.04] 




  [0.05]  [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.07] 
Inflation  0.98  2.87***  3.69***  0.99 
  [0.68]  [0.76]  [0.84]  [0.97] 
EFW  0.18***  0.17***  0.17***  0.1 
  [0.05]  [0.05]  [0.06]  [0.07] 
CTR  0.91***  1.01***  1.01***  1.15*** 
  [0.28]  [0.31]  [0.34]  [0.40] 
EDU  0.14  0.36  0.05  -0.76* 
  [0.26]  [0.30]  [0.36]  [0.44] 
SEC  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 
   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of the Tobit model: 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 control 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑐 +
𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . The dependent variable is 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1  in column (1), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2 , 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3  and 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5  in 
column (3), (5) and (7), respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Panel B and C of Table 1, Chapter 4. Country fixed effects, 𝐶𝑐,  
industry fixed effects, 𝐼𝑗, year fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡, are included in all regressions. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are 
displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. This table also reports the  marginal effects 
of the Tobit model  𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 control 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑐,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . The dependent 
variable is 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 in column (2), which is replaced with 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+2, 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+3 and 𝐿𝑁_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑡+5 in column (4), (6) and (8), respectively. 
Variable definitions are provided in Panel B and C of Table 1, Chapter 4. Industry fixed effects, 𝐼𝑗, year fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡, are included in all 
regressions. Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% 
(5%) (10%) two-tailed level. Prob > χ2show the significance of the overall model and their corresponding p values. In this case, the model is 





Table 5.12 Stock Liquidity and Innovation measured by 𝑳𝑵_𝑹𝑫𝒕+𝒏: HLM 
Dependent 
variable 


































               
LIQUIDITY  0.07*** 0.08***  0.08*** 0.09***  0.09*** 0.10***  0.10*** 0.11***  0.12*** 0.14*** 
  [0.0037] [0.0040]  [0.0039] [0.0041]  [0.0041] [0.0044]  [0.0044] [0.0047]  [0.0050] [0.0054] 
LN_TA  0.87*** 0.86***  0.86*** 0.86***  0.85*** 0.85***  0.84*** 0.83***  0.82*** 0.80*** 
  [0.0054] [0.0058]  [0.0057] [0.0061]  [0.0060] [0.0065]  [0.0064] [0.0069]  [0.0075] [0.0081] 
PPETA  -0.17*** -0.10***  -0.23*** -0.18***  -0.26*** -0.20***  -0.28*** -0.19***  -0.25*** -0.16*** 
  [0.0229] [0.0247]  [0.0242] [0.0259]  [0.0261] [0.0278]  [0.0281] [0.0299]  [0.0330] [0.0352] 
LEV  -0.87*** -0.77***  -0.87*** -0.77***  -0.87*** -0.77***  -0.86*** -0.78***  -0.82*** -0.74*** 
  [0.0375] [0.0392]  [0.0393] [0.0408]  [0.0421] [0.0436]  [0.0452] [0.0468]  [0.0527] [0.0543] 
CAPEXTA  0.92*** 1.18***  1.21*** 1.43***  1.34*** 1.41***  1.43*** 1.43***  1.47*** 1.41*** 
  [0.1579] [0.1758]  [0.1628] [0.1810]  [0.1723] [0.1914]  [0.1846] [0.2057]  [0.2130] [0.2383] 




  [0.0039] [0.0040]  [0.0040] [0.0041]  [0.0042] [0.0043]  [0.0043] [0.0044]  [0.0050] [0.0051] 
LN_AGE  -0.08*** -0.07***  -0.11*** -0.10***  -0.14*** -0.12***  -0.15*** -0.13***  -0.17*** -0.16*** 
  [0.0105] [0.0110]  [0.0110] [0.0115]  [0.0117] [0.0122]  [0.0125] [0.0130]  [0.0147] [0.0154] 
CASH  0.54*** 0.56***  0.56*** 0.60***  0.56*** 0.62***  0.51*** 0.58***  0.51*** 0.56*** 
  [0.0522] [0.0537]  [0.0550] [0.0562]  [0.0596] [0.0604]  [0.0648] [0.0655]  [0.0791] [0.0798] 
ROA  -1.59*** -1.60***  -1.24*** -1.28***  -1.02*** -1.08***  -0.90*** -0.99***  -0.82*** -0.96*** 
  [0.0385] [0.0393]  [0.0408] [0.0414]  [0.0441] [0.0445]  [0.0483] [0.0487]  [0.0583] [0.0585] 
Country 
Characteristics 
               
LN_GDP   0.09   -0.12   -0.19**   -0.28***   -0.19* 
   [0.0610]   [0.0628]   [0.0673]   [0.0778]   [0.0956] 
Credit   0.16**   0.19**   0.15*   0.12   0.06 
   [0.0601]   [0.0626]   [0.0656]   [0.0741]   [0.0907] 
Equity   -0.03   -0.05   -0.10**   -0.10*   -0.23*** 
   [0.0341]   [0.0359]   [0.0381]   [0.0406]   [0.0568] 
Trade   0.06   -0.03   0.03   -0.18   -0.22 
   [0.1297]   [0.1297]   [0.1392]   [0.1589]   [0.1836] 




   [0.6611]   [0.6867]   [0.7995]   [0.8767]   [1.0483] 
EFW   0.27***   0.38***   0.39***   0.43***   0.38*** 
   [0.0513]   [0.0542]   [0.0582]   [0.0623]   [0.0767] 
CTR   0.17   0.65   0.19   0.28   0.42 
   [0.3644]   [0.3810]   [0.4079]   [0.4937]   [0.5830] 
EDU   1.59**   1.63**   1.17   -0.54   0.36 
   [0.5601]   [0.6072]   [0.7145]   [0.9777]   [1.1148] 
SEC   -0.01***   -0.01***   -0.01**   -0.01**   -0.01* 
   [0.0023]   [0.0023]   [0.0026]   [0.0027]   [0.0029] 
Country Fixed 
effects 
 Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Fixed 
effects 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
effects 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of 
observations 
45,898 31,475 27,258 43,408 28,802 25,040 40,665 26,159 22,833 37,828 23,600 20,551 32,051 18,752 16,281 
AIC 190,037 89,811 76,719 179,970 82,056 70,309 169,028 75,187 64,675 157,582 68,506 58,708 134,259 55,729 47,513 




Note: This table reports the regression result of the HLM model in equations  (5.1a) 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, (5.1b) 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑊𝑐
′𝛾 + 𝑣𝑐. where 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 are separately 𝐿𝑁_𝑅𝐷𝑡 , 
𝐿𝑁_𝑅𝐷𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑁_𝑅𝐷𝑡+2 , 𝐿𝑁_𝑅𝐷𝑡+3  and 𝐿𝑁_𝑅𝐷𝑡+5  of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 + 𝑛; 𝛼𝑐  represents a country-level intercept term; 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 shows a vector of firm-level 
characteristics of firm 𝑖 from country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡 in Table 4.1, Panel B and C. 𝑊𝑐 represents the vector of country-level characteristics of country 𝑐 shown in Table 5.1, Panel 
B. To obtains the pure firm-level impact of 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 on 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+𝑛 in equation (5.1a), this chapter removes country-year mean from all firm-level observations in 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, in other words, 
we include the country and year fixed effects in the within-country model of equation (5.1a). Besides, to capture the pure country-level relationship between 𝑊𝑐 and 𝛼𝑐 in equation 
(5.1b), we include both country-level variables and country-year means of firm-level factors in 𝑊𝑐. All regressions include 2-digit SIC industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. 
Estimation results are shown, and their standard errors are displayed in the brackets below. *** (**) (*) Significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level. We report the AIC 




Appendix to Chapter 5  
Although previous literature finds that firm innovation could be affected by other 
country/international indicators, we do not use them as control variables in the regression. This 
is because these indicators are highly correlated with each other. This section lists these 
indicators below. 
Clò et al. (2020) showed that a country with a high-quality government (i.e., low corruption, 
high government effectiveness, high rule of law, good regulatory quality, good voice and 
accountability) improves the firm’s innovation. Therefore, we plan to control for a list of 
indicators that represent the quality of the government from the perspective of 1) control of 
corruption (i.e., 𝑊𝐺𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝑐,𝑡 ), 2) government effectiveness (i.e., 𝑊𝐺𝐼_𝐺𝐸𝑐,𝑡 ), 3) regulatory 
quality (i.e., 𝑊𝐺𝐼_𝑅𝑄𝑐,𝑡), 4) the rule of law (i.e., 𝑊𝐺𝐼_𝑅𝐿𝑐,𝑡) and 5) voice and accountability 
(i.e., 𝑊𝐺𝐼_𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑡).
55 These data are collected from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) from the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2010.  
Another alternative measurement is the freedom in the world (FIW) indicators, 𝐹𝐼𝑊𝑐,𝑡, which 
contains political rights (PR) indicators and civil liberties (CL) indicators.56 It was constructed 
by Messick and Kimura (1996) for Freedom House and currently covers around 200 countries 
from 1972 to 2019. The FIW indicators are ranged from one to seven, where one represents the 
country with the highest degree of freedom, seven the lowest.  
 
55 The detailed variable information is described in Panel D of Table 4.1, Chapter 4. It also notes that these 
indicators are highly correlated with each other (the correlation coefficients range between 0.7 and 0.9) (Clò et 
al., 2020). 
56 Gwartney and Lawson (2003) demonstrated that while EFW index and FIW index covers the different sphere 
of human interaction, the foundation of economic freedom is as same as that of political and civil liberty. In 




The enforcement of patent rights is shown to play a significant role in improving innovative 
activities (Panda and Sharma, 2020). Therefore we plan to control the index of patent protection, 
𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐,𝑡, as the patent protection index for country 𝑐 in the year 𝑡. The index of patent protection 
(i.e., index of patent rights) is created by Ginarte and Park (1997) and then updated by Park 
(2008). They designed this index to describe the strength of patent protection rather than the 
quality of the patent system in each country. 57  Currently, this index is produced for 123 
countries/regions from 1960 to 2015 (broken down into five year intervals). Following Picci 
(2010), the observation for the year will be used for the four adjacent years. For example, the 
observation for the year 1990 is used for the year 1991, 1992; the year 1993, 1994, 1996 and 
1997 are set equal to the observation for the year 1995. A country with a higher level of this 
index represents a stronger level of protection.  
An alternative indicator of 𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐,𝑡 is the patent enforcement index, 𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑐,𝑡, which was produced 
by Papageorgiadis and Sofka (2020). They argued that Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008)  
only considered information about intellectual property book laws across the country. However, 
the agencies, courts, police and customs organisations are less likely to apply a specific patent 
law immediately and uniformly after it is adopted by the country. 𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑐,𝑡  incorporates 
information about an individual’s experience and local knowledge source of patent lawyers 
and managers during the enforcement process. The dataset covers 51 countries from 1998 to 
2017. A country with a higher level of 𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑐,𝑡 indicates a higher degree of patent enforcement.   
We list their correlation in Appendix Table 5.1.
 
57 According to Park (2008), it measures as “the unweighted sum of five separate scores for coverage (inventions 
that are  patentable); membership in international treaties; duration of protection; enforcement mechanisms; and 




Table A5.1 Correlation of high correlated Country-Level Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  (1) EFW 1                   
  (2) WGI_CC 0.839*** 1         
  (3) WGI_GE 0.864*** 0.941*** 1        
  (4) WGI_RL 0.859*** 0.935*** 0.926*** 1       
  (5) WGI_RQ 0.882*** 0.891*** 0.923*** 0.880*** 1      
  (6) WGI_VA 0.791*** 0.839*** 0.814*** 0.917*** 0.814*** 1     
  (7) FIW_PR -0.691*** -0.699*** -0.701*** -0.841*** -0.688*** -0.950*** 1    
  (8) FIW_CL -0.784*** -0.766*** -0.787*** -0.876*** -0.830*** -0.948*** 0.892*** 1   
  (9) IPP 0.712*** 0.648*** 0.691*** 0.682*** 0.633*** 0.563*** -0.487*** -0.545*** 1  





Chapter 6 The Road to Economic Recovery: Pandemics and Innovation 
6.1 Introduction 
“At such difficult times, the importance of innovation comes to the fore. When we emerge from 
this challenging time, we will need the UK’s entrepreneurial spirit to be stronger than ever.” 
Tej Parikh (Institute of Directors) responding to the announcement of the Future Fund 
On 20 April 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government announced the 
Future Fund, a billion pound support package for innovative firms.58 The objective of this 
policy is very clear: to support the road to economic recovery by increasing the intensity of 
innovation. The link between innovation and GDP growth is undisputed: Kogan et al. (2017) 
demonstrate that innovation waves are followed by an acceleration in per capita GDP and 
productivity. Hasan and Tucci (2010) show that countries hosting more innovative firms also 
have higher economic growth. Importantly, Kogan et al. (2017) and Acemoglu et al. (2018) 
show that increases in aggregate innovation dominate creative destruction, leading to real 
increases in output. Acemoglu et al. (2018) demonstrate that such increases can be achieved 
more efficiently via a targeted policy response to encourage innovation within the more 
innovative firms.  
This chapter reviews the literature about the economic consequence of pandemics from the 
perspective of the macroeconomy, consumption, financial markets, supply-side, and 
socioeconomy. We mainly focus on the economic impacts of COVID-19 and supplement it by 
 
58 Along similar lines, on 27 March 2020, the US President, Donald Trump, signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act with an aim to support individuals and businesses affected by the impact of 




research about previous pandemics. They generally focus on the short-term influence and 
represent economic indicators by GDP or consumption. To the best of knowledge, we do not 
find any paper to test the impacts of pandemics on innovation even the technology innovation 
is widely regarded as a vital driver of a nation's long-term economic growth (Solow, 1956; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
According to the literature review and economic theory, we assume the pandemics cause 
negative impacts on innovation through both labour and financial mechanisms. While 
innovation requires long-term, labour-intensive teamwork (Holmström, 1989; X Chang et al., 
2015), pandemics (i.e., increased infection and/or death toll) destroy innovation by increasing 
labour costs, reducing working hours and teamwork’s productivity. Besides, firms tend to cut 
plan of new projects in terms of financial constraints and increased willingness of precautionary 
savings. 
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of past pandemics on innovation output. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide evidence regarding the long-term effects 
of pandemics on research productivity, thereby shedding light on the ways in which pandemic 
episodes impact economic growth.  
We use patent data from the European Patent Office’s PATSTAT database and select data from 
1900 to 2012.59 We focus on the set of G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) and pandemic episodes with at least reported 
 
59 This chapter does not use R&D expenditure to measure innovation activity. Although R&D can represent 
innovative input during the normal period, it may not efficiently measure innovation performance during and after 
the pandemic. The R&D spending includes wage and salary of researchers. However, the pandemic (increased 
infection and death toll) rise real wage for suriviors in the long run (Jordà et al., 2020) but is less likely to improve 
their research producvitiy. Therefore, the increased R&D investment may not be able to represent an increased 




100,000 deaths. Our measure of innovation output is the number of successful applications per 
country per year. We use a set of model-free or local projection estimators that allows us to 
estimate local projections sequentially h steps ahead into the future.  
We show that following a pandemic, innovation output is disrupted for a period of 
approximately seven years, probably because of a drop in research productivity. This result is 
striking as it shows a much more long-term effect in innovation output that the one anticipated. 
Our model provides more reliable forecasts of the long-run rather than the short-run effects of 
pandemics on innovation output. We show that the main result of the effect of pandemic shocks 
on aggregate innovation output is driven mainly by a significant reduction in innovative activity 
in the Information and Communication technology sector. Furthermore, there are some notable 
differences in the magnitude of the pandemic shock across countries and the time to recovery. 
Pandemic shocks lead to a short-term drop in the number of patent applications. Finally, 
pandemic duration is strongly associated with a drop in patent applications. The results are 
robust to a number of robustness tests.   
Our results have important policy implications. The chapter supports the policies designed to 
reduce the effect of the “Great lockdown” on research productivity. Given the non-rival nature 
of innovation, the response to COVID19 needs therefore to have a global character as this will 
support economic growth. To this end, governments need to be prepared to support innovators 
in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic, and patent offices may have to speed up the 
process of approving new patents. Finally, we recommend adopting policies that target the 
more innovative firms as this is expected to help reduce the time it will take for innovation to 
recover from the effects of COVID19. 
In Section 6.2, we review the literature about the economic impacts of pandemics. In Section 




Section 6.4, we discuss our innovation data and develop our empirical strategy. In Section 6.5, 
we present the results of the empirical analysis and discuss policy implications. In Section 6.6, 
we present the results from our robustness checks. In Section 6.7, we demonstrate the limitation 




6.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews literature about the economic impact of the pandemic around the world. 
We mainly focus on the economic implications of COVID-19 and supplement it by research 
about the previous pandemic. In the following subsections, we firstly review the literature 
investigating this impact based on the macroeconomic indicators, and the trade-off between the 
severity of the pandemic and the size of the recession caused by the pandemic. And then, we 
describe three channels in which the pandemic affect the economy, namely, consumption, 
financial market and supply chain. In the end, we summary the impacts of COVID-19 and 
governments' response policies on socioeconomy from the perspective of labour markets, 
human health and well-being, gender and racial inequality, and the environment. 
 
6.2.1 Macroeconomic impact  
COVID-19 pandemic has been regarded by World Trade Organisation (WTO) and OECD as 
the largest threat to the global economy since the 2007-08 financial crisis. It is shown to 
increase economic uncertainty, geopolitical risk and implied volatility of oil price (OECD, 
2020; Sharif et al., 2020). As an example of economic uncertainty, this pandemic has caused 
depression of multiple industries (e.g., tourism, transportation) and temperately closure of 
educational, commercial, sports and spiritual institutions (Boone, 2020). In addition to this, 
Baker et al. (2020) argue that COVID-induced uncertainty causes more than half of the 
contraction in US real GDP. 
A number of studies investigate economic losses from the outbreak of pandemics. 1918 
Pandemic (i.e., Spanish flu) spreads worldwide from 1918 to 1919. According to the Centers 




population and killed at least 50 million people among them.60 Barro et al. (2020) analyse this 
pandemic by using cross-country panel regressions and demonstrate that the real per capita 
GDP and real capita consumption are estimated to be decreased by 6 and 8 percent separately. 
Correia et al. (1918) focus on the US market and show this pandemic decreased manufacturing 
activity by about 20%. Jordà et al. (2020)  focus on the economic impact of pandemics in the 
long-term. They show that pandemics do not destroy the physical capital (compared to war); 
instead, it decreases the labour supply and increases the real wage for each survivor. 
In addition to these, a set of papers use the 1918 Pandemic as a severe flu pandemic sample 
and estimate its economic cost in the modern era. Burns et al. (2006) estimate that the cost of 
a 1918-type pandemic is close to 3.1 pecent of global GDP. Among them, 0.4 pecent comes 
from mortality, 0.9 percent is due to illness and absenteeism, and 1.9 percent is because of the 
effort to avoid infection. Besides, Arnold et al. (2006) estimate that this kind of pandemic could 
cause around 4.25 pecent loss in annual GDP in the US. While the supply side causes a 2.25 
percent loss of economy, the demand side causes the rest.  
Grais et al. (2003) set up a scenario that 1968 Hong Kong flu returns in 2000. They describe 
that the flu will do not follow the seasonal pattern and spread concurrently around the world. 
Besides, It will leave a shorter time for public health intervention than before. 
There are a number of literature analysing the trade-off between the severity of the pandemic 
and the size of the recession caused by COVID-19 (e.g., Correia et al., 1918; Alvarez et al., 
2020; Barro et al., 2020; Eichenbaum et al., 2020; Glover et al., 2020). According to 
Eichenbaum et al. (2020), with more restrictive containment policies being applied, people 
tend to decrease their consumption and working hours due to the increasing cost of 
 




consumption. It would reduce the death toll but increase the severity of the economic downturn. 
Alvarez et al. (2020) aim to find an optimal lockdown policy to balance this trade-off. They 
argue that the government should start a severe lockdown two weeks after the outbreak and 
keep it tight for a full month. It is followed by a gradual withdrawal, which releases 40% of the 
population at the beginning and 80% after three months.  
The analysis of trade-off is also included in previous research. Adda (2016) tests a group of 
viral diseases from France via an across-region dataset. It shows that while school closures and 
restriction on public transportation reduce the spread of viral diseases, they are not cost-
effective in the economy. Besides, the pandemic-related death rate is higher in developing 
countries than in industrialised countries due to worse health care systems, living conditions 
and individuals' health status (Patterson and Pyle, 1991; Johnson and Mueller, 2002; Murray 
et al., 2006; Oshitani, Kamigaki and Suzuki, 2008). 
Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020a) and Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020b) suggest three main 
transmission channels through which the COVID-19 negatively affects the economy. The first 
pathway, which directly affects the economy, is the decreased consumption of goods and 
services. The second is the indirect influence working through the shock of financial markets. 
The third is the impact of the supply-side, which consists of supply chains, labour demand and 
employment. The following subsection describes the impact of COVID-19 on these three 
channels. 
 
6.2.2 Direct channel: Consumption 
Baker et al. (2020) show that household consumption dramatically increases at the beginning 




items. It is followed by a sharp decline in the overall spending when the virus spread and a 
growing number of people stay at home. A higher social distancing level decreases household 
spending, particularly in restaurants, retail, and public transport.  
Goolsbee and Syverson (2020) find that while consumer traffic is reduced by 60 percent 
following the COVID-19 outbreak, only 7 percent of them is explained by the legal restrictions. 
The rest is mainly relevant to the individual choices, which due to the fears of infection. Besides, 
this pandemic changes consumers' spending habits that increase (decreases) the visit to 
'essential' ('non-essential') business and food sellers (restaurants and bars). Sheridan et al. (2020) 
suggest a similar result by comparing the average daily spending in Denmark and  Sweden 
during the COVID-19. While both are similarly exposed to this pandemic, Denmark imposes 
a more stringent social-distancing law than Sweden. The authors find that the restriction law 
causes only few drops in consumption, and the most reduction is due to the pandemic itself. 
This restriction decreases the aggregate spending of low-health-risk individuals but also 
decrease the spending of high-health-risk individuals in personal health service. 
The impact of HIV/ASID on consumption is different from that of influenza pandemics. 
According to Bollinger et al. (1999), household spending for medical care, drugs, and funeral 
expenses substantially increase after one of the household members is infected by HIV/ASID 
virus. 
 
6.2.3 Indirect channel: Financial markets 
According to Jordà et al. (2020), the countries experience a low natural interest rate in the next 
decades of the pandemic. It is explained by the increased precautionary savings and depressed 




real returns on stocks and short-term government bills following the growth of flu death rates. 
Besides, Altig et al. (2020) find a considerable rise in implied stock market volatility in reaction 
to the COVID-19 outbreak. The volatility peaked in mid-March, which is earlier than other 
uncertainty indicators, shows the different opinions between Wall Street and Main Street on 
the pandemic.61 
A set of literature anlysis the firm characteristics that transfer the impact of COVID-19 on their 
abnormal return in the financial market. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) argue that the financial 
market investors expect the financial channels to amplify the non-financial effect of COVID-
19. The corporate value is driven by the firms' exposure to international trade in the outbreak 
period and driven by liquidity (i.e., cash holding) and refinancing risk (i.e., leverage) in the 
fever period. Besides, Albuquerque et al. (2020) show that stocks with high Environmental and 
Social (ES) rating have better performance than others during the first quarter of 2020.  
Ding et al. (2020) supplement that the stock prices decrease less by the COVID-19 when the 
firm has stronger financial performance before 2020; more corporate social responsibility 
activities; less entrenched executives; controlled more by non-financial companies rather than 
hedge funds. Fahlenbrach et al. (2020) find that financial flexibility protects firms from the 
COVID-19. 
Alfaro et al. (2020) analyse the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on firm-level daily returns 
in the US market. They find that unanticipated changes in predicted infections could forecast 
 
61 Other economic uncertainty indicators included in Altig et al. (2020) are newspaper-based policy uncertainty, 
Twitter chatter about economic uncertainty, subjective uncertainty about business growth, forecaster disagreement 




aggregate stock market returns in the next day.62 Besides, firms in labour-intensive (versus 
highly leveraged, more capital-intensive) industries experience a slighter decrease in stock 
prices, but a larger proportional shedding of workers. It reflects that workers (versus property, 
plant and equipment) are easier to be shed during the period of extreme economic instability.  
Gormsen and Koijen (2020) test the reaction of stock price and future dividend to COVID-19. 
They find compared with the beginning of 2020, the growth expectation in dividends and GDP 
in June have fallen in the US and EU. Besides, they observe a 10% increase in stock price 
around the announcement of the fiscal stimulus bill on 26 March, while a slight decline in the 
short-term dividends during the same period. It represents that the stock market is improved by 
the value of dividends in the distant future rather than the near-term. 
Baker et al. (2020) display that the news reports of COVID-19 cause large daily movements in 
the US stock market, which has never happened during any previous infectious disease 
outbreak. They explain the reason by the sensitivity of a service-oriented economy to the 
government restrictions on commercial activity and voluntary social distancing. 
 
6.2.4 Impact of supply-side 
Gourinchas (2020) argue that the modern economy is supported by the complex 
interconnections between different parties (e.g., suppliers, firms, employees, consumers). 
Therefore, a sudden stop in supply chains and circular flows tend to cause a cascading influence 
 
62 Alfaro et al. (2020) find that doubling (halving) of projected infections predicted infections could forecast a 
decrease (increase) in aggregate stock market value from 4 to 10 percent in the next day. A similer patten is also 
found in Hong Kong during the 2013 SARS outbreak. They show the value decrease (increase) from 8 to 11 
percent under the same condition. In this case, they suggest that stock prices may begin to rally, and become less 




on the economy. Because of the spillover effects throughout supply chains, this negative effect 
is more severe for countries highly dependent on international trade (Fernandes, 2020). 
Bonadio et al. (2020) show that COVID-19 is expected to decrease the average real GDP by 
29.6%, with one-quarter of the decline is explained by disruptions in global supply chains. 
Gourinchas (2020) suggests a more considerable impact of COVID-19 on the economy than 
the financial crisis. It is because while the unemployment rate in the US financial crisis peaked 
at 'just' 10%, at least 50% of people cannot work during the short-term because of COVID-19. 
Previous researches also demonstrate that influenza and HIV/AIDS pandemic are responsible 
for the loss of adults' productivity and health (e.g., Quinn, 1996; Kumpulainen and Mäkelä, 
1997; Keech et al., 1998; Dixon et al., 2002; Szucs, 2004; Robson et al., 2006; Xue et al., 
2010).63  
 
6.2.5 Socioeconomic consequence 
A growing literature investigates the socioeconomic consequence of COVID-19 and 
governments' response policies. The studies mainly concern impacts on labour markets, human 
health and well-being, gender and racial inequality, and the environment. 
A large body of literature studies the negative impact of COVID-19 on labour markets (e.g., 
Bartik et al., 2020; Boneva et al., 2020; Coibion et al., 2020; Dingel and Neiman, 2020; Kahn 
et al., 2020). According to Boneva et al. (2020), individuals who have to work remotely from 
home are more likely to lose their job. Besides, younger adults and workers without a university 
education tend to experience reductions in their income. Coibion et al. (2020) find drops in the 
 
63 An example is 1918 Pandemic, around 50% pandemic-related death reports in the worlds occurred in adults 




labour participation rate in the long-term and explain it via the disproportionate influence on 
the older population. 64 Barrero et al. (2020) argue that the COVID-19 outbreak induces a 
major job reallocation in the US and find 42 percent of layoffs caused by the pandemic finally 
become permanent job loss.  
For research relevant to health outcomes, a set of literature document the impact of COVID-
19 on physical health and mortality (e.g., Goldstein and Lee, 2020; Lin and Meissner, 2020; 
Maringe et al., 2020). Other research such as Tubadji et al. (2020), Brodeur et al. (2020), 
Davillas and Jones (2020), Xiong et al. (2020) study the influence on mental health and well-
being. In addition to this, a growing literature shows the negative impact of lockdown policy 
on public mental health (e.g., (Armbruster and Klotzbücher, 2020; Brodeur et al., 2020).   
A set of literature demonstrates the unequal impact of COVID-19 on different genders and 
different ethnic groups. Studies provide evidence that this pandemic causes negative influences 
on women by increasing childcare needs (Alon et al., 2020) and domestic violence (Beland et 
al., 2020a). Besides, service sectors, which has a high share of female employment, suffer more 
from COVID-19 than others (Alon et al., 2020). 
COVID-19 leads to a higher mortality rate for minority groups in the US than for other groups 
(Tai et al., 2020). Besides, Latino groups and immigrants experience higher unemployment 
than others during the COVID-19 in the US (Borjas and Cassidy, 2020; Fairlie et al., 2020). 
The authors explain that Latino workers concentrate on non-essential service sectors or/and 
have lower skills, while the immigrants' jobs are generally remotely from home. In addition to 
this, the COVID-19 pandemic induces a rise of Sinophobia across the web and magnifies the 
hostility against foreigners (Bartos et al., 2020; Schild et al., 2020). 
 




The environment becomes better following the global lockdown and slowdown in economic 
activities (Bao and Zhang, 2020; Cicala et al., 2020; He et al., 2020). It is reflected in the 
reduction of air quality index and air pollutions (such as PM2.5, PM10, NO2, SO2 and CO). 
To summarise, while much research studies the economic impacts of pandemics, they generally 
focus on the short-term influence and represent economic indicators by GDP or consumption. 
Alougth Jordà et al. (2020) investigate pandemics' economic impacts in the long-term; they 
mainly compare the difference between pandemic and wars. Besides, to the best of knowledge, 
we do not find any paper test on how pandemic affects innovation even the technology 
innovation is widely regarded as a vital driver of a nation's long-term economic growth (Solow, 




6.3 The Schumpeterian theory of economic growth, shocks to innovation 
output and hypothesis 
In this section, we discuss innovation as a mediating factor in achieving economic growth. 
Schumpeterian growth theory relies on the assumption that aggregate innovation dominates 
creative destruction. The economic consequences of pandemic shocks are felt for long into the 
future and macroeconomic and firm-specific shocks lead to smaller innovation output. In the 
following paragraphs, considering the link between pandemic shocks, economic growth and 
innovation, we suggest that pandemic shocks are likely to lead to a reduction in aggregate 
innovation output.     
 
6.3.1  The Schumpeterian growth theory  
Undoubtedly, Schumpeter’s biggest contribution to economic thinking is the notion of 
“creative destruction” that characterises economic systems. According to Schumpeter, the 
process by which economies grow is a mostly evolutionary process, during which new 
innovations replace old innovations. This evolutionary process is endogenous, that is, it comes 
from within the economic system itself, it occurs discontinuously, at irregular intervals and 
with varying magnitudes, and brings fundamental changes, replacing old conditions with new 
equilibria (see Elliott, 1980).  
Schumpeterian growth theory is effectively the “operational arm” of Schumpeter’s idea of 
creative destruction. 65  Schumpeterian growth models assume that (i) firm and personal 
innovations (the innovators) affect the entire economy, (ii) innovators are motivated by the 
 




prospects of private wealth that come in the form of monopoly rents and (iii) new innovators 
have the capacity to eventually replace old innovators (creative destruction). The amount of 
research conducted by the innovators is a function of the prospects of monopoly rents and 
increases in higher wages for skilled workers over the next period (see Aghion and Howitt, 
1992). In its basic form, therefore, the value of a new innovation is a positive function of the 
expected profit from this innovation minus the cost of creative destruction, that is the loss of 
monopoly rents from new innovations that replace old innovations (Aghion et al., 2014).  
On aggregate, the effect of innovation on economic growth is positive when the increases in 
productivity achieved by new innovations are greater than the loss of monopoly rents of the 
previous innovator. Aghion and Howitt (1992) called the former effect “knowledge spillover 
effect” and the latter “business-stealing effect”. Empirically, Acemoglu et al. (2018) have 
identified that holding other things constant, increases in aggregate innovation dominate 
creative destruction, leading to real increases in output. Kogan et al. (2017) show that, as 
suggested by theory, innovation comes in waves that are followed by acceleration in per capita 
GDP and productivity. Finally, Hasan and Tucci (2010) show that countries hosting more 
innovative firms also have higher economic growth. 
 
6.3.2 Economic consequences of pandemic shocks and the role of innovation 
The above demonstrates that according to the Schumpeterian growth theory, growth is 
primarily determined by the ability of people to create new ideas. How though, do pandemics 
affect economic growth? 
In a neoclassical growth model, pandemic shocks threaten economic growth by disrupting both 




felt by a loss in the number of hours worked. On the demand side, the loss relates to a fall in 
consumption. Empirical research on the effect of pandemic shocks to economic growth is 
limited but clearly growing. For the US, Meltzer et al. (1999) show that the estimated economic 
impact of another influenza pandemic would be between US$71.3 to $166.5 billion. However, 
the study assumes a closed economy and therefore ignores the costs related to disruptions in 
commerce. Jonung and Roeger (2006) show that under “reasonable scenarios”, a pandemic 
shock is expected to lead to a loss in European Union GDP of between two and four percent. 
However, the latest growth forecast for the EU economy is that it is expected to contract by 
over seven percent in 2020 (see European Commission, 2020). More recently, Jordà et al. 
(2020) show that following a pandemic shock, the natural rate of interest declines for 
approximately two decades, therefore demonstrating the very long-term effects of pandemics 
on economic growth.66   
In an idea-based theory of economic growth, the ability of an economy to grow is the product 
of research productivity and the numbers of researchers: 
Economic growth = number of researchers × research productivity 
To this end, Bloom et al. (2020) show that research productivity in the US halves every 13 
years. Therefore maintaining constant growth requires a constant increase in the number of 
researchers (see also Kogan et al., 2017). Pandemic shocks can first of all lead to a reduction 
in the number of researchers. This may be the outcome of a very high death toll, a shift of a 
large number of researchers to other activities, a large number of researchers losing their jobs 
or a combination of all three. Research productivity is also expected to fall as the social 
 
66 A number of recent studies have attempted to quantify the effect of the COVID19 pandemic on economic 




environment that affects the intensity of creativity is affected (see Amabile et al., 1996). In 
other words, innovation requires a stimulating and supporting environment and pandemics 
threaten the nature of creativity that is essential for research productivity. 
 
6.3.3 Labour and financial mechanisms 
According to the literature review and above economic theories, we assume the pandemic 
impedes innovation performance from both labour and financial perspective. Innovation is a  
labour-intensive activity (Holmström, 1989). However, the spread of pandemic disease tends 
to cause the rise of infection and death toll, thereby reducing innovative productivity. For 
example, 1918 Pandemic is estimated to infect about one-third of the world's population and 
killed at least 50 million people among them. These pandemics reduce the labour supply and 
increase the real wage for each survivor in the long run (Jordà et al., 2020). It means that while 
pandemics are highly likely to decrease working hours are innovative activities, the innovators’ 
productivity is less likely to be increased. Besides, innovators' productivity may be reduced by 
the infection of relatives. For instance, when one of the household members is infected by 
HIV/AIDS, the other members have to sacrifice working hours to take care of him/her 
(Bollinger et al., 1999). 
Innovation also requires long-term, multiple stage teamwork (Holmström, 1989; Xin Chang et 
al., 2015). However, pandemic outbreaks tend to impede teamwork by decreasing face-to-face 
communication and usage of laboratories. Especially, infection (or even death) of critical 





The pandemic tends to cause negative impacts on innovation performance through financial 
channels. The overall consumption decreases following the pandemic outbreak (Goolsbee and 
Syverson, 2020). It will lead to a drop in firms’ income. The firms’ managers are myopic and 
willing to reduce long-term projects (i.e., R&D) to meet short-term earning target (Bushee, 
1998; Graham et al., 2005). Therefore, pandemics are highly likely to reduce firms’ innovative 
activities because of reduced internal funding.  
Besides, Jordà et al. (2020) show that the countries experience a low natural interest rate in the 
next decades of the pandemic. They explain it through the increased precautionary savings and 
depressed investment opportunities. It implies that firms experience financial constraints and 
work poorly in producing new projects or new products. Even firms could lend money in a 
loose credit environment; they are more likely to use this fund to improve risk prevention 
ability and resume productivity rather than invest in long-term projects.  
The other explanation is that investors are less willing to invest in new projects during the 
pandemic due to adverse selection and moral hazard. Innovation is a risk-taking behaviour and 
leads to informational asymmetric between investors and innovators (Holmström, 1989; 
Levine et al., 2017). Innovators with higher risk projects are more willing to attract investment 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Besides, they are possible to substitute high-risk for low-risk 
projects after obtaining investment. Therefore, when pandemics interpret communication 
between investors and innovators and increase the informational asymmetric between them, 
the investors may become more careful to treat new projects. 
To summarise, in light of the above, we hypothesise that pandemic shocks pose a threat to 
research and funding productivity, thereby reducing innovation output. In the main analysis 





6.4 Data, variables and methods  
In this section we explain our data sources, variable measurements and estimation methods.  
 
6.4.1  Data and variables  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines a pandemic as “the worldwide spread of a new 
disease” (WHO, 2020). However, it makes no mention of a minimum number of cases/deaths 
that have to be reported in order to call an outbreak a pandemic. As such, we follow the recent 
paper by Jordà et al. (2020) and select pandemic episodes with at least 100,000 deaths reported 
(see also Cirillo and Taleb, 2020). The list of pandemics is reported in Table 6.1. On 15 May 
2020, the death toll due to the COVID-19 pandemic was 307,000, a figure much higher than 
the minimum threshold used in this study.  
***Table 6.1*** 
We use patent data from the European Patent Office’s PATSTAT database (2016 Autumn 
Edition). We select data from 1900 to 2012 (approximately 21.5 million successful patent 
applications) as we drop the final four years to ensure that the data is relatively free of 
truncation bias (Dass et al., 2017). We focus on the set of G7 countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States). The bulk of global 
innovative activity is concentrated in those seven countries (see also Section 6.5 and Guloglu 
et al., 2012). We measure innovation as the number of successful patent applications per 
country.67 As a robustness test, we also reproduce the results using a sample of the top ten most 
 
67 In line with studies in the innovation literature (see Levine et al., 2017), we (i) identify the first time an invention 





innovative countries over the sample period (France, Germany, Korea, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, China, Switzerland, Austria, and Russia, hereafter T10).   
In Figure 6.1, Panel 1, we present the time series of the average number of applications granted 
for the G7 countries and the applications granted for the G7 as a proportion of total patenting 
activity. Equally, in Figure 6.1, Panel 2, we estimate the same time series for the T10 countries. 
Innovation output is rather volatile but remained at relatively similar levels until the beginning 
of the 1970s when Japan and China increased their innovation output. Interestingly, the slump 
in innovation activity in the 1970s and 1980s is related to innovation activity conducted by the 
former Soviet Union.  
***Figure 6.1*** 
 
6.4.2  Estimation methods  
We use a local projection estimator model introduced by Jordà (2005) to estimate the impulse 
response functions of pandemic shocks to innovation output. Local projection estimators are 
shown to produce more reliable forecasts over Vector Autoregression (VAR) models at 
medium to longer forecast horizons.  
In particular, Pope (1990) shows that the bias in the estimation of the autoregressive parameters 
increases as impulses are at longer forecast horizons. Additionally, VAR estimators require 
large lag length to produce reliable impulse responses (Kapetanios et al., 2007). Local 
 
application date is closer to the actual date of innovation and (iii) focus on utility patents only. We record the 
country of the invention using the Patent Authority that accepts the application of the original patent, See also the 




projection estimators are more robust to misspecification errors introduced by the data 
generation process by regressing the dependent variable vector at t+h on the information set at 
time t. Hence, a new forecast is created by each impulse horizon as compared to the use of 
iterant forecasting based on the same coefficient estimates from one VAR estimation. The loss 
of efficiency from estimating local projection impulse responses as opposed to using correctly-
estimated VARs, is low at medium to long-term forecast horizons (Haug and Smith, 2012). 
Furthermore, unlike VAR estimators, the nonlinear transformations of the estimated slope 
parameter are not required by impulse responses based on local projections. As a result, this 
approach can be better approximated by Gaussian distributions and thereby increase the 
coverage accuracy of impulse response confidence intervals. 
Our objective is to estimate the impulse response functions for innovation following a 
pandemic episode. We use a model-free or local projection estimator that allows us to estimate 
local projections sequentially h steps ahead (see Jordà, 2005; Jordà and Taylor, 2016) as 
follows: 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼𝑖
ℎ + 𝛽ℎ 𝑃𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙
ℎ𝐿
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +  𝐶𝑖
ℎ + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ℎ
ℎ ;                                         (6.1) 
for ℎ = 1, . . . , 15, and 𝐿 = 3        
Where Innovi,t-l is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of successful patent applications 
per year and for each country i. 𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡+ℎdenotes the innovation’s growth rate and is the 




dummy variable that is 1 if there is a pandemic start, 0 otherwise; Ci denotes country fixed-
effects. Three lags of innovation indicator are adopted as control variables.68  
Furthermore, we access the effect of pandemic shocks by sector of economic activity by 
estimating the following set of regressions: 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡+ℎ,𝑧 = 𝛼𝑖
ℎ + 𝛽𝑧
ℎ𝑃𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙
ℎ𝐿
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +  𝐶𝑖
ℎ + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡+ℎ,𝑧
ℎ             (6.2) 
In Equation (6.2) we estimate separate regressions by sector of economic activity, z. To this 
end, we use the existing statistical classification of economic activities for the European Union, 
NACE Rev.2, in order to categorise patents into three sectors: (1) manufacturing, (2) 
construction and (3) information and communication. NACE Rev. 2 is developed on the basis 
of the United Nations’ International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC Rev. 4). The first application recorded with NACE Rev.2 in the PATSTAT 
was submitted in 1845. It shows the weight of the association between an application and 
different technical fields. By using this, we are able to classify patents to one or more sectors 
based on their degree of association. Approximately, only 6.7% of patent applications (1.46 
million applications) do not have a sector classification.   
Finally, we investigate the effect of pandemic shocks to the number of patent applications. In 
particular, on PATSTAT, (i) we identify the first application of each invention, (ii) record the 
country of residence of its primary assignee (i.e., owner) as the country of the invention and 
(iii) focus on utility patents only.  
 
68 We choose the pandemic start date as we expect that the pandemic period is the most disruptive period for 




We examine (1) the next year effect of the end of a pandemic to the number of submitted 
applications and (2) the effect of the pandemic duration on next year’s number of submitted 
applications. To this end, we estimate the following regressions: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑛𝑑/𝐷𝑢𝑟
+ 𝐶𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1                                   (6.3) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1  denotes the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of submitted patent 
applications at year t+1 for each country i. 𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑛𝑑/𝐷𝑢𝑟
refers to the dummy variables of pandemic 
(𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑟) at time t. 𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑑 is 1 if there is a pandemic end, 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑟 is 1 if there 





6.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we provide the main results of this study and discuss policy implications. We 
start by investigating the effect of pandemic shocks on aggregate innovation output. Next, we 
classify patents by sector of economic activity and show the effect of pandemics separately for 
the manufacturing, construction and information and communication sectors. In the third 
subsection, we show the effect of pandemic shocks by country of award and in the final section, 
we demonstrate the effect of pandemic shocks on patent applications. Finally, given the 
ongoing COVID19 pandemic, we discuss some very important policy implications that stem 
from our research.  
 
6.5.1 Pandemic shocks and aggregate innovation 
In Table 6.2, we present our main results. The dependent variable is the change in innovation 
output. Each row refers to a separate local projection model with country-fixed effects. Three 
lags of innovation output are included in each regression (not reproduced here).  
The results presented in Table 6.2 show that pandemic shocks disrupt research productivity 
with effects being felt long into the future. Innovation remains relatively stable for 
approximately four years after the pandemic start. This result however is not surprising. R&D 
investments take several years to materialise,  so the relatively stable trend of applications four 
years after the pandemic start most likely reflects R&D investments that started before the 
pandemic had any effect on R&D projects. Subsequent innovation output is reduced for three 
years and,  overall, it takes approximately seven years for innovation output to return to pre-
pandemic levels. Clearly, the model provides more reliable forecasts of the long-run rather than 





In Figure 6.2, we produce the impulse responses of innovation output to a pandemic. The solid 
line refers to the pandemic coefficient value for h = 1,...,15 and the light and dark shaded areas 
refer to 70% and 95% error bands, respectively.  
The impulse response plots are striking. In a recent interview, Professor Bloom, Senior Fellow 
at Stanford’s Institute for Economic Policy Research, summarised the fears for a “slump in 
innovation” as follows: “The new ideas we are losing today could show up as fewer new 
products in 2021 and beyond, lowering long-run growth” (Gorlick, 2020). In line with this 
prediction, Figure 6.2 demonstrates that the effects of past pandemics on research productivity 
– and therefore on innovation output – are felt for approximately seven years from the onset of 
the pandemic. This result, whilst in line with the current expectations of the impact of 
COVID19 on economic growth, they show a much longer-term effect on innovation output that 
the one anticipated.  
***Figure 6.2*** 
 
6.5.2 Pandemic shocks by Sector of Economic Activity 
In this subsection, we present the results of the effect of pandemic shocks to innovation output 
by sector of economic activity (NACE Rev.2).69 We present the impulse response results in 
Figure 6.3.  
 
69 We do not report the regression results of the set of local projection estimator models by country in order to 
conserve space. The results are available upon request. We provide an interpretation of the impulse response plots 





In line with the main result, following a pandemic shock, innovation output remains unchanged 
for approximately four years, probably due to the lag between R&D investments and patent 
applications. Overall, the manufacturing and the construction sectors are immune to the 
pandemic shock. Importantly, our main result regarding the effect of pandemic shocks on 
aggregate innovation output is driven mainly by a significant reduction in the Information and 
Communication technology sector, a sector that depends more on research productivity than 
the construction and manufacturing sectors do.  
Overall, the results by sector of economic activity demonstrate that one-size-fits-all 
government policies that support innovation output may be inefficient as more research-
intensive sectors receive a disproportionately large pandemic shock. An allocation of resources 
to sectors that historically have a greater exposure to pandemics is likely to lead to a faster 
economic recovery.  
 
6.5.3 Results by country of award 
In this subsection we investigate the effect of pandemic shocks on innovation output by country 
of award. In the first part of the analysis, we establish that following a pandemic shock, global 
innovation outlook takes approximately seven years to recover. We present the results by 
country in Figure 6.4.  
***Figure 6.4*** 
There are some notable differences in the magnitude of the pandemic shock across countries 




considerably larger than the remaining G7 countries. Notably, innovation output in Canada is 
relatively more volatile than in the rest of G7. Whilst for the five of seven countries, the 
duration of the pandemic shock ie the time to recovery, is approximately seven years, for Italy, 
recovery is achieved after four years. On the other hand, innovation output in the UK remains 
at below pre-pandemic level for several years. Overall, the results by country underline the 
need for government initiatives that remedy the effect of the pandemic shock, especially with 
respect to the idiosyncrasies of the innovative sectors across countries. 
 
6.5.4 Effect of pandemic shocks on patent applications 
Finally, we investigate the effect of pandemic shocks and duration on patent applications. Even 
though the number of patent applications is likely to be affected by the applicant’s ability to 
submit patent applications rather than just the ability to develop new ideas, this measure 
ultimately reflects the short-term effect of pandemic shocks to innovation. We focus on the 
pandemic end rather than the pandemic start as the first year of the pandemic will most likely 
reflect the research productivity of the previous year. Also, as the HIV/AIDS pandemic has a 
very long duration, we drop HIV/AIDS from the measurement of the pandemic duration 
dummy. 
We present the results of the effect of pandemic shocks and duration on patent applications in 
Table 6.3. For robustness, we report the regression results for both the G7 and the T10 samples. 
Furthermore, we report the results with and without country-fixed effects.  
As anticipated, pandemic shocks lead to a short-term drop in the number of patent applications. 
This result is statistically significant at 1% for the G7 countries. For the T10 countries, the 




that the insignificant result for the T10 countries reflects the fact that (i) the most significant 
pandemic episodes happened at the start of the twentieth century and (ii) the G7 (T10) countries 
have tended to capture an even smaller (larger) proportion of the total patenting activity since 
the 1990s. Figure 6.1, Panels 1 and 2 demonstrate that T10 traces more accurately global 
patenting activity towards the end rather than the start of the sample period. Equally, pandemic 
duration is strongly associated with a drop in patent applications. In contrast to the regression 
results for the Pend dummy, Pdur is negative and statistically significant at 1% level for both the 
G7 and T10 samples.  
 
6.5.5 Policy implications 
The results presented in this section have very important policy implications. First, given that 
the pandemic poses a clear threat to research productivity in the long-run, policies that may 
reduce the effect of the “Great Lockdown” on research productivity are needed. Second, whilst 
the pandemic shock has an effect on global innovation output, the results vary by country and 
sectors of economic activity. The response to COVID19 needs therefore to have a global 
character70 but countries also need to introduce support schemes for the sectors that are more 
exposed to the pandemic shock. Overall, policies which target the more innovative firms are 
expected to remedy the effect of COV19 on future growth. Third, the pandemic shock is 
expected to have a strongly negative effect on patent applications. Governments, need to be 
prepared to support innovators in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. Patent offices may 
have to speedup the process of approving new patents. Bloom et al. (2020) show that “ideas 
 
70 The “Next Generation EU” support fund with a total value of €750B is such an example. The fact that the 
European Commission has also recommended changes to the long-term European Union budget for 2021-2027 is 




are non-rival”, meaning that “they can be used simultaneously by any number of people”. 
Supporting inventors and expediting the patent application process is therefore key in 
supporting economic growth. Finally, innovation output is significantly and negatively affected 
by the duration of the pandemic and it is therefore important to implement support policies for 





6.6 Robustness tests 
To further support our main finding that pandemic shocks disrupt innovation output for long 
into the future, in this section we check the robustness of our results. Overall, we obtain 
qualitatively similar results that are robust to the model specifications. In each subsection 
below, we outline the specifications of each robustness test. We present all robustness test 




6.6.1 Using the pandemic end date 
We first examine whether the effect of pandemic shocks on innovation output is robust to 
alternative pandemic date specifications. To this end, we re-run the baseline set of regressions 
and define 𝑃𝑡 as the dummy variable that is 1 if there is a pandemic end, 0 otherwise. The 
results are presented in Table 6.4, Panel 1. In Figure 6.5, Panel 1, we present the impulse 
response function of the effect of pandemic shocks to innovation output. 
  
6.6.2 Using the ten most innovative countries  
One criticism may be that the G7 countries are not representative of global innovative activity. 
To respond to this criticism, we estimate Equation 1 using the top ten most innovative countries 
over the sample period (T10). Figure 6.1, Panel 2, shows the average number of successful 
patents per country and the percentage of global innovation activity that is awarded to the top 




regression models in Table 6.4, Panel 2. In Figure 6.5, Panel 2, we present the corresponding 
impulse response function.  
 
6.6.3 Dropping the HIV pandemic 
With the exception of HIV, most pandemics are short-lived. For robustness we drop HIV from 
the list of pandemics as it did not have a distinctive outbreak and estimate Equation 1 again. 
We present the re-estimation results in Table 6.4, Panel 3 and in Figure 6.5, Panel 3. 
 
6.6.4 Use the patent owner’s country of residence 
Finally, approximately 31% of the successful patent applications do not mention the nationality 
of their applicants. In the main analysis, we used the country of the patenting office that is the 
first to accept the application of the original patent in order to classify patent applications per 
country. As a robustness test, in Table 6.4, Panel 4 and in Figure 6.5, Panel 4, we use the patent 
owner’s residential country as the country of the invention.  
Overall, the results in this section show that qualitatively the established relationship between 
pandemic shocks and innovation output remains the same, albeit statistical significance is not 
always consistent across samples and robustness tests. Nevertheless, the impulse response 
functions show that the main result still holds: following a pandemic, innovation output is 





A limitation of this chapter is that we do not distinguish between pandemic shocks and policy 
response shock caused by the pandemic. However, the government containment policies, such 
as social-distancing policy, are only imposed during the pandemic. Besides, they tend to cause 
less damage to the economy. For example, Goolsbee and Syverson (2020) find that while 
consumer traffic is reduced by 60 percent following the COVID-19 outbreak, only 7 percent 
of them is explained by the legal restrictions. The rest is mainly relevant to the individual 
choices, which due to the fears of infection. Besiedes, Sheridan et al. (2020) suggest that 
restriction law causes only a few drops in consumption, and the most reduction is due to the 
pandemic itself. However, it is true that these researches only focus on short-term impacts. 




6.8 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we employ an idea-based theory of economic growth in which growth is a 
function of both research productivity and the number of researchers. Given that pandemics 
pose a threat to research productivity, we use a local projection estimator to model the effect 
of pandemic shocks on innovation output.  
We show that following a pandemic, innovation output is disrupted for a period of 
approximately seven years, probably because of a drop in research productivity. Given that 
COVID19 is expected to be a major obstacle to research productivity, especially during the 
lockdown, the effects of the pandemic on future innovation output and subsequently on growth 
are expected to be felt for long into the future. The main result in the effect of pandemic shocks 
on aggregate innovation output is driven primarily by a significant reduction in innovative 
activity in the Information and Communication technology sector. In addition, there are some 
notable differences in the magnitude of the pandemic shock across countries and the time to 
recovery. Pandemic shocks lead to a short-term drop in the number of patent applications. 
Finally, pandemic duration is strongly associated with a drop in patent applications.  
This chapter contributes to the recent debate on the economic consequences of COVID19. It 
supports policies designed to reduce the effect of the “Great Lockdown” on research 
productivity. We recommend policies that have a global character, support innovators, speed 
up the process of approving new patents and target the more innovative firms. However, further 
research should delve deeper into the exact effects of COVID19 and the “Great Lockdown” on 




Table 6.1 Pandemic episodes since 1900 with at least 100,000 deaths 
Event Death toll Location Start  /End date 
Encephalitis lethargica pandemic 1.5 million Worldwide 1915-26 
Spanish flu 17-100 million Worldwide 1918-20 
Asian flu 1-4 million Worldwide 1957–58 
Hong Kong flu 1-4 million Worldwide 1968–69 
HIV/AIDS 32 million+ Worldwide 1981– present 
H1N1/09 virus 203,000 Worldwide 2009-10 





Table 6.2 Effect of a pandemic episode on innovation output 
Dependent variable: ΔInnovi, t+h 
h P L C N R2 
1 0.05 3 Yes 625 0.07 
 (0.06)     
2 0.12** 3 Yes 622 0.11 
 (0.04)     
3 0.06 3 Yes 620 0.12 
 (0.15)     
4 0.28 3 Yes 615 0.13 
 (0.16)     
5 0.15 3 Yes 608 0.18 
 (0.19)     
6 -0.32 3 Yes 602 0.22 
 (0.26)     
7 -0.6 3 Yes 594 0.26 
 (0.4)     
8 0.42** 3 Yes 586 0.27 
 (0.15)     
9 0.42* 3 Yes 578 0.29 
 (0.18)     
10 0.18 3 Yes 570 0.32 




11 0.50** 3 Yes 562 0.38 
 (0.16)     
12 0.51** 3 Yes 554 0.41 
 (0.15)     
13 0.58** 3 Yes 546 0.44 
 (0.18)     
14 0.66** 3 Yes 538 0.47 
 (0.23)     
15 0.68** 3 Yes 530 0.50 
 (0.27)     
Note: This table presents the results of the local projection model with country fixed effects and cluster-
robust standard errors. h refers to the number of years in the future. P refers to the start of a pandemic. 
Country fixed effects (C) and three lags of innovation output (L) are included in each regression (not 
reproduced here). Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 





Table 6.3 Effect of pandemic shocks on patent applications 
Dependent variable:    Ln(Innovationi,t+1) 
Sample G7 T10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PEnd -0.60*** -0.63***   -0.10 -0.09   
 (0.15) (0.15)   (0.28) (0.30)   
PDur   -2.24*** -2.34***   -2.24*** -2.24*** 
   (0.19) (0.19)   (0.23) (0.23) 
N 712 712 712 712 859 859 859 859 
Country 
FEs 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.002 0.114 0.074 0.193 0.001 0.102 0.060 0.166 
Note: This table presents the results of the effect of pandemic shocks on next year’s innovation 
output. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of submitted patent 
applications at year t+1 for each country i. 𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑛𝑑/𝐷𝑢𝑟
refers to the dummy variables of pandemic 
(𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑟) at time t. 𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑑 is 1 if there is a pandemic end, 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑟 is 1 if there is a 
pandemic, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 











Table 6.4 Robustness tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
h P R2 P R2 P R2 P R2 
1 
0.03 0.07 0.06* 0.10 0.05 0.07 -0.11 0.04 
(0.05)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.11)  
2 
0.03 0.11 0.10** 0.19 0.14* 0.11 -0.28 0.04 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.16)  
3 
0.21 0.12 0.14** 0.12 0.04 0.12 -0.54** 0.07 
(0.19)  (0.06)  (0.2)  (0.2)  
4 
0.04 0.13 0.17* 0.10 0.31 0.13 -0.39 0.08 
(0.19)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.23)  
5 
-0.56* 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.18 -0.58* 0.08 
(0.27)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.25)  
6 
-0.62 0.23 -0.45** 0.15 -0.46 0.22 -1.32*** 0.12 
(0.5)  (0.18)  (0.29)  (0.23)  
7 
0.39* 0.25 -1.01* 0.20 -0.83 0.26 -1.50*** 0.13 
(0.17)  (0.48)  (0.54)  (0.38)  
8 
0.45* 0.27 0.40*** 0.20 0.50** 0.27 -0.73 0.10 
(0.19)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.4)  
9 
0.49** 0.30 0.41*** 0.20 0.53** 0.29 -0.85** 0.12 
(0.18)  (0.1)  (0.17)  (0.29)  
10 
0.51** 0.33 0.41*** 0.22 0.19 0.32 -0.67* 0.11 
(0.2)  (0.12)  (0.49)  (0.3)  




(0.23)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.28)  
12 
0.58* 0.41 0.41*** 0.27 0.60*** 0.41 -0.47 0.13 
(0.27)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.31)  
13 
0.65 0.44 0.42*** 0.29 0.68** 0.44 -0.4 0.13 
(0.34)  (0.13)  (0.2)  (0.23)  
14 
0.61 0.47 0.40** 0.31 0.74** 0.47 -0.33 0.14 
(0.38)  (0.13)  (0.25)  (0.3)  
15 
0.57 0.50 0.40** 0.32 0.74** 0.50 -0.44 0.15 
(0.34)   (0.13)   (0.28)   (0.29)   
Note: This table presents the results of the robustness tests. We estimate a set of local projection models with country 
fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors. h refers to the number of years in the future. Country fixed effects (C) 
and three lags of innovation output (L) are included in each regression (not reproduced here). In (1), P refers to the end 
of a pandemic period. In (2), (3) and (4), P refers to the start of a pandemic. In (2), we reproduce the results using the 
top 10 most innovative countries over the sample period. In (3), we do not account for the HIV pandemic. In (4), we 
use the patent owner’s country of residence. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 




































































Note: In (1), the solid line refers to the average number of applications granted for the G7. The dashed line refers to the proportion of successful applications granted in G7 
countries as a percentage of total global activity. In (2), we replace G7 with T10. In (3), the solid line refers to the average number of applications submitted for the G7. The 




Figure 6.2 The impulse response of innovation output to a pandemic episode  
 
Note: The vertical axis refers to the percentage change to innovation following a pandemic episode. The shaded 
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Figure 6.3 The impulse response of innovation output to a 
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Note: The vertical axis refers to the percentage change to innovation following a 
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Note: The vertical axis refers to the percentage change to innovation following a pandemic episode. The shaded areas 











Note: The vertical axis refers to the percentage change to innovation following a pandemic episode. The shaded 
areas refer to 70% and 95% error bands. In (1), we use the end of a pandemic period. In (2), we reproduce the 
results using the top 10 most innovative countries over the sample period. In (3), we do not account for the HIV 
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Chapter 7 Thesis Conclusion 
In this thesis, we investigate factors that may impact on innovation activities from the 
perspective of financial literature. More specifically, by using an international sample, we 
consider both micro (firm-level) and macro (country-level) factors and discuss how they affect 
innovation performance. 
In Chapter 3, we merge the patent-based data from the PATSTAT database with firm account 
information from Datastream. It provides a more accessible dataset by which to investigate the 
relationship between financial markets and firm innovation from an international perspective. 
Compared with previous researches, this dataset includes patents from patent authorities 
worldwide rather than just USPTO. Thus, it is less like to underestimate the number of patents 
per company in non-US countries. In addition, we collect and calculate patent data in different 
countries with the same standard, which provides a basis for global innovation research through 
innovation outputs.  
In Chapter 4, we investigate the R&D-patent relationship from the perspective of stock 
liquidity. While stock liquidity causes a significant negative influence on firm R&D investment, 
it is much lighter than the impact on firm innovation outputs. Thus, we argue that although 
stock liquidity can affect firm innovation through R&D investment, the most impact of stock 
liquidity on firm innovation comes from the direct impact of stock liquidity itself. It emphasises 
the importance of stock liquidity on firms innovation performance and improves the 
understanding of the R&D-patents relationship from the perspective of stock liquidity. It also 
provides a basis for our next chapter that focuses on the impact of stock liquidity on firm 
innovation performance. 
In Chapter 5, we explore the relationship between stock liquidity and firm innovation 




liquidity on firms’ patent-based indicators. More specifically, we find that stock liquidity 
mainly contributes to a firm’s efficiency in producing high-quality patents rather than more 
patents. In addition, we assert that firms tend to produce more patents in larger economies with 
a higher level of international trading and economic freedom. These results provide evidence 
to policymakers in the financial area who expect to encourage innovation outputs through 
financial systems. In addition, public companies could be more confident to continue their 
R&D activities following policies that increase stock liquidity. 
In Chapter 6, we investigate the long-term consequences of pandemic shocks on innovation 
output and demonstrate that following a pandemic, innovation output is disrupted for 
approximately seven years. We show that the main result of the effect of pandemic shocks on 
aggregate innovation output is driven mainly by a significant reduction in innovative activity 
in the Information and Communication technology sector. Furthermore, there are some notable 
differences in the magnitude of the pandemic shock across countries and the time to recovery. 
Pandemic shocks lead to a short-term drop in the number of patent applications. Crucially, the 
duration of a pandemic has a strong effect on innovation output. Our results support the policies 
designed to reduce the effect of the “Great lockdown” on research productivity. Governments 
need to be prepared to support innovators in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic, and 
patent offices may have to speed up the process of approving new patents. In addition, we 
recommend adopting policies that target the more innovative firms as this is expected to help 
reduce the time it will take for innovation to recover from the effects of COVID19. 
Overall, we specifically emphasise the influence of two factors on innovation activities in this 
thesis. The first is stock liquidity. We provide a deep understanding of these factors by 
exploring how it affects innovation outputs and what impact it has on innovation performance. 
The second is the pandemic shocks. We provide an original view by which to analyse the 




innovation as a channel of exogenous shock. In terms of this, we show that financial systems 
could improve innovation performance by boosting its efficiency, such as increasing stock 
liquidity. It could also affect innovation activities as a channel of exogenous shocks.  
While we make several original contributions to this literature, several limitations should be 
noticed. Although patent-based data is widely used to represent innovation activities, this 
indicator shows several shortcomings (Becheikh et al., 2006).  First, not all innovators apply 
for patents to protect their innovation. Different sectors tend to have different patenting 
propensities and innovation cycles (Michie, 1998; Archibugi and Sirilli, 2000; Cao et al., 2015). 
Companies may choose other ways to protect their profits due to various reasons, such as high 
costs, week intellectual property right protection rules and cumbersome patenting procedures 
(Mansfield, 1985; Archibugi and Planta, 1996; Kleinknecht et al., 2002). For instance, Coca 
Cola holds its formula in the vault as business secrets. In this thesis, we include a series of firm 
and country characters, fixed effects, robustness test for specific industry and countries to 
control for heterogeneity in different firms and industries. Although we may not be able to 
figure out this problem completely, we believe these adequate control variables and robustness 
tests could lead to proper deduction applicable firms in different industries and countries. 
Besides, some researchers argue that innovation is the procedures of transforming invention 
into marketable products or process (Coombs et al., 1996; OECD., 1997; Flor and Oltra, 2004). 
They propose that the patent-based measurements may overestimate innovation outputs by 
including inventions that are not translated to products or process. However, the patent-based 
date is still difficult to be replaced in innovation research at the current stage. In particular, we 
are doing international research in this thesis. Patents are still one of the most direct measures 
of innovation’s extent and quality, and widely accepted by recent finance literature  (such as 
Chemmanur and Tian, 2018; Fang et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2015; Luong et al., 2017; Zhu and 




based surveys, to measure innovation activities, they subject to idiosyncratic bias and surveys’ 
answer rate separately (Archibugi and Planta, 1996; Archibugi and Sirilli, 2000). It is also less 
likely to construct the long term sample of these indicators for international study.  
In Chapter 4 and 5, we include the firm accounting information rather than corporate 
governance indicators. Although a growing body of literature demonstrates that firm 
innovation can be affected by ownerships (Battaggion and Tajoli, 2000; Lee, 2005) and human 
characters (Liu et al., 2017; Chemmanur et al., 2019; Chang et al., 2015), we do not include 
them as firm-level control variables. One of the reason is that we are restricted by the available 
data at Datastream. For example, Datastream only provides the current ownership structure of 
the company rather than recording the history of firm ownership transformation. We expect to 
include corporate governance indicators in future research to consider their impacts on firm 
innovation.  
For future research, this thesis recommends continuing investigation in finance and innovation 
fields. There are still few studies covering the impact of trading and exchange structures on 
firm innovation activities. For instance, derivative tradings are highly relevant to firms’ long-
term earnings (Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017). They could encourage employees to take the risk 
(Chang et al., 2015), improve information transmission about long-term investments (Blanco 
and Wehrheim, 2017). However, there are still few literature studies in this area. We expect to 
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